IAEA Symposium on Nuclear Security Relates Terrorism Threat

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000240

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA
NA-20 LOONEY, NA-20.1 KOONTZ
NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS, NA-25
HUIZENGA/VOGLER, NA-24-WHITNEY/GOOREVICH/PERRY/O'CONNOR/LAMONT AGNE
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA Symposium on Nuclear Security Relates Terrorism Threat
to Nuclear Power Expansion


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The IAEA Nuclear Security Symposium, attended by
over 500 participants representing over 90 countries, dealt with
issues involved in protecting nuclear and other radioactive
materials from the hands of criminals and provided a forum for
discussions with nuclear security counterparts. The Symposium took
place against the backdrop of renewed interest in nuclear power,
current efforts to develop a Nuclear Security Plan guiding the
IAEA's interim nuclear security priorities, and increased concern
regarding the need for greater nuclear and radiological security
worldwide. The Department of Energy National Nuclear Security
Administration's Ken Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, led the U.S. delegation to the
Symposium and held meetings with counterparts from South Africa,
Canada, and Jordan, as well as IAEA Deputy Directors General Waller,
Heinonen, and Sokolov, and Office of Nuclear Security Director
Nilsson, and with World Institute for Nuclear Security Executive
Director Roger Howsley. Ambassador used the opportunity to engage
counterparts from over three dozen Vienna missions, in an official
dinner and separate afternoon gathering, on mainstreaming nuclear
security in the IAEA organization and budget. End Summary.


2. (U) The Symposium on Nuclear Security was convened 30 March to 2
April at IAEA headquarters in Vienna by the IAEA in cooperation with
the European Police Office, INTERPOL, the Joint Research Centre,
European Commission, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN Counter Terrorism
Task Force, the United Nations - Office on Drugs and Crime, the
World Customs Organization, the World Institute for Nuclear Security
(WINS),the World Nuclear Transport Institute. The following report
focuses on USDEL interactions in the symposium and in bilateral side
meetings, in the sequence they occurred.

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South Africa Open to Pelindaba Visit
--------------


3. (SBU) DoE/NNSA Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator Baker
thanked South African IAEA Governor Abdul Minty for the successful
recent cooperation in export controls/Commodity Identification
Training. Baker also noted his hope for expanded bilateral nuclear
and radiological security cooperation, stating for example that the
U.S. has converted several HEU-fueled research reactors to LEU fuel
and would be interested in sharing our lessons learned in this area
with South Africa. Baker also offered to explore radiological
physical protection cooperation, especially in light of the upcoming
2010 World Cup, and mentioned recent domestic partnerships with the
University of Pennsylvania and several other universities.


4. (SBU) Minty noted the success in the area of export control with
the NNSA and stated that he would like to continue to proceed
trilaterally (with Argentina and the U.S.) in this area. He
responded by saying the South African Government was very interested
in reactor conversion and would like to see more information on the
topic. (A February 2009 U.S. nonpaper on nuclear and radiological
security assistance was presented to the South African Mission for
Minty on the topic on April 1.) Minty also said that an MOU with
the U.S. was ready for signature in the area of nuclear energy
collaboration; however, there seemed to be a delay now. He noted
that the South African resources are currently stretched due to work
on the pebble bed reactor, but that cooperation remains a priority.



5. (SBU) Minty then turned to the issue of security at Pelindaba.
Minty said that he and his staff have searched for a formal request
from the U.S. regarding concerns the U.S. has about security at
Pelindaba and have not been able to turn up any such request,
although he stated that often such communications go directly to the
concerned Departments, bypassing the MFA. (NOTE: Later in the
conversation Minty repeated that USG should send relevant
communications directly to his attention in the MFA. End Note.)
Minty stated that he was unaware the U.S. had documented such
concerns. He added that in his discussions with former Acting U/S
John Rood, he was told that the U.S. had concerns initially but was
satisfied with South Africa's efforts. Minty said he set up two
meetings with Ministers for Ambassador Schulte after inviting him to
South Africa, however, the ambassador had been unable to travel due
to conflicting commitments. Minty stressed that he has no problem
with U.S. officials coming to Pelindaba at any time, and that he was
very eager to clear up any concerns that the U.S. may have about the
facility and would ensure that he himself was present during any
such visits. Minty then went through a description of the break-in
and pointed out that the only item taken, a notebook, was left at
the gate. He also stressed that the intruders were on the


commercial side of the site and were nowhere near the site's
"nuclear perimeter." The one concern he did have was allowing the
television crew film access and filming rights to so much of the
facility during the "60 Minutes" segment; for security purposes he
might have done that differently in hindsight.


6. (SBU) Minty said he is very open with the U.S. He recalled he
had worked with us immediately on the AQ Khan network issue and
reminded that his country got two successful convictions. (He
observed that Pakistan is very upset with South Arica for the
prosecutions.) Minty stated that he is not very happy with other
countries' results, but he is satisfied with the U.S. interactions.
He feels some "developed countries" that were involved with the
investigation did not behave as well. (Note: Minty regularly
complains about Germany in this regard.) Minty believes that the
networks are out there and the only way they can be cracked is by
working together. He is happy that the IAEA is beginning to collect
information on networks from public sources, but he feels the
missing link is that the chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
needs to set up a system so that when a country gets an export
request and subsequently denies export, it should be reported both
to the government and the IAEA. (Note: the NNSA team did not
comment on this reference to NSG denial sharing.) He has pressed
for the 1540 Committee to look at networks; however, he indicated
that since South Africa is not on the Security Council anymore there
is no movement. (Interestingly, Ambassador Minty stated during this
conversation that he has never said that "nonproliferation and
disarmament must be balanced," because "nonproliferation is
critical.")


7. (SBU) On the topic of shipments from ports in South Africa, Minty
said that there must be more advanced notice on ships coming in.
Five days is not enough notice to get information through the
internal system. He said there is a cluster of ministries and
interagency level meetings, and it takes several weeks to approve
these types of shipments. Minty went on to thank the U.S. for the
cooperation.

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Canada Emphasizes Global Partnership Agenda
--------------


8. (SBU) Baker thanked Troy Lulashnyk for Canada's close cooperation
with NNSA on nuclear threat reduction initiatives. Lulashnyk said
that cooperation between the U.S. and Canada is incredible and very
successful because we have similar visions. Canada feels that NNSA
is a leader in this business of international nonproliferation
cooperative activities, with 1-2 billion dollars spent on these
efforts through DOE/NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
and Second Line of Defense (SLD) programs alone; Lulashnyk feels we
are winning most of the fights. He stressed that Canada is excited
about the new Administration's vision and is interested to see how
this vision is developed and operationalized. He indicated that
Canada can help back up this vision with money; the challenge (per
Lulashnyk) is to get other countries on board. Lulashnyk noted that
the G-8 pledged $20 billion in 2002 but there is a question in
Canada's mind on how you get the Europeans and Japan to do more.
Lulashnyk also emphasized his view that expanding G-8 efforts beyond
Russia and the FSU is a priority, and that the new challenge for
Russia was "training and sustainability." Lulashnyk closed by saying
again that Canada is willing to help now and in the future with
funding and it was important to have others step up and also
contribute.

--------------
IAEA DDG Waller Defends PSC, Appeals for SAL
--------------


9. (SBU) Baker raised the issue of the IAEA's newly instituted
Program Support Costs (PSC) with IAEA Deputy Director General (DDG)
for Management David Waller. Baker pointed out our disagreement
over the application of PSC had held up NNSA's recent extrabudgetary
contributions (Aprx 4M USD) to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund.
Specifically, Baker requested greater transparency regarding the use
and application of the PSC. Waller said that the 7 percent PSC is
now necessary because the Agency is "cross subsidizing" due to the
huge growth of extra-budgetary contributions; current administrative
services were being squeezed in supporting extra-budgetary
activities, which is not proper in his view because there are also
regular budget activities that need to be addressed. Waller pointed
out that the IAEA is the last major international organization to
introduce a PSC, and that most UN organizations have had them for
years at an average of 13 percent, not 7 percent. Waller said he

understands that transparency is important and noted that, while it
is impossible to account for "every dime," the Agency can generally
explain what is done and stood ready to do so. He stressed his hope
that this issue not "bleed" into the Program and Budgeting Committee
meeting in April.


10. (U) Baker mentioned that a GTRI contribution ($1.5 million) was
recently exempted from the PSC under a "grandfather" clause, and
that NNSA was hopeful that a Second Line of Defense contribution
($1.2 million) similarly could be exempted since the funding and
scope of work was agreed to with the Agency prior to July 2008.
Waller responded that if there is strong evidence that the money and
scope of work was agreed to prior to July 2008, exemption should be
possible. When Baker inquired as to the PSC's application to Cost
Free Experts (CFE),Waller confirmed that the PSC will be added to
contributions unless the CFE is in a service area within management
to support the administrative burden from extra-budgetary
contributions. He also said the one procurement manager that the
U.S. does fund is priceless, however he currently only works on
support programs. (Comment: Mission is pursuing a separate
clarification of PSC rates for CFE's.)


11. (SBU) Waller then turned to the issue of the IAEA Safeguards
Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and required funding for its operation.
Waller noted that there is a 20 percent increase in operations at
SAL and that there is an urgent need for funding for infrastructure
and other upgrades. He said that a total of 40 million Euros is
needed for SAL. Baker responded that NNSA (in concert with DOS)
would look into this issue.

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Making the Case to "Mainstream" Security
--------------


12. (U) On March 30, to conclude day one of the symposium,
Ambassador Schulte hosted Ambassadors or DCMs from Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Romania, and Russia at dinner
with NNSA's Baker, Andrew Bieniawski and Dave Huizenga, IAEA DDG
Waller, and the Office of Nuclear Security's Anita Nilsson and Tim
Andrews, plus UNVIE notetakers. Ambassador Schulte opened with a
few words on the IAEA 2010-2011 budget proposals, specifically the
increase in regular budget support for the Office of Nuclear
Security. He acknowledged the impact of the global financial crisis
that had occasioned the recent G-20 summit, but asked those around
the table to imagine the global economic impact of terrorists
detonating an improvised nuclear or radiological device. Against
that backdrop he emphasized the importance of mainstreaming nuclear
security within the IAEA and how the 2010-2011 budget starts the
process. He then asked DDG Waller to comment further.


13. (SBU) Waller noted that the Secretariat's 2010-2011 proposals
are not just budgets, which refer only to price tags, but they
reflect the program activities that the Secretariat believes Member
States expect to be carried out. Waller acknowledged a delicate
political balance must be maintained among IAEA programs. He said
the nominal budget increase of about 20 percent aimed at (a) meeting
statutory requirements on the Agency that have grown with the
expanded use of nuclear energy in all forms around the globe and (b)
correcting shortfalls in investment that resulted from years of
"unrealistic" zero real growth treatment. Getting a regular budget
increase for nuclear security was also crucial, Waller said, as the
program's activities related to the gravest threat we commonly face.
He argued the ONS was in an untenable position; relying on
uncertain and irregular extra-budgetary funding resulted in
cherry-picking for projects and, at times, too much funding for some
and zero funding for others. Waller pointed out that the current
2010-2011 budget proposals would leave nuclear security reliant for
66 percent of its resources from extra budgetary funding in 2010 and
50 percent in 2011. This is in contrast to the 95 percent extra
budgetary portion of the budget in 2008. Waller said the budget is
the Agency's Secretariat giving its best advice on where money
should be spent. As a citizen and a tax payer, he said, he fully
supports zero growth in other international organizations; however,
no other international organization has regulations to implement or
mandates to push forward like nuclear safeguards. In his view, it
is not possible to implement these activities responsibly with zero
growth.


14. (SBU) NNSA's Ken Baker echoed that we need to all together work
to address the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. He
emphasized the need for multilateral support and adequate support to
the IAEA. He also mentioned that it is difficult for the Agency to
plan for the long term utilizing only voluntary contributions and

that the Agency needs to focus on such an important issue as nuclear
security and be able to sustain momentum over the long term.


15. (SBU) Waller pointed out that the 2008 regular budget for
nuclear security was only 1.1 million Euros; very little can be done
in this important area with this regular budget. Ambassador Schulte
argued the need for nuclear security to be a core function and
showed two charts that give perspective to the relative increase for
nuclear security as compared to technical cooperation. Bieniawski
also said that it is important to put stability into the Agency's
process of nuclear security.


16. (SBU) Romanian Ambassador Feruta commented there were many valid
arguments that nuclear security programmatic activities should be a
core part of the regular budget. He noted that nuclear programs are
expanding due to the current nuclear energy renaissance, and any
flaws or accidents could mean a disaster for all nuclear activities.
All countries need to match commitments made for nuclear energy
development. This is an activity where time is of the essence even
though there is the financial crisis. Romania agreed that this is
an investment worth making and his Mission would advocate this view
to Bucharest.


17. (SBU) French DCM Gross said France shares similar objectives in
nonproliferation and thanks the U.S for stepping forward with $10
million for the Global Partnership. France also wanted to thank
Russia for all the work on upgrading their facilities. However, it
is clear in France's view that if $20 million was put into the
Agency that they would not have the where-with-all to use the money
effectively, and having Russia was essential in this process.
France argued that the Agency must be able to absorb the proposed
increase in funding in operations, and Paris did not think this is
possible. Gross noted the Agency had $120 million of Technical
Cooperation Fund (TCF) resources invested in government bonds that
in France's view could be borrowed against if there is a shortfall
elsewhere. (Comment: France underestimates the political resistance
this would face from G-77.) Waller countered that the Secretariat
had no standing authority to borrow and that a specific Board
decision would be required; borrowing from the TCF reserves was
likely to be politically challenging, he observed.


18. (SBU) German Ambassador Luedeking praised Anita Nilsson and her
work in nuclear security and sustainability. However, Germany has
an issue with the 2010-2011 budget increase overall and with the
optics of a 600 percent increase for nuclear security. It is
virtually impossible to agree with an increase of this magnitude, he
said. Germany favored that funds be sought elsewhere, for example
as proposed by France (borrow against TCF money). Germany agrees
that nuclear security should be a core function and that 5 percent
of the regular budget is not right, however, the program had to be
increased within an overall zero growth policy. Anita Nilsson then
mentioned that her office is currently in the red and there is no
additional funding. There are activities that are being cancelled
due to the shortfall.


19. (SBU) Japanese DCM Nakane stated that there are still
contributions that have not been used for countries like Kazakhstan
and should be considered as additional funding. Japan also noted
that 70 percent of the budget is spent on personnel and not
implementing activities, and they understand that a major part of
the regular budget increase in nuclear security will be used for
personnel. Japan also felt as though it was important to encourage
the G-77 to support the increase; however all should realize that
the increase is drastic. Ultimately, Japan shared the opinion that
nuclear security is an important activity for the Agency and they
would think about the best way to achieve the goal of increasing the
nuclear security budget.


20. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte then asked the group to share their
thoughts on how to get the G-77 to agree with the nuclear security
increase, particularly since a majority of the Office of Nuclear
Security missions benefit G-77 countries. Germany responded that it
is difficult because the feelings are so deep along ideological
lines of what the IAEA should be focused on, i.e., the G-77 feel
that TC is "theirs" and propagate the view that nuclear security is
a preoccupation of the industrialized countries. Nilsson then
pointed out the 75 percent of the 22.9 million Euros spent in 2008
went to low-income countries (including Central Asia and Eastern
Europe). Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy mentioned that the
consequences of not implementing nuclear security have never really
been realized. In Russia's view, member countries do not feel as
though there is a real threat; there is a need to make countries
interested in getting assistance, but it may take years to persuade

them. It is also necessary for the Ministries of Finance to
convince their countries it is important by funding nuclear security
activities.


21. (SBU) Canadian DCM Wood said that progress has been made in the
area of nuclear security and we have been successful. Canada
supported the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) becoming part of the
regular budget from the very beginning and that extra budgetary
funds are used to focus on higher and more immediate threats.
However, Canada expressed it is not realistic to try to fix all the
problems in one biennium budget; it may take several biennia to fix
the problem. Also, it is not helpful to discuss the issue of
nuclear security being balanced with other parts of the Agency; it
should be thought of as a more holistic, better integrated Agency if
nuclear security is a core mission. In addition, Canada feels it
does not get a full accounting from the Agency Secretariat and
pointed out that the Safeguards budget was under-spent by 5 percent
in 2008. That said, Canada does agree that nuclear security should
be a core part of the Agency.


22. (SBU) Netherlands DCM Coppoolse noted that The Hague had
supported nuclear security becoming a part of the regular budget
four years ago. She recalled specifically that her own first
intervention in an IAEA Board meeting on instruction had addressed
three items: safeguards noncompliance on the part of Iran, promotion
of women in the Agency, and getting the NSF in the regular budget.
On convincing the G-77, Netherlands feels that going through the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is the best
route. The Netherlands does have a concern with the overall budget
increase of 23 percent and thinks there needs to be a more creative
way to increase the budget, which should be discussed in the EU and
Geneva Group.


23. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte then suggested doing a GICNT event in
the developed world. Canada mentioned that there is also a question
of the future of the GICNT, Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(GTRI),and Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Baker said
that GTRI's budget has gone to up significantly and that the
nonproliferation program in the National Nuclear Security
Administration could rise to $3 billion in U.S. FY-2010. Bieniawski
also pointed out that with many of these programs are being
implemented in G-77 countries.


24. (SBU) Waller suggested that it would be good to get testimonials
from countries on what is being done in the area of nuclear
security. He also pointed out that regularizing the budget helps
make Cost Free Experts (CFE) regular staff and thereby increases the
degree of confidentiality and helps retain expertise within the
organization. Waller then said it is not possible to enhance the
Agency within the existing budget. He has been at the Agency for
sixteen years and it cannot be done this way and it is not a viable
option.


25. (SBU) Germany said it seems that nuclear security is being held
hostage by the overall budget and an increase in one area creates a
larger appetite in other areas as well and that is the ultimate
problem. Nilsson thanked everyone warmly for their input on the
future of nuclear security at the Agency. She pointed out that ONS
wants to continue with voluntary contributions as well and wants to
focus regular budget funding on long term activities such as
publishing guidance documents. When all the funding is directed
towards hard security (physical protection upgrades),soft security
items cannot be funded (recommendation and guidance documents). She
pointed out that the practical realities of the G-77 must be
separated out from the budget discussions. It is the case that from
a programmatic level the G-77 countries do want the support of ONS,
however, due to the funding situation, it cannot happen fast
enough.


27. (SBU) Ambassador closed the discussion, adding that
sustainability is also an important factor in nuclear security and
that the culture of security should be just as important as the
safety culture. He agreed that it would be impossible for the
Agency to administer all these programs alone; however, there are
key niches within the Agency and many countries want to only deal
with the UN or IAEA flag. He agreed we need to get the G-77
countries discussing the benefits of nuclear security through the
Missions in Vienna and also begin using the GICNT to promote nuclear
security.

--------------
DDG Sokolov on Nuclear Power Promotion
--------------



28. (SBU) IAEA DDG for Nuclear Energy Yury Sokolov noted the
long-standing good working relationship that his office has with
NNSA. He stated that since (former UNVIE Energy Attach) Anne Starz
took a regular IAEA staff position, he hoped the U.S. would provide
another CFE to his office to work on that portfolio.


29. (SBU) In response to Baker's query on the application of Project
Support Costs (PSC) and its impact to Sokolov's department, Sokolov
said that there is no simple answer. He noted that even "in house"
there is not a unified view and that the case-by-case application of
PSC to extrabudgetary projects actually started years ago. He said
he understood from a management and administrative point of view why
cost recovery through OSC was necessary.


30. (SBU) Sokolov then turned the discussion to the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP) and stressed his personal belief that this
is a very positive initiative. There is no other forum currently
available for collecting ideas at the ministerial level annually.
He feels this forum should not be used to report on small activities
but to bring principal activities to broad notice. Sokolov
mentioned that the Agency supports 53 countries without nuclear
power, whereas GNEP is only supporting 10-15; he stated that on one
hand GNEP is a good forum but on the other had it has very small
outreach. Sokolov noted that it is important that countries
interested in nuclear power need to start with an effective program,
not immediately be introduced to the "Three S Concept" ( Safety,
Security, Safeguards). He feels this concept should be integrated
into the program and not pulled out as a separate concept.


31. (SBU) Hans Forstrom on Sokolov's staff then mentioned the
research reactor at the Vinca Institute in Serbia, noting that the
European Commission recently committed an additional $5 million for
the nuclear fuel to be returned to Russia.

--------------
Joint IAEA Office Nuclear Security (ONS)and NNSA Activities
--------------


32. (SBU) Anita Nilsson began by stating that the first drafting
meeting for the new 2010 Nuclear Security Plan would be held in
April 2009, with a focus on core group activities that can be used
by all countries, transport security of nuclear and radiological
material, and the categorization of radioactivity.


33. (SBU) Nilsson asserted that the PSC issue is currently
"crippling" her operations, as her funding was being held up. She
said a solution to the 7 percent PSC must come soon or she will have
to begin cancelling activities. State ISN/MNSA foreign affairs
officer Cockerham emphasized that the PSC needs to be transparent,
and an explanation should be given as to why the funds need to go to
management and not program implementation. Nilsson commented that
an explanation of the PSC was already developed and the DG has
decided the path forward. Regarding additional funds to ONS, Nilsson
noted she would like to have more flexibility in how funding is used
and examine having an account that can be spent down over a period
of time. In addition, she hopes that if the 2010-2011 IAEA budgets
are adopted, she will have more regular budget funding allocated to
ONS and be able to do more long-term planning and hire more regular
staff (citing the importance of maintaining the necessary
geographical balance).


34. (SBU) Baker inquired as to Nilsson's estimated timing for
completion of the revision to IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4. Nilsson
seemed to imply that her office required a larger role in this
revision effort, noting how much had been done via the "Core Group."
She noted that there were some "conceptual" issues to be resolved,
specifically: 1) the appropriate level of detail in the guidance and
2) the interface between radiological-related documents (e.g., the
issue of irradiation, which is still being discussed.)


35. (SBU) Nilsson also noted her satisfaction with recent NNSA-ONS
cooperative activities, specifically a security sustainability pilot
project with GTRI. She also noted that she would like to add
modules on Trigger List and dual-use commodity ("equipment")
recognition to ONS's counter-illicit smuggling/nuclear security
courses, and requested NNSA assistance in that area. The NNSA team
pledged to take that back to appropriate staff within the Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security for response.

--------------
Dr. Jamal Sharaf Director General,
Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission

--------------


36. (SBU) Baker noted Jordan's strong regional leadership on
nonproliferation, and Jordan likewise praised the cooperative
relationship. Jordan especially noted the successful partnership
with the Second Line of Defense program, stating that Jordan hopes
to cover additional 2-4 border crossings (perhaps 2 on the Syrian
border and 2 on the Saudi border). Jordon also mentioned that
Jordan is looking at constructing a "mini" HAMMER facility within
the region, possibly as an elaboration of the Cooperative Monitoring
Center in Amman, and similar to the HAMMER facility at the
Department of Energy's Hanford Site. Jordanian officials requested
NNSA support on this issue. He noted that Jordan feels establishing
such a facility in the region is important due to the difficulty of
getting U.S. visas for stateside training; with a Jordanian
facility, he stressed, key GCC participants from Lebanon, Egypt, and
elsewhere would not require visas. Jordan said they also talked to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) about establishing a
facility in the region, and noted that they would like to have
access to use NARAC facilities for environmental monitoring
activities. Baker noted the NRC and NA-40 (Adm. Krol) as the
appropriate POCs for these issues and said that he would take this
back to Washington.

--------------
Briefing with Missions
--------------


37. (U) A NNSA briefing was given by Baker, Bieniawski and Huizenga
to several Missions (Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan,
Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay,
Vietnam, Pakistan, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Australia, Saudi
Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Russia,
UK, Mexico, Turkey) on NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative and
Second Line of Defense activities. Participant response was
positive, with one foreign representative suggesting that there is
only one global threat, and that is "terrorism." The group was
impressed with the various activities NNSA has underway throughout
the world and praised U.S. efforts overall in this area.

--------------
World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) cooperation with NNSA
--------------


38. (SBU) Roger Howsley, Executive Director thanked NNSA for its
support of WINS and updated on efforts to build WINS support,
stating that WINS is recruiting staff and currently looking at 2 or
3 permanent positions, then other positions in the coming months. In
addition, WINS is working to indentify/recruit Board
Members--particularly in Russia, France, Japan and Argentina.
Howsley expects that the Board would physically meet once a year,
and would hold several other meetings via telephone.

--------------
Comment
--------------


39. (SBU) The IAEA's nuclear security efforts are undertaken in the
framework of four-year Nuclear Security Plans approved by the IAEA's
Board of Governors. The next plan, covering 2010 -2013, is in
preparation and it is important that the U.S. press the IAEA to
adopt a systematic approach that identifies core-long-term
activities, emphasizing the sustainability of nuclear and
radiological security improvements. Furthering this goal is the
incorporation of IAEA security activities into the regular budget;
this could reduce exposure of nuclear security activities to the
uncertainty of voluntary contributions and most importantly brings
the nuclear security activities of the IAEA into the Agency's
mainstream.

SCHULTE