PAKISTAN - IAEA AND UNODC EFFORTS TO HELP GOP COUNTER

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000208

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/ECC, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA
DOE FOR NA-20 LOONEY, NA-20.1 KOONTZ,
NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS,
NA-25 HUIZENGA/VOGLER,
NA-24-WHITNEY/GOOREVICH/PERRY/O'CONNOR/LAMONT AGNE
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN
ISLAMABAD FOR DOE - DALTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC PTER KNNP ENRG TRGY IAEA KCRM SNAR PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN - IAEA AND UNODC EFFORTS TO HELP GOP COUNTER
NUCLEAR TERRORISM

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has several
ongoing activities with Pakistan that deal with nuclear and
radiological security, training, regulatory development, safety, and
equipment certification. Another Vienna-based International
Organization, UNODC, is engaged with Pakistan in port and container
security. UNODC continues to lobby for U.S. support for the
container program, specifically an in-kind contribution of C-30
kits. The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security (ONS) has been working
with Pakistan, particularly the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory
Authority (PNRA),on activities related to security of nuclear and
radiological material. To date, the IAEA has been unable to gain
knowledge about specific locations of radiological sources in
Pakistan. An ONS trip planned for June, at Pakistani invitation,
will aim to improve IAEA's information on source locations and
types; Mission is emphasizing to ONS the importance of improved
awareness of vulnerable sources. The IAEA activities outlined in
Para 2-11 include the work that is being done directly with Pakistan
and training events Pakistani officials have attended. This
catalogue of activities is intended as a baseline for those in
Washington and Islamabad looking at questions of nuclear security in
Pakistan. End Summary.

IAEA Nuclear Security Activities in Pakistan
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2. (SBU) Joint IAEA-PNRA Project: "Development of National Program
of Sustainable Development in Nuclear Security through education,
training and supply of services."
This activity involves training on developing nuclear security
regulations and supply of nuclear security equipment in accordance
with the IAEA support plan. Activities included in this task aim to
create a pool of Pakistani nuclear security specialists, trained in
physical protection of radioactive sources, nuclear materials and
facilities. Another important goal is to qualify a large group of
operators and regulators from Pakistan to use modern detection and
radionuclide identification equipment to combat illicit trafficking
of radioactive materials.


3. (SBU) The IAEA-PNRA Partnership Program for Human Resource
Development in the field of Nuclear Security.
This project focuses on developing a national capacity to implement
PNRA's Nuclear Security Action Plan through training courses,
on-the-job training, fellowships, scientific visits and technical
advice for establishment of training laboratories and procurement of
equipment. The program includes an effort to increase the number of
PNRA junior staff trained in IAEA Incident and Emergency Center and
Nuclear Security Equipment Laboratory activities.


4. (SBU) Safety and Security of Research Reactors (RR) under Project
and Supply Agreement (PSA).
This activity assists Pakistan in the assessment of nuclear safety
and security status of the PSA reactors and associated sites,
including their physical protection, and identification of issues on
operational and regulatory levels. The IAEA and Pakistan are also
discussing HEU-to-LEU conversion and spent fuel return problems.
The IAEA has a plan under development for better coordination of
IAEA assistance for upgrading safety and security systems of
research reactors. The final version of the IAEA Technical
Assistance Plan is expected to be completed by the end of 2009.


5. (SBU) National Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Facilities and Materials for Pakistani participants, Beijing, China
in December 2008.
This course trained participants in the physical protection of
nuclear facilities and materials and promoted understanding of the
methodology used in establishing an effective national physical
protection program. Twenty participants from PNRA and other
relevant organizations of Pakistan participated.


6. (SBU) Establishment of a mobile laboratory in Pakistan for
responding to radiological incidents.
This project will design and equip one PNRA vehicle with the
necessary detection and response-related equipment for responding to
radiological incidents. A PNRA team visited France in January 2009.

A French CEA team was expected to visit Pakistan in April 2009 to
follow up.


7. (SBU) Detection Equipment for PNRA's Nuclear Security Action
Plan, Phase I.
This project provided a set of basic radiation detection equipment,
which is now available with PNRA for use. Some of the equipment
will be used by front line officers to combat illicit trafficking at
the northern borders of Pakistan and the remainder will be used at
the PNRA's nuclear security training center in Islamabad.


8. (SBU) Detection Equipment for PNRA's Nuclear Security Action Plan
- Phase II.
This project will provide a set of basic radiation detection
equipment for the implementation of PNRA's Nuclear Security Action
Plan. Following the agreement with PNRA, the required equipment and
specifications were agreed by PNRA and the IAEA. The equipment was
procured, tested, accepted and shipped to Pakistan.


9. (SBU) Establishment of Nuclear Security Equipment Training,
Certification, Maintenance, Repair Laboratory at the PNRA Nuclear
Security Training Centre, Islamabad.
This prospect supports PNRA in building capacity for training,
certification, maintenance and repair of detection equipment used in
combating nuclear terrorism. A proposal for training,
certification, and maintenance of a repair lab for radiation
detection equipment for the PNRA Nuclear Security Centre, Islamabad,
has been prepared by PNRA and is being finalized.


10. (SBU) Illicit Trafficking Information Management and
Coordination Workshop, in Sri Lanka, September 2008.
This workshop was focused on strengthening states' capacities to
combat nuclear trafficking through enhanced information management
and coordination. The workshop was hosted by the Sri Lankan Atomic
Energy Authority and attended by 25 representatives of regulatory
and law enforcement agencies from Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The IAEA held bilateral meetings with
delegations on the margins of the workshop to discuss outstanding
issues related to information cooperation. The workshop
substantially improved participants understanding of the ITDB
processes and reporting requirements, which should result in the
improved reporting in the future.


11. (SBU) Regional Workshop on Nuclear Material Accounting and
Control at Facilities, Jakarta, Indonesia in November 2008.
The purpose of this training course, which included Pakistani
participation, was to provide concepts and technology focusing on
national obligations to establish and strengthen state systems of
nuclear material accountancy and control (SSACs) and physical
protection arrangements, to account for and control nuclear material
in the State, and to contribute to the detection of possible losses,
or unauthorized use or removal of nuclear material.

UNODC Activities in Pakistan
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12. (SBU) The UNODC Container Control Program is currently working
in Pakistan on several activities relevant to nuclear smuggling. A
Project Document was signed by involved Pakistani agencies and UNODC
in September 2007. The Pakistan program has been rolled into a
wider subregional program covering Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan (ECO countries). UNODC
agreed to establish Port Control Units in Karachi, Port Qasim and in
seven dry ports (Torkham, Chamman/Quetta, Sust, Lahore, Sambrial,
Faisalabad and Multan),since the dry ports are linked to the
seaports in the national transport network. A technical needs
assessment was completed for the seaports of Karachi and Port Qasim
and the dry ports in Lahore, Faislabad and Sambrial. The remaining
dry ports have not been assessed due to the security situation not
allowing UN staff to visit these places.


13. (SBU) The training program commenced in January 2008 with a
three-week theoretical training workshop completed in Dubai. UNODC
(in coordination with the World Customs Organization) trained 38
officials from the Pakistani Customs and the Anti-Narcotic Force
(ANF). There are ongoing negotiations between Pakistan Customs, ANF
and UNODC about the establishment of Port Control Units (PCUs),
establishment of the Steering Committee, procurement of equipment

(UNODC) and the Government contribution. UNODC/WCO assisted in
establishing four PCUs (2 Customs units and 2 ANF units) at Karachi
and Port Qasim, equipped with with basic search and safety
equipment, computers etc. Training was also undertaken in the use
of the information sharing mechanisms (ContainerComm). The IAEA
Office of Nuclear Security has been involved in the Pakistan
project, including in nuclear/radiological training at all the
seaports and dry ports. Law enforcement officials working in these
locations will be trained by the IAEA in a similar manner to UNODC
training on drug-related matters.


14. (SBU) In 2009, there was follow-up practical training in
January (19 officials trained) and March (14 officials trained).
The units are currently fully operational (equipped and trained) and
working based on modern methodologies in the area of profiling of
containers. All four units have been operational since March 2009.
UNODC is currently planning for a Work Study Tour for selected
officials to the container port in Antwerp (16 officials) in May and
for the initial theoretical training in Lahore for "dry port
officials," tentatively scheduled to take place in July 2009.
Additionally, follow-up training in Lahore is targeted for October

2009.


15. (SBU) There is also ongoing procurement of technical equipment
- some of the equipment through headquarters and some through the
UNODC office in Islamabad. However, UNODC has faced problems in
procuring HazMatId kits and therefore continues to lobby for a U.S.
in kind contribution of C-30 kits. According to UNODC officials, a
contribution of C-30 kits (www.sasrad.com/products/ct30.htm) would
greatly assist in accelerating the pace of the training program in
Pakistan. Currently, Canada remains the largest donor
(approximately U.S. $2 million) to the UNODC container training
program in Pakistan. Given the growth of the program there, UNODC
now faces a shortfall of approximately U.S. $1 million. Note: The
European Commission has fully funded (approximately U.S. $3 million)
the UNODC's related regional training programs in Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, Iran, and Kazakhstan. Canada has also partially funded
the Turkmenistan portion of the program (approximately U.S.
$500,000),but currently a shortfall of approximately U.S. $500,000
remains. End Note.

Comment
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16. (SBU) As indicated above, IAEA/ONS and UNODC activities in
Pakistan are extensive and currently cover several aspects of
nuclear and radiological security. Assessing the quality of the
training and materials ONS is providing to Pakistan and the overall
benefits of the cooperation is impossible from Vienna, and we would
welcome views from Islamabad and Washington. ONS informs us it will
undertake a trip to five radiological sites (current locations
unknown) in June; Mission will pursue more information about the
location of radiological sources with which IAEA is concerned after
that trip. Meanwhile, as the U.S. currently provides no funding for
the UNODC container control program, an in-kind contribution of C-30
kits for use in Pakistan would send a much needed positive signal
regarding our support for the program. End Comment.

SCHULTE