IAEA/IRAN: SEEKING A UNIFIED EU3+3 APPROACH IN

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000014

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS: PREL IAEA KNNP AORC MNUC PARM IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: SEEKING A UNIFIED EU3+3 APPROACH IN
VIENNA

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d.

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (S) Ambassador Schulte called a meeting of EU3 3
Ambassadors on January 13 to solicit input on how to overcome
Iran's current "blockage" of its nuclear file at the IAEA.
The EU3 and U.S. counseled against allowing the upcoming
March Board to be another replay of do-nothing September and
November Board sessions even as the DG continues to report
the lack of any progress in the IAEA investigation. Germany
and the UK made a strong push for a unified EU3 3 message at
the March Board, whether in the form of a joint statement or
a resolution. Failure to do anything again, the EU3 and U.S.
argued, would send the wrong message to Tehran and undermine
the credibility and capacity of the IAEA to implement
safeguards in Iran and elsewhere. As expected, Russia and
China maintained that any movement on the Iran nuclear issue
will come only from EU3 3 political engagement and moves by
the new U.S. administration, and again counseled
"flexibility" and "patience." They acknowledged that
cooperation with the IAEA was important but did not see
action in Vienna as "the key" to extracting such cooperation.
The EU3 and U.S. insisted that Vienna nevertheless had an
important role to play and made several suggestions for joint
action: common talking points for use with the Secretariat, a
demarche in advance of the DG report, and an EU3 3 statement
at the Board (since Russia continues to see no utility in a
Board resolution.) France also revisited the proposal for a
third EU3 3 experts meeting in Vienna after the release of
the DG report, but Russia and China requested clarification
of the agenda and scope before committing. It was clear that
Russian and Chinese Missions in Vienna are not prepared to be
proactive absent marching orders from their PolDirs, and are
content to play the waiting game. They will look to the
possible early February PolDirs meeting in Berlin to help
delineate our approach at the IAEA Board. End Summary and
Comment.


EU3 1: March Board Should Not Be a Reenactment
-------------- --


2. (S) In opening the meeting, Ambassador Schulte underlined
the value of close EU3 3 consultations in Vienna, as
elsewhere, and solicited views on how to break the current
"stalemate" or, more appropriately, Iran's blockage of the
IAEA investigation. Since September the DG had reported no
progress on any front, clarification of possible military
dimensions (PMD) or implementation of the AP or Code 3.1
modified, a situation wholly attributable to Iran's
noncompliance. Iran was only allowing the IAEA to implement
"bare bones" safeguards on declared nuclear material in Iran,
which has the effect of allowing the IAEA to document
continued violation of UNSCR demands for suspension at
Natanz. The EU3 3 in Vienna could not accept or ignore this
situation, Ambassador Schulte cautioned, and should send a
message to Tehran to cooperate and support the IAEA
investigation. The March Board meeting would be the first of
the Obama Administration, and he flagged Secretary-designate
Clinton's statement to Congress promising tough, aggressive
and direct diplomacy.


3. (S) The EU3 shared U.S. concerns about accepting this
"classic stalemate." Since the September Board, UK
Ambassador Smith recounted how it had been exactly the same
narrative with the DG reporting nothing new besides
enrichment levels at Natanz. The DG and Secretariat seem
poised to say "We can go no further" in the investigation.
Smith warned that another replay of the November Board, with
the same response from the Board, would send a worrying
signal, and damage confidence in the capacity of the Agency
to deal with similar issues in the future. He further
regretted that the Board had chosen not use "the levers" or
instruments at its disposal, i.e. that efforts for a
resolution did not make headway among the EU3 3, to support
the Agency. German Ambassador Ludeking, who had shepherded
resolution efforts in September and November, seconded UK
views on repeating this situation in March, and just "going
through the motions" of national, EU and EU3 statements.
Ludeking suggested trying something new, such as an EU3 3
statement, to relay a unified message to Tehran. In a recent

conversation, Iranian Ambassador Soltinieh had given Ludeking
the impression that he expected no news and nothing to come
of the March Board, the implication being that we need to do
something to increase Iranian discomfort with the situation
in Vienna.


4. (S) Anticipating Russia and China's usual emphasis on the
EU3 3 political track with Iran, the UK and Germany argued
that the political track did not absolve the need for Board
action in Vienna. Smith fully acknowledged the importance of
political engagement and the Obama Administration's promised
new approach on Iran. However, it was too limiting to say,
as the DG was prone to do, "there is nothing the Agency can
do," and to rely entirely on a shift in the political
dynamic. Citing German FM Steinmeier's open letter to
President-elect Obama, Ludeking underlined that welcoming
dialogue did not entail granting concessions on
non-negotiable issues such as a nuclear-armed Iran. Although
diplomatic activity outside Vienna may be more decisive, he
warned that continued silence in Vienna would undermine
multilateralism and the Agency's credibility. Ludeking also
noted that the usual appeal for "patience" (on the part of
Russia and China) was wearing thin.

Russia and China: Vienna is Not the Key
--------------

5.(S) Chinese Ambassador Tang welcomed the new U.S. approach,
including the possibility of direct talks with Iran, and
still saw opportunities for the resumption of negotiations,
urging his EU3 3 counterparts to maintain "patience,
confidence and flexibility." He cited the Cooper-Bagheri
meeting in Vienna in December as evidence that the Iranian
side was thinking about the views of the Six. China was also
urging Iran bilaterally to consider EU3 3 proposals and to
continue cooperation with the IAEA, including clarification
of outstanding issues to restore confidence. Tang suggested
that we continue to push forward and hope for progress but
made no commitment to any Vienna-based action.


6. (S) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky fully shared China's view
of sticking to the path of dialogue and counseled EU3 3
"flexibility" even if "patience" is wearing thin for some.
Russia agreed with EU3 3 counterparts on the need for Iran's
full cooperation with the IAEA but argued that it would be
"nave" to think the key to the problem is in Vienna. We
need a new approach, and new political moves, he said,
quoting from President-elect Obama that engagement is the
place to start. Iran was also waiting for these new political
moves and we will need to gauge their reaction. As to
Vienna, Zmeyevsky saw no need for a new Board resolution and
did not think one would help. The EU3 3 should continue to
do our best in Vienna to persuade Iran, but should also
recognize that Iran is waiting for the new U.S.
administration and we should wait also. Taking a longer
perspective than the last few months, he recalled that there
was a time when there were many more outstanding issues in
the IAEA investigation, but many have been resolved. For
further progress in Vienna, Russia insisted, "we need big
moves elsewhere."

EU3 1: We Must Do Something in Vienna
--------------


7. (S) The EU3 responded that Vienna may not be the key, but
has a role to play. French Ambassador Deniau attempted to
bring the discussion back to "the facts," noting the
escalation in uranium enrichment at Natanz in the last 15
months. All of the Solana contacts had reaped "zero" result,
he observed, allowing Iran to buy more time. France
supported the use of all Secretariat and Board instruments,
and further noted that if dialogue recommences, Iran must
still abide by UNSC and Board resolutions. As to the current
stalemate, Iran was using the pretext of "completion" of the
IAEA's work plan in Iran, a plan the EU had not endorsed, to
do nothing. It was time, Deniau stressed for the Agency "to
call a spade, spade" on Iran's failure to cooperate. Not
implementing Code 3.1 modified, in particular, was a clear
breach of compliance and a damaging example to others.
France also suggested that a third EU3 3 experts meeting be
convened in Vienna after the release of the next IAEA DG
report in late February. The meeting might take place before
or after the March Board, but should not occur before the

pending DG's report. Russia and China did not exclude this
idea, but requested clarification as to the agenda and scope
of such a meeting so as to invite appropriate experts.


8. (S) Exasperated by Russia and China's stance, Ludeking
registered disappointment if the EU3 3 is heading toward
another repeat of the September and November Boards. Germany
attached importance to the EU3 3, which he stressed must also
play its role in Vienna. A Board resolution would be the
"natural" course, or he suggested an EU3 3 statement focused
on Vienna issues - the need for Iran to clarify outstanding
issues, provide more transparency and implement Code 3.1-
that was forceful and clearly spelled out. The UK likewise
argued that Vienna may not be the center of the universe but
Board members have a responsibility to protect IAEA
authority. Smith noted that there is a risk of the Agency
being incapable of anything beyond routine implementation of
safeguards. In the run-up to the Board, he suggested an
EU3 3 approach to influence the tenor of the DG report prior
to its release, to get the DG to "call a spade a spade" and
to give assurance of more vigorous EU3 3 support. DCM added
that the EU3 3 should focus on two audiences, Tehran and the
IAEA Secretariat, where he noted that the Safeguards
Department was besieged by those in the IAEA who were not
prepared to "call a spade a spade." As to Tehran, given the
history of missed signals with Washington, it was important
for others to also send the right message that Tehran cannot
hope to sidestep its obligations at the IAEA.


9. (S) Summing up, Ambassador Schulte acknowledged that
outside developments would have an impact on Vienna, but also
urged that the EU3 3 here to not lose sight of its task in
Vienna. The question was how to effect a change in the IAEA
Board dynamic and express our views before, during and after
the March Board. He outlined three risks if the March Board
becomes another iteration of September and November: sending
the message to Iran that we accept the "stalemate;" risk to
the efficacy of the IAEA as an institution and to the
safeguards system and, finally, the risk of an ineffective
Board undercutting a new U.S. Administration's desire for
effective multilateralism.

Next Steps
--------------


10. (S) Although there was no agreement on next steps in the
Board, Missions here will continue to consider several ideas
for EU3 3 action -- a common set of talking points for
discussion with the Secretariat, a possible joint demarche in
advance of the Board, and an EU3 3 statement at the Board.
France will circulate a proposed agenda for topics at a
possible experts meeting. The EU3 are particularly concerned
that DG ElBaradei may be tempted to water down his next
report rather than "call a spade a spade" so as give greater
impetus to the diplomatic track. At the same time, pressing
ElBaradei's "valedictory" button and the prospect of leaving
the Iran file frozen at the end of his tenure may persuade
him otherwise.


11. (S) France also noted that PolDirs were planning to meet
in Germany in February, and suggested that the EU3 3 seek
clarification as to what was expected of them in Vienna.
Germany urged that we do something different in Vienna to
change the dynamics here. Russia cautioned that the EU3 3
propose something concrete to PolDirs while China advised in
Vienna will not be proactive and will do nothing absent
marching orders from their PolDirs.
SCHULTE