UNODC HIGHLIGHTS URGENT FUNDING NEEDS FOR IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000173

SIPDIS

INL FOR TOM WILLIAMS, S/SAGSWA FOR DENNIS ROSS, S/SAGSWA
FOR ALEX DEHGAN, NEA FOR TODD SCHWARTZ, S/P FOR JILLIAN
BURNS, S/P FOR PETER HARRELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2023
TAGS: PREL IR KNNP PA SNAR AF
SUBJECT: UNODC HIGHLIGHTS URGENT FUNDING NEEDS FOR IRAN
PROGRAM

REF: A. UNVIE VIENNA 00117

B. UNVIE VIENNA 00172

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (c) and
(e)


1. (C) Summary. Presenting on the status of their
programs in Iran on drug demand reduction, drug supply
reduction, and rule of law efforts, UNODC officials on April
15 argued that most of their programs with Iran have been
successful, but the overall program remains seriously
underfunded, putting its continuation at risk. Iranian
Ambassador Soltanieh added his own plea for international
cooperation with Iran to combat the narcotics trade,
especially through the provision of much-needed equipment to
Iranian counternarcotics forces, noting that the drug issue
is a "shared responsibility." The Washington-approved U.S.
presence at the meeting was also appreciated, including by
Iran. End Summary.

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Iran Programs Successful but Underfunded
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2. (U) UNODC Chief of the Co-Financing and Partnership
Section Johann Weijers kicked off an April 15 presentation of
the UNODC's country program on Iran by expressing
satisfaction with the growing support for a regional approach
to the counternarcotics issue in Afghanistan and an honest
admission that the meeting was a "fundraising event" as will
be a May meeting of the ambassadors of the mini-Dublin Group
in Tehran, which will be chaired by the Director General of
Iran's Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ).


3. (SBU) Roberto Arbitrio, head of UNODC Europe and
Central/West Asia office, and the head of UNODC's office in
Tehran for several years, described three elements of UNODC's
Iran programs: partnership, a regional approach, and the
Triangular Initiative. According to him, the partnership
comprised the mini-Dublin Group, the Iranian DCHQ, the Health
Ministry, and NGOs. He also briefed the group on the
successes of supply reduction initiatives, including the
March 8 tri-border counternarcotics operation which was part
of the Triangular Initiative (see Refs A and B). He
stressed that the lessons learned session to evaluate where
improvements could be made in cross-border cooperation would
probably take place in late April and said he recognized that
the outcome of this session would be important for the
development of initiatives for bilateral support.


4. (U) Iran desk officer and Paris Pact Coordinator
Antonino De Leo began his presentation by praising the
success of drug control efforts in Iran and noted that this
is due both to UNODC-sponsored efforts and Iran's own
prioritization of the issue. Iran told UNODC that it spends
600 million dollars each year on interdiction efforts and
drug control and treatments and that the DCHQ coordinates the
efforts of about 13 Iranian ministries that are dealing with
the problem. De Leo illustrated the magnitude of Iran's
domestic problem by citing some remarkable statistics. UNODC
estimates that 50 percent of opium produced in Afghanistan is
trafficked to or through Iran and over 60 percent of Iranian
inmates are in prison for drug-related offenses. However, De
Leo noted that this represents a 33 percent reduction in the
number of people imprisoned for drug offenses, presumably
since 2007. He also highlighted that Iran is very advanced
in its study of drug addiction and displayed a quarterly
Iranian publication on drug addiction studies. In addition,
there is regional recognition of Iran as a leader in drug
demand reduction. Consequently, delegations from the region,
and more broadly across Asia, often go to Iran to learn from
its programs. Although De Leo sees Iran's work with reducing
drug demand in its prison population-including the
introduction of methadone maintenance treatment and
HIV-control programs-as respecting prisoners' rights, he
noted that it is important both to promote the adoption of
international standards in Iran as well as exporting Iranian
best practices.


5. (U) De Leo also reported successes in rule of law
programs, including support to the process of reviewing the
Iranian anti-narcotics law based on UN conventions, a draft
bill on the promotion of alternatives to imprisonment that is
currently being reviewed by the Majles, support to the

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development of Iran's law against money laundering that was
adopted in January 2008, the establishment of a financial
intelligence unit in Tehran, and Iranian ratification of the
UN Convention against Corruption.


6. (U) De Leo gave the specifics of UNODC's funding needs
for Iran, noting that the program funding had fallen far
short of the UNODC's budget from 2005 to 2008, especially in
funding for drug supply reduction (six million dollar
shortfall) and drug demand reduction (approximately a five
million dollar shortfall) programs. Rule of law program
funding came much closer to meeting budgetary needs. Current
and future programs are also in "urgent" need of additional
financial support, according to De Leo. UNODC drug supply
reduction activities currently are only funded to 42 percent,
drug demand reduction programs are funded to 17 percent, and
rule of law efforts have received 74 percent of the needed
funding (slides from UNODC's presentation that detail Iran
programs needing funding and the amount of funding passed in
Hall-Williams email). De Leo noted that they needed between
four and five million dollars to maintain its level of
activities in Iran through 2009 and to mid-2010. An outside
evaluation of the program is underway and will be completed
in June 2009 to determine future areas of cooperation on all
three areas of counternarcotics programs with Iran. (Note:
Mission will follow up and pass on a copy of the evaluation
report when complete. End Note.)

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Soltanieh Asks for "Symbolic" Support
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7. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh reiterated Iran's
commitment to combating drugs, noting that Supreme Leader
Khamenei had called this effort a "jihad." Nevertheless,
Iran believes that counternarcotics efforts are a "shared
responsibility" because the effects are felt internationally.
Because this is an international problem, Iran does not
appreciate when other countries refer to support to these
programs as "donations." Rather, Iran wants to work
cooperatively with those countries affected. Soltanieh added
his own plea for international cooperation with Iran to
combat the narcotics trade, especially for much-needed
equipment for Iranian counternarcotics forces which are
suffering a high number of casualties and need help to
improve their combat efficiency. He argued that countries
have used the "excuse" that the equipment is dual-use in
nature to avoid providing support. However, Iran would be
willing to help increase international confidence that it
would use the equipment responsibly and would even pay for
this equipment itself. Iran would be willing to take
"serious steps" towards some type of end-use monitoring by
UNODC to "ensure" that the end user of such equipment is the
counternarcotics police and that it is being utilized in the
intended way.


8. (SBU) Soltanieh also lobbied for monitoring equipment
for Iran's ports, arguing that as Iran closes its border to
traffickers, they will shift routes and enter Iran by sea.
He showed a diorama of the tri-border area and announced that
this month, Iran is scheduled to complete the construction of
berms and trenches along about 1000 kilometers of its border
with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Expressing disappointment in
the lack of funding from the mini-Dublin Group to meet
program needs, Soltanieh argued that the funding necessary is
"peanuts" and that Iran does not need the money. Rather, the
provision of funding by the Group would be an important
symbolic gesture, and the Iranian government would "much
appreciate" assistance either bilaterally or through UNODC.
Soltanieh also welcomed cooperation and visits to Iran to see
its counternarcotics efforts by "all parties" in the room.


9. (U) Soltanieh gave Iranian government figures for its
drug seizures in 2007 and 2008 (full figures passed
separately in Hall-Williams email),noting significant
increases in seizures of opiates in several forms (heroin,
morphine, opium) as well as other drugs, such as hashish
(marijuana). The figures also illustrated an 83 percent
increase in the number of drug traffickers arrested and a 96
percent decrease in the arrest of drug abusers, which UNODC
noted was due to Iranian drug demand reduction programs that
decreased the number of new and repeat offenders. De Leo
noted that many of these programs were funded by UNODC and
the mini-Dublin Group.

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U.S. Presence Appreciated
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10. (C) Even though MsnOffs complied scrupulously with the
Washington direction not to speak at this event, the U.S.
presence at the meeting did not go unnoticed. At the
conclusion of the meeting, an Iranian Mission official
approached UN Affairs Counselor to say that it was "good"
that the U.S. was there. UNODC was also pleased we attended,
and the Russian official said "I know why you were quiet, but
it's good that you are here." UNODC is clearly hoping for
more active U.S. participation in such events in the future,
and External Relations Officer Muki Jernelov approached
MsnOff to ask whether there was anything UNODC could do to
facilitate U.S. funding for these or other regional programs,
noting that UNODC is anxious to help find ways for the U.S.
to contribute that would accommodate U.S. restrictions on
provision of assistance to Iran.
PYATT