IAEA: SECOND ANALYTIC TRAINING SESSION PROVIDES

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000251

SIPDIS

IO FOR A/S BRIMMER, IO/T, ISN/MNSA FOR RCOCKERHAM, NCPC FOR
KSTROH, ISN FOR RNEPHEW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2034
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA: SECOND ANALYTIC TRAINING SESSION PROVIDES
NEW EVALUATION TOOLS TO SAFEGUARDS INSPECTORS

REF: A. 08 UNVIE 00564

B. MONGIELLO-NEPHEW E-MAIL 9/12/08

C. FERNANDEZ-COCKERHAM E-MAIL 12/5/07

D. 01 STATE 026438

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D)


1. (S) Summary. In response to a continuing request from the
IAEA Safeguards Department for assistance in improving its
analytic methods, the National Counterproliferation Center
(NCPC),with the close support of CIA's Sherman Kent School,
sponsored training for IAEA Safeguards officials in analytic
tradecraft techniques from 30 March through 1 April 2009 at
IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The course (the second
running since mid-November 2008) introduced another group of
Safeguards Department's open-source analysts, inspectors, and
trainers to rigorous analytic methodologies. Safeguards
officials hope for continued U.S. support in offering this
course several times a year in order to adequately address
the long-term needs of the Safeguards Department and to
continue to reinforce and "transform the safeguards culture"
from solely nuclear material accountancy to a state-level
analytic approach. The IAEA's feedback for this course, like
that of the prototype running in November, was extremely
positive.


2. (S) Mission endorses the need for a multi-year training
effort and requests the support of the Department, CIA/DI and
its Sherman Kent School and the National Counterproliferation
Center in addressing the course needs and frequency. End
Summary.

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IAEA's Interest in Analytic Training
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3. (S) As noted in Ref A, the Director of Safeguards
Information Management Division (SGIM),Jacques Baute,
requested U.S. assistance from Ambassador Kenneth Brill,
Director of NCPC, in November 2007 to train the IAEA
Safeguards Department in analytic tradecraft and techniques.
SGIM provides the Department of Safeguards with services
relating to data processing, secure information distribution,
information analysis and knowledge generation necessary for
the IAEA to draw independent, impartial, and credible
safeguards conclusions. Separately, DDG for Safeguards Olli
Heinonen in early September 2008 also expressed interest in
receiving such training, and later relayed this interest to
Ambassador Brill in Washington D.C. on September 12 (Ref B).
Heinonen put the request in context, noting the current IAEA
practice of framing its safeguards assessments in terms of
analyzing whether all available information is "consistent,"
"not inconsistent," or "inconsistent" with claims made by the
inspected party. He would like to see an evolution in
safeguards methodology that helps shift the burden of proof
when verification questions arise from the IAEA to the
inspected party. He requested assistance in training his
staff on confidence levels in assessments and information
credibility, and in the consistent use of risk assessment
terminology. (Comment: This training provides an excellent
opportunity for the USG to establish a common assessment
vernacular with the IAEA.) These points were emphasized by
Baute and the Section Head for Safeguards Training,
Jean-Maurice Crete, at the completion of the first round of
analytic training who both referred to the effort as a means
of "transforming the culture of the IAEA" to encourage
analytic support to inspection missions and reporting.

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Analysis Workshop - 30 March-1 April
--------------


4. (S) Before the workshop, and following from lessons
learned during the initial the November 2008 running, Mission
worked closely with the IAEA and Department of State, NCPC,
and the Sherman Kent School to fine-tune the training(Ref C).
U.S. contractor Norman Green, from the Sherman Kent School
for Intelligence Analysis, developed and again presented the
bulk of the analysis workshop for the IAEA. He was supported
by Kevin Stroh from NCPC as a co-instructor. (Comment: For
the purposes of the training course, Green is described only
as a U.S. contractor/trainer and Stroh as a State Department
officer, in keeping with past precedent.)


5. (S) The workshop addressed the IAEA's requests to ensure
students have an enhanced understanding of the nature of
collaborative analysis and the role that structured analytic
methodologies can play in testing key analytic assumptions,

challenging "group think" and gaining insight into complex
issues. Based on the highly positive feedback from the dozen
IAEA officials who attended the course (representing
inspectors from OPS sections, analysts from SGIM),as well as
post-workshop reviews with IAEA management, there was clear
consensus among IAEA participants that the training is
hitting the mark in helping to enable the analytic culture
the Agency seeks to further develop.

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Course Material: A Work in Progress
--------------


6. (S) To continue to evolve and refine the course, the IAEA
requested adjustments to the course content to increasingly
emphasize actual analytic experiences derived from
case-studies of real-world proliferants. For example,
MsnOff, Stroh, and Baute recalled an Iraq Retrospective
Exercise done for the IAEA in December 2000 (Ref D) in which
Stroh and other USG participants shared actual case study
materials and analyses with IAEA officials at that time.
Safeguards officials also offered to draw on their inspection
information and experience as another potential source of
data to construct further case study applications for the
analytic techniques in the workshop.

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Comment and Next Steps
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7. (S) The IAEA has identified this training as a top
priority for enabling its safeguards cadre to enhance
strengthened safeguards implementation. Mission sees
U.S.-provision of this training as an invaluable catalyst for
prompting discussion with senior Safeguards officials of
further adjustments to IAEA safeguards and training
implementation in support of achieving the U.S. objective of
stronger IAEA assurances about the absence of undeclared
nuclear activities. For example, our provision of this
course has provided the vehicle for prompting the IAEA to
begin to move toward reviewing its safeguards training
curriculum to inculcate the analytic ethos throughout.
Mission strongly recommends continued long-term U.S.
provision of this training course, and requests Department
consider (including with NCPC or others as appropriate) means
for funding the conduct of this course 2-3 times per year.


8. (S) The Mission strongly endorses the continued
participation of Green and Stroh in this training effort,
particularly given Green's deep training skill and Stroh's
IAEA and Iraq-relevant background that could be drawn upon
for the next course running, nominally requested for this
summer and that could include a reprise of sorts of the
earlier Iraq analytical case study.


9. (S) Gabriela Fernandez (IAEA section, 43 1 31339 4823,
FernandezGA@state.sgov.gov) is the Mission's POC for this
activity.
SCHULTE