Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA244
2009-05-27 16:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/DG RACE: BOARD MEETS THE FIVE CANDIDATES

Tags:  AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0244/01 1471643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADX6DC81F MSI0173 - 648)
O 271643Z MAY 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9505
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0221
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 0146
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000244 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA 2 CLASSIFICATION

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: BOARD MEETS THE FIVE CANDIDATES

REF: UNVIE 209 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000244

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA 2 CLASSIFICATION

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: BOARD MEETS THE FIVE CANDIDATES

REF: UNVIE 209 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) The five DG candidates each performed respectably at
the informal Board session May 26 with no clear winner (full
text of remarks emailed to Department.) Japanese candidate
Amano tailored his intervention for G-77 consumption,
highlighting that the IAEA should not be a nuclear watchdog
but fulfill a "dual role." Amano's delivery was much
improved. Minty gave the most personable presentation,
harkening back to his childhood under apartheid and as a
champion of South African disarmament, but he did not come
across as someone who thought he could win. The substance of
interventions by the three new European candidates was
similar to those they made to the Western European and Others
Group (WEOG) earlier this month (reftel). Spanish candidate
Echavarri and Belgian Poncelet presented themselves as
serious contenders and Slovenia's Petric did not rule himself
out. In what may be an illustrative comment, Brazilian
Ambassador opined privately that both Echavarri and Poncelet
were persuasive and either would make an "acceptable" DG. To
us, Echavarri was the more compelling of the two, drawing as
he had with the WEOG on his 20 years of interaction with the
IAEA. Echavarri also referred to Spain's experience as
illustrative of the fact that a country does not need ENR
technology to have nuclear power. During the Q&A, Australia
asked a question intended to allow Amano to burnish his
nonproliferation credentials, while an uncharacteristically
restrained Iran asked about the Agency's shortcomings. In
one response, Minty cited over-reliance on laboratories in
advanced countries and the need to develop capacity
elsewhere. Notably, none of the five candidates addressed

the hard nonproliferation cases of Iran and DPRK, though
Amano deeply regretted the DPRK's nuclear test. After the
meeting, candidates made their campaign pitches to a gaggle
of international press, which asked about Iran. Echavarri
noted that while this was a matter for the UNSC, Iran should
not miss the opportunity for negotiations. Echavarri told us
privately the next day that the Iranian Mission in Madrid had
complained about these remarks.


2. (C) On the margins of the meeting, there continued to be
persistent expectations of a stalemate, a feeling that the
"real" DG candidate had yet to come forward, and rumors that
ElBaradei could be asked to extend his term. (Note: The IAEA
Statute stipulates a four year term for the DG. End Note.)
The straw poll, now scheduled for June 9, will be the first
concrete indicator of the candidates' support, though the
fact that it is non-binding will taint the result. An
unconfirmed date of July 2 or 9 is being floated for the
election, apparently to placate the new candidates pushing
for as late a date as possible. UNVIE advised the
Secretariat that July is too late and contrary to the Board's
"intent" in the procedures to make the appointment by June
"at the latest." Echavarri has argued for holding the
election in July to help Board members consolidate behind a
consensus candidate in this round. End Summary and Comment.

Amano Plays to the G-77
--------------


3. (C) Beginning in alphabetical order with Amano, the
candidates each had 10 minutes to make presentations. Having
learned from experience, Amano promised not to "bore" Board
members by recapitulating his March presentation but focused
on specific areas and shared his "vision" for the Agency.
Prior to the meeting, he had warned us that his statement
would be tailored to the G-77. Amano highlighted his
extensive experience on disarmament issues as useful to the
position of IAEA Director General and deeply regretted the
DPRK's nuclear test. He emphasized that Technical
Cooperation "deserves more attention" and better financing,
citing the example of cancer therapy, which he proposed be
the subject of the 2010 Scientific Forum. Amano also argued
that the IAEA was "well placed" to assist countries seeking
nuclear power and committed to "concrete progress" in this
domain within four years to break the perception that nuclear
technology is only for developed countries. Turning briefly
to safeguards, Amano made a strong pitch for the urgency and
importance of modernizing the Safeguards Analytical
Laboratory (SAL),noting Japan's contribution of 6.9 million
Euros.


4. (SBU) Amano concluded by sharing his vision for the
Agency, arguing that it was "inaccurate" to view the IAEA as
a "nuclear watchdog." Rather, the IAEA must balance a dual
objective of promoting peaceful use of nuclear technology
along with nonproliferation. Amano also stressed that he was
well placed to reduce North-South tensions and his role as a
consensus builder. To fulfill his vision of a
"dual-objective organization," he emphasized the need to set
achievable, short term targets (such as making progress on
nuclear infrastructure within four years) and to improve
management. He pledged to be an impartial, reliable and
action-oriented Director General.

Echavarri Touts Experience
--------------


5. (SBU) Echavarri began by stating that it would be an
"honor" to succeed DG ElBaradei, who had vested the Agency
with authority and credibility. Echavarri's vision for the
IAEA was of an objective and independent organization,
qualities he also ascribed to the role of the Director
General. As to the political vice technical role of the DG,
Echavarri emphasized the DG providing a factual basis for
political judgments but not playing a negotiating role. He
also noted that the DG should serve all countries. Echavarri
cited his combination of technical and political experience
in this regard. Among the IAEA's priorities, he saw
technical cooperation as fundamental and supported regular
budget funding. Echavarri argued that without safety and
security there would be no future for nuclear power, but he
did not support mandatory international standards. As to
nonproliferation, he stipulated that implementation of the
NPT was a core IAEA function and every country should have a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.
In addition, he supported innovative approaches to the fuel
cycle, including multinational enrichment centers and fuel
banks. He also noted that the IAEA was not a party to
disarmament negotiations but could be asked to play an
implementing role.


6. (SBU) For the IAEA to be an efficient and effective
organization, Echavarri emphasized management as the crux.
He shared a high regard for the professional staff based on
his 20 years of experience working with the IAEA, but saw
room for improved coordination and clarification of
objectives. Echavarri concluded by citing his political,
technical and managerial expertise as making him well
prepared for the position of DG. He pledged to serve only
two terms.

Minty Gets Sentimental
--------------


7. (SBU) Minty thanked the African Union for its support
going into this new phase of the election. He hoped to
measure up to DG ElBaradei and saw impartiality and integrity
as imperative for the IAEA Director General. Minty
highlighted South Africa's leadership on disarmament,
nonproliferation and arms control issues and his own
prominent role since the 1960s. He harkened back to
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in calling for disarmament. Minty
focused on technology transfer and technical cooperation, but
also saw strengthened safeguards and nuclear safety as
indispensable. Relating an anecdote from his youth in
apartheid South Africa about standing outside a library while
a white teacher brought him books on nuclear issues, he
emphasized access to nuclear knowledge and placed education
and training high on the new DG's agenda. Although the IAEA
is not a development agency, he said, technical cooperation
is a core activity. The IAEA also had a complementary (i.e.,
verification) role to play in disarmament, as it did in South
Africa or potentially it may have on a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT.) He further emphasized the need for
human and financial resources so as to not allow IAEA
infrastructure to collapse. Minty concluded by resuming his
prior campaign positions that the political role of the DG
not be under-emphasized or over-emphasized, favoring
consensus in an inclusive and comprehensive manner, and
focusing on the promotion of nuclear energy or "atoms only
for peace."

Petric the Underdog
--------------


8. (SBU) Casting himself as the underdog, Petric apologized
for not being in the position to visit capitals. He shared
his vision of the IAEA as encompassing two main orientations
"a great hope and a great fear" and identified his
priorities. Petric saw the IAEA as a complex and sensitive
agency and an important part of the UN System. While the
IAEA was mainly a technical body, Petric opined that it would
be "naive" to ignore that Board decisions have political
implications and that the Director General could not just be
a technocrat or bureaucrat. He attributed the success of the
IAEA in all of its main pillars to the work of the
Secretariat and ElBaradei's leadership. Among the
priorities, safeguards was the most important and needed a
solid legal basis (through the AP and CSAs) and technical and
human capacity. He stressed the need for cooperation by all
states, to include those that have safeguards issues. He
advocated mandatory international safety and security
standards but stressed that these be developed in partnership
so as to not be seen by others as an obstacle to joining the
nuclear club but as a "win-win." Beside the complex of
safety, security and safeguards Petric noted a common
interest in technical cooperation as "two sides of the same
coin." Respecting the fact that TC was the number one
priority for some countries was important to build confidence
and gain their cooperation in other matters, he advised. He
would not specify support for regular or voluntary funding
for TC. Petric cited multilateral fuel supply as a final
priority and recommended greater involvement by potential
beneficiary countries to mitigate their concerns.


9. (SBU) Petric also explained the thinking behind his
candidacy, noting that Slovenia had no interest in the DG
position but had nominated him to help the Agency overcome
the March impasse. He underlined that he would be a
consensual and independent DG not beholden to any national or
regional interest and counseled against picking someone who
would be "divisive from the beginning." Petric pledged close
cooperation with the Board and to spend most of his time as
DG in Vienna. A final commitment to serve one term since it
was up to the Board to re-elect him or not in four years,
elicited a chuckle from several Governors.


10. (C) In a private conversation with Ambassador Schulte
after the Board meeting, Petric noted the importance of the
straw poll and speculated that if Minty does not fare well,
he, Petric, may get some of his support. Ambassador Schulte
reiterated U.S. support for Amano and observed that Minty
supporters could also gravitate to another European
candidate. He cautioned that despite Petric's performance
and qualifications, he may not get any votes in the straw
poll, in which case his government would need to reevaluate
his candidacy.

Poncelet the Francophone
--------------


11. (SBU) The last to speak, Belgian candidate Poncelet
offered the Agency strong leadership and consensus on the
Belgian model. He noted his technical, political and
multilateral experience and stressed that he was not an
industry lobbyist, having stepped aside from his position at
Areva upon being nominated. Poncelet's platform consisted of
promotion of nuclear energy consistent with the "3 S's"
(safety, safeguards, security). He noted that building
nuclear infrastructure would not happen overnight and
required a long-standing effort and international support.
Poncelet emphasized sensitivity to the Agency's
nonproliferation mission and the DG's duty to report verified
and multi-source information to the Board in a timely manner,
so that the IAEA Board and UNSC can make the political calls.
He also focused on nuclear safety, including encouragement
of binding international standards and support for newcomers
in developing regulatory frameworks it took advanced states
decades to establish. Poncelet also called for deeper
cooperation and funding for nuclear security -- the only one
of the candidates to mention prevention of nuclear terrorism
-- and human and financial capital for safeguards, in
addition to legal authorities. The Board Chair cut Poncelet
off before he could address technical cooperation. Though a
bit long-winded and lacking in broad vision, Poncelet
performed respectably and augmented his delivery by switching
into French.

Candidate Q & A
--------------


12. (SBU) Australia opened the Q & A by asking about the
Agency's watchdog role and strengthening the nonproliferation
regime, a question which gave both Amano and Minty an
opportunity to highlight their long experience on
Nonproliferation. Minty cited securing an indefinite
extension of the NPT at the 1995 Prepcom and his work on a
NWFZ in Africa. Echavarri noted that his 35 years of
experience on nuclear power included attention to
nonproliferation, and he held up Spain as a model for nuclear
power without ENR technology sending a message to the world.
He also reiterated support for all states having CSAs and APs
and noted the need for accurate, objective and timely DG
reports on verification issues, which he was well equipped to
deliver given his experience managing technical experts.
Petric could not say that he had personally contributed to
nonproliferation but cited the Agency's successes and
shortcomings (Iran, DPRK) and the need for CSAs and APs,
safeguards technology and manpower. Poncelet gave a similar
answer about helping the Agency apply nonproliferation rules
including through technology, intelligence, imagery and
information gathering.


13. (SBU) In an uncharacteristically short and
non-provocative question, Iran asked about the Agency's
shortcomings, a question also asked by the UK. Mexico also
asked about concrete measures to improve Agency financial
management. Poncelet supported budget saving through
increased efficiency while recognizing that the IAEA was
asked to undertake new responsibilities. He suggested
learning from industry best practices and streamlining
management of the TC program in particular. Petric committed
to management as his first priority and proposed an internal
study within six months of taking office. He acknowledged
the precarious financial situation of the IAEA in a time of
financial crisis but suggested a five to six year
stabilization plan rather than a "big jump" in the budget.
Minty focused on the "critically important" need to improve
technology transfer to the developing world, including via
synergies with other international organizations and
anti-poverty programs. He further suggested that in lieu of
using laboratories in advanced countries, the Agency should
promote building centers of excellence in the developing
world. Echavarri did not support change for change's sake
but from his 20 years experience with the IAEA he saw a need
for greater clarity of objectives and horizontal
cross-fertilization between departments. One of the first
things he had done at the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency was to
formulate a strategic plan that resulted in a 10 percent
budget cut and 20 percent reduction of staff, he noted; the
reformed agency, he said, had performed so well that member
states gradually expanded it to beyond the size from which he
originally cut it. Amano returned to his overall theme of
the IAEA's biggest "shortcoming" being the fact that it is
perceived as a nuclear watchdog rather than a "dual purpose"
organization as stipulated in the Statute. He also cited the
failure to set achievable objectives in defined timeframe,
and repeated his commitment to renovation of SAL, cancer
therapy and making progress on building nuclear
infrastructure within four years.

Mr. Plan B Says He's in to Win
--------------


14. (C) In a private May 27 lunch with the Ambassador and
DCM, Echavarri reiterated his message that "my agenda is your
agenda" and argued that he was much better positioned than
Amano to heal the rifts inside the IAEA board and advance the
U.S. agenda at the agency. Ambassador made clear that the
U.S. is supporting Amano at the highest levels, but also
sought to probe Echavarri on his own intentions. The Spanish
candidate stated that he would be pleased with 4 or 5 votes
in the initial rounds, and suggested he might even get as
many as ten by picking up "2 or 3 Latins, 2 or 3 in Europe,
and 2 or 3 among Russia, China and India." Echavarri departs
May 28 for Moscow, Beijing and Delhi, and then plans visits
to EU capitals, followed by a long swing (after the June 9
straw poll) through Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador,
Cuba, Mexico, Canada and hopefully the U.S.


15. (C) Echavarri argued that Minty's sole agenda at this
stage is to block Amano and indicated his hope that the South
African could be persuaded to drop out of the race at some
point this summer. Echavarri argued for the latest possible
polling date, indicating he needs more time to make his case
as a consensus candidate. He was untroubled by the other two
European candidates, and expected them to drop out early,
with a good possibility in his assessment of a head-to-head
Amano-Echavarri final round. Echavarri said that it all
depends on the United States; if we shifted our support fro
Amano to him, he argued, many would follow.


16. (C) Echavarri reported that ElBaradei had offered him the
position of Deputy Director General for Safeguards ("before
that Finnish guy") with the promise that it would set him up
to run as ElBaradei's successor. Echavarri recalled that he
turned down that offer because he expected it would draw him
into conflict with ElBaradei over the content of safeguards
reports on Iran (where Echavarri argued for the IAEA to call
it straight). He ruled out any deal between Spain and Japan
over IAEA leadership positions, and indicated that if he is
not elected DG he will return to the NEA with the hope of
eventually securing a senior position in the Spanish
government.


17. (C) Comment: Echavarri came across as extremely confident
and committed to stay in the campaign for as long as it
takes. Although he did not share any specific commitments,
he was optimistic that he would pull down enough votes in the
early rounds to prove his viability as a consensus candidate.
"I know I must break Amano," he added, "but if I can win a
few the rest will crumble." Ambassador offered to convey
Echavarri's proposal to visit Washington around the end of
June, but also noted that we have rebuffed other such
requests. Mission recommends that we defer any decisions on
how to handle this request until after the June 9 straw poll,
which will provide insight into Amano's likelihood of
success.


SCHULTE