Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA164
2009-04-15 15:24:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:
IAEA/DPRK: INSPECTORS IN PYONGYANG; TO DEPART
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUNV #0164 1051524 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 151524Z APR 09 FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9300 RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0830 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0885 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0300 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0684 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1587
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000164
SIPDIS
ISN/RA FOR MAHAFFEY AND RANA, IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, EAP FOR
KELLY AND JOHNSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2033
TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: INSPECTORS IN PYONGYANG; TO DEPART
NORTH KOREA ON APRIL 16
REF: UNVIE 00162
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000164
SIPDIS
ISN/RA FOR MAHAFFEY AND RANA, IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, EAP FOR
KELLY AND JOHNSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2033
TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: INSPECTORS IN PYONGYANG; TO DEPART
NORTH KOREA ON APRIL 16
REF: UNVIE 00162
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)
1. (S) IAEA officials informed Mission on April 15 that its
inspectors had completed the removal of seals and containment
and surveillance measures and arrived in Pyongyang. The IAEA
left its equipment at the Yongbyon nuclear center and will
decide how to handle the return of equipment "later."
Inspectors are scheduled to fly out of North Korea on April
16.
2. (SBU) Background: IAEA inspectors returned to North Korea
on July 14, 2007 after a 4.5 year absence to implement the ad
hoc monitoring and verification arrangement approved by Board
of Governors during a Special Board meeting on July 9, 2007
(GOV/2007/36). Inspectors have since monitored and verified
the shutdown status of the reprocessing facility, the 5 MWe
reactor, the fuel fabrication facility, and two unfinished
reactor construction sites, with the exception of a brief
period in October 2008. North Korea denied inspectors access
to Yongbyon facilities from October 9-14, 2008, when the
North suspended (and began reversing) disablement work at
Yongbyon. At the time, the IAEA removed some seals at the
request of the North Koreans, but all seals and containment
and surveillance measures were reapplied after inspectors
regained access on October 14.
3. (S) Safeguards DDG Heinonen privately shared with DCM on
April 15 his estimate that in the absence of monitoring the
DPRK could resume reprocessing of spent fuel within one month
(not two weeks as suggested by some prominent NGO
commentators) and would require about six months to
manufacture fuel and restart the reactor. Heinonen
discounted the likelihood that Pyongyang's expulsion of the
IAEA was a conscious step toward the conduct of a nuclear
explosive test.
4. (SBU) Comment: Japanese and Australian mission reps have
queried UNVIE as to whether the U.S. will seek a special IAEA
Board of Governors meeting to review North Korea's expulsion
of IAEA inspectors. Absent other guidance, Mission will
continue to respond that we have no such instructions.
Mission speculates that should the DPRK-enforced departure of
inspectors remain in force for a period of months, the IAEA
may feel increasingly compelled to resurface the
question--last put to the IAEA Board by DG ElBaradei in his
September 2 report to the Board (GOV/2008/40-GC(52)/14) as to
whether the DPRK is legally a non-NPT member. If DPRK is not
an NPT member, as noted by the DG, the IAEA has an obligation
to resume safeguards implementation under the INFCIRC/66-type
safeguards agreement with North Korea covering the IRT
research reactor. (The IRT-specific safeguards agreement is
contained in INFCIRC/252). An enforced total absence from
Yongbyon for a long period of time may lead the IAEA to feel
more acutely a responsibility to clarify its obligations at
the IRT reactor.
SCHULTE
SIPDIS
ISN/RA FOR MAHAFFEY AND RANA, IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, EAP FOR
KELLY AND JOHNSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2033
TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: INSPECTORS IN PYONGYANG; TO DEPART
NORTH KOREA ON APRIL 16
REF: UNVIE 00162
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)
1. (S) IAEA officials informed Mission on April 15 that its
inspectors had completed the removal of seals and containment
and surveillance measures and arrived in Pyongyang. The IAEA
left its equipment at the Yongbyon nuclear center and will
decide how to handle the return of equipment "later."
Inspectors are scheduled to fly out of North Korea on April
16.
2. (SBU) Background: IAEA inspectors returned to North Korea
on July 14, 2007 after a 4.5 year absence to implement the ad
hoc monitoring and verification arrangement approved by Board
of Governors during a Special Board meeting on July 9, 2007
(GOV/2007/36). Inspectors have since monitored and verified
the shutdown status of the reprocessing facility, the 5 MWe
reactor, the fuel fabrication facility, and two unfinished
reactor construction sites, with the exception of a brief
period in October 2008. North Korea denied inspectors access
to Yongbyon facilities from October 9-14, 2008, when the
North suspended (and began reversing) disablement work at
Yongbyon. At the time, the IAEA removed some seals at the
request of the North Koreans, but all seals and containment
and surveillance measures were reapplied after inspectors
regained access on October 14.
3. (S) Safeguards DDG Heinonen privately shared with DCM on
April 15 his estimate that in the absence of monitoring the
DPRK could resume reprocessing of spent fuel within one month
(not two weeks as suggested by some prominent NGO
commentators) and would require about six months to
manufacture fuel and restart the reactor. Heinonen
discounted the likelihood that Pyongyang's expulsion of the
IAEA was a conscious step toward the conduct of a nuclear
explosive test.
4. (SBU) Comment: Japanese and Australian mission reps have
queried UNVIE as to whether the U.S. will seek a special IAEA
Board of Governors meeting to review North Korea's expulsion
of IAEA inspectors. Absent other guidance, Mission will
continue to respond that we have no such instructions.
Mission speculates that should the DPRK-enforced departure of
inspectors remain in force for a period of months, the IAEA
may feel increasingly compelled to resurface the
question--last put to the IAEA Board by DG ElBaradei in his
September 2 report to the Board (GOV/2008/40-GC(52)/14) as to
whether the DPRK is legally a non-NPT member. If DPRK is not
an NPT member, as noted by the DG, the IAEA has an obligation
to resume safeguards implementation under the INFCIRC/66-type
safeguards agreement with North Korea covering the IRT
research reactor. (The IRT-specific safeguards agreement is
contained in INFCIRC/252). An enforced total absence from
Yongbyon for a long period of time may lead the IAEA to feel
more acutely a responsibility to clarify its obligations at
the IRT reactor.
SCHULTE