IAEA DG RACE: ECHAVARRI IN, PETRIC AND OTHERS

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000156

SIPDIS

FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA DG RACE: ECHAVARRI IN, PETRIC AND OTHERS
LIKELY; DIVISION MORE LIKELY THAN CONSENSUS

REF: A. UNVIE 151 AND PREVIOUS

B. UNVIE 154

C. STATE 34652

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: IAEA DG ElBaradei on April 8 privately
expressed regret that the first round of the selection
process for his successor had cut, as he saw it, along
North-South lines. He said Spain had formally nominated OECD
nuclear agency chief Echavarri, Slovenia's nomination of
Chief Justice Petric was expected the next day, a Malaysian
nomination was expected, and Chile could follow suit.
Another deadlock would not be good for the Agency, but
ElBaradei thought an Amano-Echavarri race could be
inconclusive. He viewed a consensus outcome as important for
the Agency and appealed to the U.S. to endorse a candidate
whom the P-5, China, India, South Africa and ultimately the
whole Board would support. Mission judges the political
divisions between member states are likely too great for a
consensus solution of the sort ElBaradei seeks, particularly
if we are to restore the low-profile, technocratic character
of the position. A renewed run by South African Governor
Minty is not yet to be ruled out. Apart from Ambassador's
conversation with ElBaradei, we learned the Spanish
nomination of Echavarri was a surprise to Spain's ambassador
here, and that Belgium is contemplating a nomination of
Jean-Pol Poncelet, a former Belgian Energy Minister,
previously with Westinghouse and now with Areva, in the case
of protracted impasse.


2. (C) Summary contd.: On the Iran and Syria verification
issues, ElBaradei in a meeting with Ambassador said nothing
new; he has, at this writing, no appointment to see President
Asad when the latter visits Vienna. End summary.

DG Calls in Vain for Consensus
--------------


3. (S) During an April 8, 2009, office call devoted mostly
to the issue of multilateral nuclear fuel assurances (ref B),
IAEA Director General (DG) ElBaradei observed it was
unfortunate that the first round of the selection process for
his successor had cut along North-South lines. Ambassador
countered that groups across the Board - the P-5, Africa,
Latin America, Asia - had split between Japanese candidate
Amano and South Africa's Minty, and Amano had had developing
country support. ElBaradei dismissed the analysis, saying
"you know what kind" of developing countries had voted with
Japan. ElBaradei confirmed that Spain had formally nominated
Luis Echavarri, Director-General of the OECD Nuclear Energy
Agency, for the IAEA post. The DG added that former
Slovenian ambassador, Chief Justice Ernest Petric, had called
him to confirm his country would nominate him, and that
Malaysian former DDG Noramly Bin Muslim would be a formal
candidate. ElBaradei and EXPO chief Cserveny speculated that
Chile would likely put forward its current ambassador,
Milenko Skoknic, who has told us he is seeking Santiago's
endorsement.


4. (C) ElBaradei offered his own view that the job requires
a unifier across North-South lines, one who understands both
the policy and technology issues well, and a good manager.
(Note: He did not clearly ascribe this resume to any of the
known candidates. End note.) The DG expressed concern that
further deadlock would be bad for the Agency and observed
that having Echavarri in the race against Amano would make
achieving a successful outcome in this coming round more
difficult, as Spain had substantial relationships across
Latin America, Africa, and of course within the EU.


5. (S) ElBaradei went on that an outcome in which India,
China, Russia and South Africa are unhappy is not desirable
for the Agency. South Africa was upset over the "North-South
divide" that had characterized the race. Ambassador replied
that the U.S. had viewed Minty's campaign as a dignified one,
until his closing statement, and had told him so; that
Minty's statement had perhaps magnified the North-South
dimension; and that the North-South split had otherwise been
the media's narrative. ElBaradei acknowledged this all but
nevertheless appealed to the U.S. to seek a consensus
candidate, taking the view that a DG elected with 24 votes
would not be good for the Agency.


6. (S) In a one-on-one discussion, Ambassador Schulte
expressed concern that the Secretariat, including its senior
leadership, was playing too much in the DG race. The next
phase promised to be more complex than the first, and
potentially more divisive, and the Secretariat should not
make it more so by playing favorites. ElBaradei said he
could not keep Secretariat members from privately expressing
their views on individual candidates, but he agreed to send
the message that the Secretariat should act professionally
and apolitically and keep out of the DG race.

Spanish Surprise
--------------


7. (C) After his meeting with ElBaradei, Ambassador received
a call from Spanish Ambassador Jose Rosello Serra, who stated
that Spain had nominated Echavarri for the IAEA DG race.
Serra apologized on behalf of his Minister that Spain's
decision had come out of sync with our bilateral exchanges on
the issue. Serra said that the decision was a surprise to
him. The MFA had not been interested when Echavarri's name
had come up in the press. Spain had already decided to
support Amano, PM Zapatero was not a great supporter of
nuclear energy, and there was a major reshuffle taking place
in the government. Speculating how Echavarri won GOS
endorsement despite these factors, Serra noted Echavarri was
close to the Minister of Industry and has the confidence of
Spain's nuclear sector. Serra observed that Echavarri had a
solid background, including experience as an operator (with
Westinghouse),regulator (with Spain's Nuclear Safety
Council),and as manager of an international organization
(NEA for 12 years). He said that the USG had supported
Echavarri to become NEA DG, and asserted we had sounded out
Echavarri four years ago as a possible successor to ElBaradei
at that time.


8. (C) Serra closed by saying he would inform Japanese
colleague Amano in person, and indicated he would be inviting
Echavarri to Vienna to meet with regional groups and
interested missions. (Note: Echavarri will also be in
Beijing for the upcoming Ministerial, where he will have
ample opportunity to network. End Note.)

And Not Shown on your Scorecard ...
--------------


9. (C) Prior to (and not figuring in) the ElBaradei
conversation reported above, Ambassador was also phoned April
8 by Belgian MFA official Werner Bauwens, an acquaintance and
colleague from the Ambassador's 1990s tenure at NATO.
Bauwens said his Foreign Minister was actively considering
nominating a Belgian candidate if it became apparent that
Japan's Amano could not win. Bauwens said that the possible
candidate had a good mix of political and nuclear skills; he
had studied nuclear physics, had worked for Belgonucleaire,
then entered Belgian politics where he served as Minister of
Energy, Minister of Defense, and Deputy Prime Minister. He
worked for four years at the European Space Agency in Paris
and now works as an executive at Areva on sustainable energy.
Bauwens declined to provide a name officially, but
Ambassador determined that it is Jean-Pol Poncelet, a
francophone from the Christian Democrat party.


10. (C) Bauwens said that he personally found the individual
to be a strong candidate - not a diplomat like Amano or
Minty, but a nuclear expert with strong political background
and skills. His Foreign Minister had asked him to query a
number of countries about their interest in a Belgian
"fallback" candidate. He indicated that he would be talking
to France and Russia, among others. If the U.S. or EU
countries discouraged Belgium from moving forward, his
Foreign Minister would probably take their advice. Bauwens
went on that the FM did not want to take on Japan if Amano
remained a viable candidate, and thus considered the Belgian
candidate as someone to "keep up the sleeve" as a "fallback
candidate."


11. (C) In terms of getting support, Bauwens noted that
Belgium had good relations in Africa and that it would not
automatically generate opposition from China, as Bauwens
presumed Amano, as a Japanese, had done. He noted that
Belgium had not had a senior position at the Agency since the
departure of Pierre Goldschmidt, the DDG for Safeguards twice
removed. He also noted that Belgium has taken a strong
stance on nonproliferation and Iran. The Belgian government
was postured to take a quick decision if it concluded it
should go forward and would probably not nominate a candidate
until late April.

24 Will Have to Do
--------------


12. (S) Comment: ElBaradei's gambit for a consensus
candidate, which we may see reflected in procedural
meandering by Board Chairwoman Feroukhi, would lead us into
deeper impasse. ElBaradei wants the U.S. to galvanize all
players by engineering the nomination of a global statesman
who drives off the competition. This would be consistent
with ElBaradei's but not our vision of the job. ElBaradei's
own consensus election was possible in part because he was
not a commanding political figure in 1997. Moreover, the
political divisions between member states are severe -- over
how to proceed on Iran, Syria, and the mission of safeguards
verification generally; the relative importance of
safeguards, security and safety versus technical cooperation;
and linkage of the IAEA's technical nonproliferation mission
to issues outside Vienna (e.g., Palestinian status,
disarmament in the Middle East and globally).


13. (S) Comment contd.: Mission assesses that gaining
two-thirds-majority support for a competent
technocrat/manager remains our best hope for settling the
leadership issue at the IAEA satisfactorily for U.S.
interests and in a timely manner. We also cannot rule out
the possibility that a prolonged impasse could build support
for a "draft Mohamed" campaign that would induce the DG to
defer his retirement plans. Japan has shown it will devote
diplomatic resources and offer incentives to secure Amano's
support in excess of the campaigns that most other states,
Spain included, may be able or willing to muster. Per ref C,
Mission is taking soundings on Board members' views of other
candidates as they declare, but the field is not yet complete
and Japan clearly intends to secure and build on its
front-runner status.

SCHULTE