Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA260
2009-06-05 12:06:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/DG RACE: CAMPAIGN UPDATE FROM AMANO

Tags:  AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0010
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0260/01 1561206
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051206Z JUN 09 (CCY ADX74D831 ICMSI1882-623)
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9545
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0226
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 0151
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0044
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000260 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FIXED GARBLED TEXT)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: CAMPAIGN UPDATE FROM AMANO

REF: UNVIE 244 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
---------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000260

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FIXED GARBLED TEXT)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: CAMPAIGN UPDATE FROM AMANO

REF: UNVIE 244 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Taking stock in advance of the June 9 straw poll,
Japanese DG candidate Yukiya Amano provided Ambassador
Schulte an update June 5 of Japan's world-wide wide campaign.
The GOJ is pulling out all the stops on Amano's behalf,
including contacts by PM Aso and at the FM level. Among the
undecided, Japan counts Uruguay, Mexico, Germany, Ireland and
Romania, while the UK and Russia will not disclose their
position. Japan has received encouraging signals from the
Turkish FM but Turkey could still defect to Echavarri because
of Spain's support of Turkey's eventual EU accession. Japan
has also not given up on India and Argentina; PM Aso was
scheduled to call his Indian counterpart on June 2 and a FM
telcon with Buenos Aires is planned for June 8 or 9 (we
encouraged an earlier call.) PM Aso was scheduled to call
President Lula on May 27, PM Brown on May 28 and President
Medvedev on May 3O and to meet with Chinese President Hu
Jintao on June 7. FM telcons were also slated for Uruguay on
June 4 and Germany and Mexico on June 5. Amano did not have
readouts of these various calls. Japan's lobbying efforts
even extend to hard-core Minty supporters, including Egypt,
Cuba and Algeria, to support Amano in a "leading candidate"
vote or in the event of a Minty withdrawal; to date Japan has
not received a positive response. Japan had not been able to
send a high-level representative to the OAS Ministerial, but
Tokyo is dispatching high-level officials to Vienna; the MFA
Director General was just here and a Vice-Minister plans to
attend the opening of the June Board meeting. (Spanish FM
Moritanos will also be in attendance.)


2. (S) Ambassador Schulte updated Amano on U.S. efforts and

the responses we have received to date; he advised that
countries like Germany and Uruguay needed to be convinced
Amano could win. Japan reported that the Uruguayan
Ambassador did not have new instructions but Montevideo will
support either Amano or Echavarri if the vote shifts in their
favor. Ambassador Schulte shared the more cautious Uruguayan
line to us -- that Montevideo "is not in Amano's camp for
now." Ambassador Schulte reported that the Romanian
Ambassador had not been aware of continued U.S. or French
support for Amano, and was concerned about the lack of an EU
consensus. The Romanian Ambassador confirmed to us June 5
that he remains uninstructed. PM Aso also plans to call his
Romanian counterpart. Amano reported that Chinese Ambassador
Tang is characterizing U.S. support for Amano as a Bush
Administration position, a misrepresentation which Ambassador
Schulte assured would be rectified in our discussions in
Beijing and Vienna. End Summary.

Negative Campaigning
--------------


3. (S) From the discussion it was also evident that Amano's
continued focus is eliminating Spanish candidate Echavarri so
as to prompt an Amano-Minty rematch. He denied any negative
campaigning on his part but noted that Spain had embarked on
a "conquest" strategy focused on India, Russia, China and the
Latin American countries, and would seek to woo back the
Europeans in the event of a Minty withdrawal. The Spanish
have been telling others that if Echavarri made it through
the elimination rounds, he could win a runoff against Amano.
Amano sniffed that that Spanish Conquistadors may have been
able to do this five centuries ago, but Spain lacked the time
and capacity to implement such as strategy now. He also
accused Belgian candidate Poncelet of negatively campaigning;
making the rounds in Latin America, Poncelet has been
predicting that Amano will be forced to withdraw and only two
Europeans would be left in the race. (Comment: We continue
to assess that Poncelet has as little if any support; no one
has signaled that they would vote for him. End comment.) The
Mexican Mission has approached us in Vienna asking whether
Amano will withdraw if he does not do well in the straw poll.


4. (S) Ambassador Schulte and DCM encouraged Amano to keep to
the high road, and to make this a campaign about Japan's
support of the IAEA and Amano as the most qualified
candidate. This would be especially important after the
straw poll, they advised.
straw poll, they advised.

Straw Poll
--------------


5. (S) Ambassador Schulte also exchanged views on various
scenarios and public diplomacy for the June 9 straw poll.
Amano reported that both Poncelet and Petric have vowed to
stay in the race even if they get zero votes in the poll.
While the straw poll may not help winnow the field, Amano
said he fully understood that it will shape Board member
positions and perceptions about the race. The period after
the poll, DCM advised, and leading into the June Board will
be critically important as countries seek to interpret the
results and speculate on withdrawals. In dealing with the
press, Amano agreed with Ambassador Schulte about downplaying
the significance of the non-binding poll, given the
uncertainty of the result. Amano is taking a low-profile
approach and is avoiding press in advance of the poll; if
asked, he notes the strengths of all the candidates. Even
after the straw poll, whatever the result, Amano will avoid
being overly optimistic. Ambassador Schulte noted that the
negative impact of possible press narratives following the
straw poll -- that Amano's support has diminished since the
March vote (he will not get the 22 votes from March),that
new candidates are gaining ground or that Minty is holding
strong. Amano will not overstate his support and will focus
on the number 12 as the minimum number of votes a candidate
would need in the elimination rounds of formal voting to
ensure placement in the runoff.

Election Date
--------------


6. (C) In bilateral consultations June 4, the Board Chair
advised Japan that she plans to suggest a date before June 30
(her preference) for the election but expects objections.
She was prepared to countenance delaying a day or two, i.e.
circa July 1-3, and seeks to conduct the election over two
days without long intervals so as to preserve the "integrity"
of the vote. Japan indicated flexibility to the Board Chair
on this date, and did not insist on having a day or two
hiatus between rounds of voting since there are both pros and
cons to such a hiatus. Ambassador Schulte said that he would
urge the Board Chair to set a date for the election at the
conclusion of the straw poll, as he had recommended in a June
3 WEOG meeting. Japan had encouraged the Board Chair to
announce the date "just after" the straw poll.
SCHULTE