UNODC AND COUNTERNARCOTICS IN THE AF-PAK POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 UNVIE VIENNA 000152

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: KCRM PREL PTER SNAR AF AS CA IR IT JA PK UN
SUBJECT: UNODC AND COUNTERNARCOTICS IN THE AF-PAK POLICY

REF: A. STATE 31663

B. STATE 29482

C. UNVIE 117

D. 08 UNVIE 371

E. UNVIE 0030

F. STATE 3515

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY SCHULTE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. This is action request. Please, see para 5.


2. (SBU) Ambassador met UNODC Executive Director Antonio
Costa on April 2, and discussed with him the Administration's
new Af-Pak strategy and deployed the points in Ref A,
highlighting our new regional emphasis and our interest in
incorporating non-traditional partners such as Iran in
UNODC's regional programs. Costa suggested that his policy
review for UNODC in the coming weeks would take into account
the new USG policy, but also made a plea for the need to
strengthen UNODC's capacity to do such work. He reported that
Canada and Australia had expressed an interest in giving
contributions to UNODC's programs in Iran. DCM and Counselor
also met a number of UNODC staff in recent days to seek their
reaction to the White Paper (Ref B),stressing its focus on
working with Pakistan, and advocating particular issues such
as border security in Baluchistan. UNODC Operations
Division Director Francis Maertens told DCM that UNODC would
have to re-think its regional strategy in the face of the new
US policy, noting that his staff is preparing a strategy
paper for Japan which has recently expressed an interest in
Pakistan. Roberto Arbitrio, head of UNODC's Europe and
Central/West Asia Office, and Miwa Kato, Programme Management
Officer, advised Counselor that the Pakistan paper they are
preparing for Japan will likely focus on strengthening
criminal justice capacity. Arbitrio noted UNODC's
operational work in strengthening border security under the
Triangle Initiative, and named several possible deliverables
for Baluchistan.


3. (SBU) At an April 2 luncheon Italian Ambassador hosted in
honor of Italy's Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Italy announced its commitment to support UNODC's regional
programs. A number of participants at the luncheon expressed
support for a regional approach, urged the inclusion of Iran
in such an effort, and asked Italy not to duplicate existing
regional initiatives, such as the Dubai Process on
Afghanistan-Pakistan border security initiated by Canada.
Ambassador reviewed Ref A points with the Italian Special
Envoy who was to see Costa later in the day.


4. (SBU) Mission looks forward to advancing the
counternarcotics portion of our Af-Pak policy in Vienna. We
recommend urging the Friends of Afghanistan Group in Vienna
(Ref E) to include Pakistan as a member.
Mission also recommends that we provide funding for a D-1
position to head UNODC's Islamabad office. We may also
partner with other donors to support several border security
projects in Baluchistan under UNODC's Triangle Initiative.
Given Canada's focus on Kandahar province, the U.S. could
partner with Canada to support such a project on border
crossing in Chaman-Weishi in Baluchistan, with Canada funding
activities on the Afghan side (Chaman) and the U.S. and Japan
the Pakistan side (Weishi). The U.S. could also partner with
countries like Italy, Germany and UK to fund UNODC programs
on Pakistan-Iran border security, such as that at the
Taftan-Mirjaveh crossing, with the U.S. funding Taftan
programs on the Pakistan side, and others funding Mirjaveh
programs in Sistan-Baluchistan in Iran. It may even be
possible for partners to work with UNODC on border security
in Bahram Chah/Barah Chah, a village bisected by the
Afghan-Pakistan border, which UNODC's Arbitrio claims is a
military stronghold of the Taliban and a depot for both drugs
and weapons.



5. (SBU) Action Requested: Mission seeks Washington guidance
as to whether (i) Washington would be willing to fund the D-1
position in UNODC's Islamabad office, and (ii) Mission should
actively engage Canada, Japan, Italy, and other donors in
Vienna to form partnership to support border security

UNVIE VIEN 00000152 002 OF 006


programs in Baluchistan, within the framework of UNODC's
Triangle Initiative. We will work with others to incorporate
Pakistan in the Friends of Afghanistan. End Summary and
Action Request.

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Costa's Reaction: Kabul, Islamabad and Tehran
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6. (SBU) Meeting on April 2, Ambassador reviewed the U.S.
White Paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan, and encouraged Costa
to think "big" about the two countries, including
incorporating non-traditional regional partners for tackling
the drug problem there. Ambassador highlighted the new
attention to alternative development and agricultural
assistance, and encouraged UNODC to develop programs in
precursor chemicals control and border security, especially
in Baluchistan. Costa told Ambassador that during his tenure
(since 2002),UNODC had established criteria for a number of
policy "lines," such as the annual Afghanistan Opium Survey,
the link between narcotics and insurgency and the Triangle
Initiative. He is in the process of discussing with his
Executive Committee criteria for the next policy line. Topics
under consideration include how national, bilateral, or
multilateral military interventions have damaged
Afghanistan's opium economy. He expects to "solidify" such
discussions in a few weeks, and have a final decision by
August. He seemed to imply that such discussions would
incorporate the elements from the U.S. White Paper.



7. (SBU) Welcoming the new attention to alternative
development and agricultural assistance, Costa claimed that
while he is not against "forced" eradication, it could only
be effective if done in a "muscular way, as in Colombia." He
noted UNODC has taken a regional approach in fighting Afghan
drugs, evident in its Rainbow Strategy, the Triangle
Initiative and the Paris Pact. He highlighted the success
UNODC had last year in the interdiction of precursor
chemicals. (Note: Under UNODC's TARCET initiative, part of
the Rainbow Strategy, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran
authorities seized a total of 19.5 tonnes of precursor
chemicals in those three countries in 2008. In addition,
Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgystan, and Uzbekistan seized 27.5
tonnes in substitute chemicals in 2008. End Note.) Costa
stressed the excellent new relationship between UNODC and
UNAMA in Kabul, noting that UNAMA chief Kai Eide is so
pleased with UNODC's new chief representative in Kabul
(Jean-Luc LeMahieu) that Eide may no longer wish to upgrade
UNODC's Kabul office. (Note: Costa previously persuaded Eide
to fund a D-2 chief position at UNODC's office in Kabul to
act as counternarcotics advisor to Eide and ultimately to
Karzai. End Note.)


8. (SBU) Costa commented on the recent loss of the American
chief of UNODC's Islamabad office (Note: The senior American
is former INL DAS Christy McCampbell who left at the end of
March to become Director of the Senate Drug Caucus. End
Note.). However, UNODC has selected a young and capable
Canadian from its Bangkok office to replace her. (Note:
Although the position has been downgraded from a D-1 to P-4
after McCampbell's departure, partly for budget reasons, we
understand the next incumbent will still have title of "chief
representative." End Note.) On April 3, Counselor received
an inquiry from another UNODC contact about U.S. willingness
to fund the D-1 position in Islamabad. (Note: INL/AF Director
Tom Williams, in his mid-March visit to UNODC, urged UNODC
not to downgrade that position, See Ref C. End Note.)


9. (SBU) In Costa's view, the UNODC's last representative in
Tehran, Roberto Arbitrio, had been instrumental in getting
Iran to re-establish its Drug Liaison Office and re-activate
regular briefings for the mini-Dublin group. (Note: Arbitrio
left Tehran recently to become head of UNODC's Europe and
West/Central Asia Office in Vienna. End Note) Costa added
that Canada and Australia had expressed willingness to give
"significant" amounts of money to UNODC for Iran programs.

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Canadian and Australian Money for Iran? Pakistan?
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10. (C) Subsequent to the Costa meeting, Counselor learned
from her Canadian counterpart that Canada was unlikely to

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fund UNODC programs in Iran. Nelson said Canada has an
unresolved political problem with Iran over the beating death
of Iranian-Canadian journalist Kazemi in an Iranian prison.
According to Nelson, Canada believes her death had been
ordered by a "very senior" official from the Iranian Ministry
of Interior. Canada has been demanding, without success, the
arrest and trial of those responsible for her death, and
withdrew its Ambassador from Tehran. In addition, Canada has
been tabling an annual human rights resolution in the General
Assembly. Although Canada has been the largest donor to
UNODC's Afghanistan programs, such funds are prescribed
strictly for use in Afghanistan only. Nelson said that
recently UNODC has approached his government for funding
activities in Pakistan. (Note: Canada gave UNODC Cdn$27
million in 2007-2009 for Afghanistan. Another tranche of
Cdn$25 million expected for 2009-2011 will be used mainly for
Kandahar province, to improve its security before Canada
withdraws its troops in 2011. End Note.) Canada was able to
re-program small amounts of its 2007-2009 Afghanistan money
to upgrade security for UNODC's Islamabad office, such as
$200,000 for an armored car. Furthermore, Canada is
considering contributing to a $2 million UNODC project to
strengthen Pakistan border control activities, possibly
including the Chaman-Weishi crossing point between those two
countries. Canada may also be interested in controlling
precursor chemicals in Pakistan, and in the development of an
UNODC country program for Pakistan. However, Nelson stressed
that such contributions would be relatively small.


11. (C) The Australian Mission's Simon Mamouney told
Counselor that UNODC staff have also sought clarification of
a possible Australian contribution to UNODC's activities in
Iran. The UNODC interlocutor said that Costa had been
promised such funding by the Australian Foreign Minister at
The Hague. Our Australian contact noted that the Foreign
Ministry had announced, after The Hague, a $2 million
donation to the UN and a $1 million to the International Red
Cross, specifically for humanitarian assistance programs in
Pakistan. Mamouney said Australia has no political problem
with Iran on counternarcotics issues, and its Mission here
has recommended such cooperation, notwithstanding the
differences on nuclear issues between the two countries.
Mamouney noted that Australia gave UNODC $4 to $5 million in
voluntary contributions.

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Italy Committed to Regional Approach, Others Too
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12. (SBU) On April 2, in preparation for a G-8 meeting in
Trieste in June on Afghanistan regional issues, the Italian
Ambassador to the UN in Vienna hosted a lunch in honor of the
Italian Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Guests at
the lunch included ambassadors or other representatives of
the G-8, Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Note: Italy plans to
invite to the Trieste meeting Iran, China, India, Turkey and
three Central Asian countries as well. End Note.) Italian
Ambassador said his country is ready to commit funds for
UNODC's regional programs. Many lunch participants urged
Italy not to duplicate other regional initiatives. Canada
cited the Dubai Process, a Canadian initiative on
Afghanistan-Pakistan border security, which had recently
mediated an action plan agreed to by the two sides, and to
which Canada has invited G-8 participation. (Note: Canadian
Foreign Minister Cannon announced this at the March 31 The
Hague meeting. End Note.) Japan expressed support for a
regional, comprehensive approach. The German Ambassador said
his government wants to use the mini-Dublin Group to
encourage support for UNODC's Triangle Initiative. The
Pakistani Ambassador underlined support for the new U.S.
approach as a way to tackle extremists in the border region
while trying to work with the less radical insurgents. He
stressed the need to include Iran in any regional
counternarcotics efforts. The UK Ambassador cited "enormous
obstacles" in his country's bilateral counternarcotics
programs with Iran. He expressed hope that Trieste could
signal the importance of such cooperation, and asked the
participants to encourage UNODC to explore areas of
cooperation with Iran. The Russian Ambassador praised the
idea of "thinking big" and "thinking radically." He agreed
with the need to break the link between narcotics and
terrorism, and applauded the concrete ideas in the U.S. White
Paper. He too stressed the need to involve Iran in any
regional effort, as well as engaging other regional bodies

UNVIE VIEN 00000152 004 OF 006


such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The
French rep, supporting the regional approach and priorities
in the Italian paper, noted that engaging Iran should not be
limited to counternarcotics, but should include other
regional economic matters, such as energy and water. The
Afghan representative thanked President Obama for the new
U.S. strategy, which he said, was "better than expected" and
"well-received" at home. He called for a monitoring system
to ensure the effective use of international resources.
Ambassador handed out copies of the White Paper and of
Secretary Clinton's remarks in The Hague, and reviewed, with
the Italian Special Envoy, the points he made to Costa in
their meeting in the morning (see Para 6 above).

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UNODC Rethinking the Regional Program
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13. (SBU) In a meeting with DCM and Counselor on March 30,
Francis Maertens, Director of UNODC's Division of Operations,
responded that UNODC would have to re-think its regional
program in the face of the new U.S. policy, which, he noted,
had led to the appointments of new Special Representatives to
Afghanistan and Pakistan from Italy, France, and the UK.
Maertens explained that UNODC's Islamabad office currently
runs one law enforcement program funded by Germany. The rest
of its programs are all focused on drug demand reduction. He
mentioned that he had a team working on a concept paper on
the justice sector in Pakistan, which will be sent to Japan
for possible funding, because of Japan's recent expression of
interest in Pakistan. The paper could possibly target a
number of areas, such as building up law enforcement capacity
in Baluchistan. He added that the next ministerial meeting
of the Triangle Initiative, scheduled to take place in
Islamabad in June, could also focus on a regional program
aimed at law enforcement, precursor chemicals and criminal
justice. However, Maertens highlighted the difficult
political situation in Pakistan, the rift among its agencies,
and the sustainability of the government in the face of such
a rift. DCM noted that Pakistan has the "raw material" -- a
government infrastructure, civil society and other
institutions -- lacking in Afghanistan. The challenge, he
said, is to bring all of them together to "lift" the
country's civilian administration. Pointing out the potential
growth in U.S. programs in Pakistan (Ref B),he also stressed
the importance of not duplicating bilateral efforts.
Maertens stated that UNODC would have to send a small mission
to Pakistan to identify the needs that UNODC could fill. He
also talked about UNODC's current negotiations with Canada on
a "big package" that may include cross-border issues.

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Japan's Growing Interest in Pakistan and the Region
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14. (SBU) In meetings on 3/25 and 3/30, Miwa Kato, a former
Japanese Foreign Ministry official, and currently a program
management officer in the Division of Treaty Affairs at the
UNODC, told Counselor that Japan has been expressing
increasing interest in Pakistan, and in the region. Starting
from a casual conversation she had with her former MOFA
colleagues in Tokyo in January/February, she went on to brief
them about UNODC's Triangle Initiative, which involves
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, and which, in early March,
conducted the first trilateral operation on their borders.
The Japanese delegation to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
(CND) during March 11-20 re-affirmed to UNODC their interest
by pledging $3 million to UNODC's Afghanistan programs.
UNODC is in discussions with Japan on another $2 million for
UNODC's Iran programs. It is also negotiating for Japan to
contribute a small sum ($60,000-$70,000) for a terrorism
prevention project in Pakistan. Kato told Counselor that
Japan had appointed its ambassador to Spain, Yoshikawa, to be
Japan's special envoy to Afghanistan-Pakistan.


15. (SBU) Early in the week of March 23, Japan indicated to
UNODC that it might consider donations for UNODC programs in
Pakistan. In Kato's opinion, such contributions could
amount to several million dollars. The amount is significant
because, Kato said, Japanese contributions to UNODC have
accounted for less than 1 percent of total voluntary
contributions UNODC receives, compared to 10 percent or more
from the U.S. As a result, UNODC is developing a Pakistan
paper for Japan's consideration. Initially aiming at a

UNVIE VIEN 00000152 005 OF 006


Friends of Pakistan donors meeting Japan will co-host with
the World Bank in Tokyo on April 17, Kato and her colleague
Roberto Arbitrio, head of the Europe and West/Central Asia
Unit, have since learned that the April 17 meeting would not
be appropriate for both timing and substance reasons, since
the meeting will focus on poverty alleviation in Pakistan. .


16. (SBU) Instead, Kato, working with Arbitrio, plans to
complete "a solid proposal" by the end of April, which Costa
can take to Tokyo in May, and then to the next Friends of
Pakistan meeting. (Note: This Friends Group was formed in
New York in September 2008, and held a subsequent meeting in
Abu Dhabi in November 2008, attended by political
director-level representatives from the U.S., UK, UAE, and
Pakistan. While those four countries formed the core of the
Group, other participants at the April 17 meeting in Tokyo
will include the G-7, plus Australia, Turkey, and the
European Commission. End Note.) On April 7 Kato told
Counselor that she and Bernard Frahi, Deputy Director of
UNODC's Operations Division, would attend the April 17
meeting in Tokyo.


17. (SBU) Given Japan's interest in the "softer" side of
security, Kato plans to concentrate on "durable" security
institution-building, such as training and equipment to
improve capacity and ways to improve mutual legal assistance.
Based on her discussions with Japan, Kato has suggested
focusing the paper in three areas: criminal justice reform,
general border security, and regional cooperation. Tokyo
responded with a request for an even narrower focus. In
response to Counselor's question about border security in
Baluchistan, Kato and Arbitrio said there had also been much
discussion on how to target Baluchistan, as the expected
military surge in southern Afghanistan would push traffickers
and insurgents into Baluchistan, thereby making border
security in Baluchistan for the region an increasingly
important issue. However, Kato claimed that even the UN
"cannot go there."

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What Can Be Done in Baluchistan
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18. (SBU) In subsequent conversations on April 1 and 7,
Arbitrio, who spent four-and-half years in Tehran (until
December 2008) as UNODC's representative in that country,
gave a more upbeat vision of what UNODC could do in that
region that straddles three countries. Although the UN, for
security reasons, does not allow international staff to be
posted in Baluchistan, Arbitrio believes that UNODC could
post national staff there. In his view, UNODC could build on
the Triangle Initiative to strengthen border security in that
area. UNODC can identify national shortcomings, e.g.,
communications and intelligence capacity. Addressing such
shortcomings would require improved software and hardware,
such as establishing mobile units equipped with motorbikes,
land cruisers, tracking and scanning devices. Improving
intelligence capacity would require strategic planning and
working with national police, something that has already been
started with the Joint Planning Cell established in Tehran
under the Triangle Initiative last year. (Note. The Cell
planned and conducted a joint operation on the borders on
March 8. End Note.) In response to Counselor's question,
Arbitrio expressed his belief that deliverables for
Baluchistan could include the establishment of border liaison
offices, intelligence sharing through the Joint Planning Cell
in Tehran, and a joint operation in the village of Bahram
Chah/Bahrah Chah which is bisected by the Afghan-Pakistan
border. He described the village as heavily "militarized" by
the Taliban, and as a major depot for both drugs and weapons.
He considered it too difficult to actually work there but
expressed his belief that some work could be done "around"
the village to fight drug trafficking.

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Comment and Recommendations
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19. (SBU) Mission believes that there is are a number of
steps that we can take in Vienna to advance the
counternarcotics portion of our new Af-Pak policy. The first
is to invite Pakistan to the informal Vienna Friends of
Afghanistan Group (started here last fall). At the last
Friends meeting in January, Mission received Washington

UNVIE VIEN 00000152 006 OF 006


guidance (Ref F) to support the French chair's request to
invite, with Afghanistan's concurrence, Russia, Poland to the
meeting. (Note: France also invited China, but it did not
attend. End Note.) The U.K. will host the next Friends
meeting on April 28. Mission can propose to the UK to invite
Pakistan to the meeting, provided Afghanistan agrees.


20. (SBU) Mission also believes that given UNODC's current
financial crisis, which has compelled restructuring measures
at the UNODC, including downgrading the position of its
representative in Pakistan from D-1 to P-4, Washington should
consider contributions to UNODC to permit maintaining that
Islamabad position at the D-1 level.


21. (SBU) In addition, Mission recommends, as an effective
way to utilize international resources, partnering with other
donors to support several border security initiatives in
Baluchistan, within the framework of UNODC's Triangle
Initiative. Given Canada's focus on Kandahar province, the
U.S. could partner with Canada to support such a project on
border security in Chaman-Weishi in Baluchistan, with Canada
funding activities on the Afghan side (Chaman) and the U.S.
and Japan the Pakistan side (Weishi). The U.S. could also
partner with countries like Italy, Germany and UK to fund
UNODC programs on Pakistan-Iran border security, such as that
at the Taftan-Mirjaveh crossing, with the U.S. funding the
Pakistan side (Taftan),and others funding the Iran side
(Mirjaveh in Sistan-Baluchistan). It may even be possible
for partners to work with UNODC on border security around
Bahram Chah/Barah Chah, a village bisected by the
Afghan-Pakistan border in Baluchistan, known as a military
stronghold of the Taliban, and a depot for both drugs and
weapons. End Comment and Recommendations.






SCHULTE