UNODC OFFICIALS DISCUSS PROGRESS IN AF-PAK AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 UNVIE VIENNA 000117

SIPDIS

INL FOR TOM WILLIAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2023
TAGS: PREL SNAR KCRM EAID IR PK AF
SUBJECT: UNODC OFFICIALS DISCUSS PROGRESS IN AF-PAK AND
IRAN PROGRAMS, REITERATE DIALOGUE POSSIBILITIES WITH TEHRAN

REF: UNVIE VIENNA 00655

UNVIE VIEN 00000117 001.6 OF 006


Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e
)


1. (C) Summary. On March 18, INL/PA Director of the Office
of Afghanistan and Pakistan Program Tom Williams met with
UNODC officials to discuss counternarcotics issues in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, and to gain insight into
UNODC's program plans and needs in the coming year. UNODC
officials were uniformly enthusiastic about responding to
Williams' request to identify new concrete actions that could
be taken to promote border security and counternarcotics
cooperation. On Iran, Technical Cooperation Section Chief
Roberto Arbitrio argued that UNODC was an effective
facilitator of dialogue with Iran and warned that decreases
in funding for 2010 might put that role at risk. He believes
that drug control might be a good place to start a bilateral
conversation with Tehran because Iran is a "good guy" on this
issue, it would allow "peer to peer" engagement, and it is an
issue on which Iran has a real role to play, but cautioned
that even their own dialogue with Iran has ups and downs in
terms of Iran's level of cooperation. However, Iran is
showing signs that it has a real interest in dialogue on this
issue and has stepped up cooperation in response to the
change in U.S. administration. This additional cooperation,
in Arbitrio's opinion, led to the successful joint
counternarcotics operation carried out by Iran, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan on March 8. Interlocutors on Pakistan argued
that they, too, were disappointed about UNODC's downgrading
of its office in Pakistan, but noted that they were forced to
do by a lack of general funds. They also identified capacity
building needs in Pakistan. On March 19, Arbitrio requested
that USG officials repeat to Executive Director Costa and
other high-ranking UNODC officials Williams' request for
UNODC's thoughts on concrete future actions in order to
decide where the U.S. is best able to and interested in
contributing. End Summary.


2. (C) On March 18, INL/PA Director of the Office of
Afghanistan and Pakistan Program Tom Williams met with UNODC
officials to discuss counternarcotics issues in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iran, and to gain insight into UNODC's program
plans and needs in the coming year. He conveyed USG interest
in UNODC's assessment about how counterdrug initiatives are
faring in the three countries and asked about what is needed
to promote better regional cooperation on counternarcotics
and border security.

-------------- -
Iran Showing Interest in Cooperation, Dialogue
-------------- -


3. (C) Paris Pact Coordinator Antonino De Leo briefed on
progress being made under the Rainbow Strategy. Williams
encouraged De Leo to convey the specific capacity-building
needs for Afghanistan broadly to the international community.
De Leo took this as an action item and is working to
identify short-, medium-, and long-term requirements for
capacity building. He will work to add to this list at a
meeting in Kabul scheduled to take place after the Afghan
elections. De Leo also noted that they are contemplating
additional projects for Iran and that Tehran has asked them
to broker new initiatives. He argued that Iran is interested
because through these projects, Iran can have an impact on
the future of Afghanistan. Iran is already working to finish
up a training center that can contribute to Pakistan and
Afghanistan's ability to improve their counternarcotics
efforts as they do better on capacity building. Iran's
expertise on prevention is also broadly beneficial, he
argued, noting that 14 delegations from Asia and Africa are
traveling to Iran to learn about its prevention and treatment
initiatives. This is a place where more external funding
would be welcome. He also noted that, although he
understands international concerns about giving Iran dual-use
equipment for their counternarcotics forces, Iran does need
the requested items. Iran has demonstrated that it will
focus its efforts on counternarcotics efforts-it increases
its drug control budget every year and is improving its legal
capacity to deal with the drug problem, for instance by
passing a money laundering law. Although this law is not
perfect, De Leo argued, it is an important step in the right
direction.

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4. (C) Separately, Technical Cooperation Section Chief
Roberto Arbitrio, who recently returned from several years as
head of UNODC's office in Tehran, described UNODC's
coordination role in Iran and how it filters this information
back to the U.S. He believes that drug control might be a
good place to start a bilateral conversation with Tehran
because Iran is a "good guy" on this issue, it would allow
"peer to peer" engagement, and it is an issue on which Iran
has a real role to play. He cautioned that even UNODC's own
dialogue with Iran has ups and downs in terms of Iran's level
of cooperation. For instance, cooperation waned when tension
on the nuclear issue increased and after the election of
Ahmadinejad. It is also clear that Iran has a "double
agenda." It is taking steps forward on regional efforts for
drug control while trying to use those steps for leverage.
Nevertheless, there are signs that Iran is interested in
dialogue. First, Iran is proving to be a good partner in the
Triangular Initiative, and second, Iran has reengaged the
Dublin Group. Arbitrio argued that Iranian counternarcotics
chief Moghadam's meeting with the Dublin Group must have been
approved by Ahmadinejad since Moghadam is a close advisor of
the president. Iran is currently trying to organize a tour
of its counternarcotics efforts on the border for the Dublin
Group. (Note: This tour is likely to be similar to a tour
Iran gave other diplomats in late 2008 as reported in ref A.)
If there is a positive response to these moves, Tehran will
continue to move forward, although we should expect a slow
process because of the unwieldy and fragmented Iranian
government decisionmaking process. However, if there is not
a good response, Arbitrio would expect Iran to blame the U.S.
and others for the problems in Afghanistan. Arbitrio also
highlighted what he described as UNODC's "unique" leverage
with Iran since it is one of the few UN organizations working
in Iran and his ability to get meetings quickly and often
with high-level Iranian officials, including from the police
forces and the Majles. He noted that they do not have direct
contacts with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
and, in response to a question about whether the IRGC could
be a spoiler in attempts to increase dialogue with Iran over
the counternarcotics issue, Arbitrio responded that he
believes that given that both Ahmadinejad and Moghadam were
in the IRGC, his consultations with them make sure that the
IRGC is informed of UNODC and its activities. In any case,
his current interlocutors could mobilize the IRGC for support
if necessary. That said, he noted that clearance for
interaction on drug control comes from both the Supreme
Leader's office and the President's office, and if Khamenei
sees risks in this dialogue, then Iran's level of cooperation
will change.

--------------
Triangular Initiative Moving Forward
--------------


5. (C) Arbitrio described the Triangular Initiative as a
step forward because UNODC can engage Iran regionally despite
the ad hoc nature of the exercise. Arbitrio sees a change in
Iran's commitment to the initiative that he believes was
linked to the change in the U.S. administration. Iran was
initially reluctant on the ground despite its original
enthusiasm for the initiative, but more recently Tehran has
started to take the lead in the Triangular Initiative. For
example, UNODC tried to springboard off of a May 2008 meeting
in Tehran to get increased cooperation on intelligence
sharing, joint counternarcotics operations, and border
control but with little luck despite Arbitrio calling 12
meetings to try to get movement on these issues in the months
that followed. Then, after the change in U.S.
administration, Tehran took action. They ran workshops,
sponsored training, and made progress with the Joint Planning
Cell (JPC),contributing space for the cell's headquarters
and a full-time liaison officer, Colonel Masoud Rezvani, who
was previously a drug liaison officer (DLO) in Pakistan for
several years. Pakistan and Afghanistan only have part-time
officers attached to the JPC, both of whom work in their
respective embassies and have larger portfolios than drug
control, although the Pakistani liaison is close to
Anti-Narcotics Forces Chief General Jafari who "calls the
shots in Pakistan." Arbitrio argued that an important future
step will be to get full time liaison officers from Pakistan
and Afghanistan.


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6. (C) De Leo said that UNODC set up three deliverables
for the Triangular Initiative: the development of the JPC,
to conduct operations based on intelligence, and to establish
border liaison offices. He added that the goal is to
dismantle drug networks and that they planned to create
better mutual legal assistance that could, for instance, lead
to extraditions. Although Iran is further ahead on border
liaison offices (BLOs) than Pakistan and Afghanistan, more
work is needed in all three countries, and UNODC does not
currently have the funding to start BLOs on the Afghan side.


7. (C) Arbitrio told Msnoff on March 19 that many details
of the JPC were set up during the second ministerial meeting
of the Triangular Initiative in Iran. Both Iran and Pakistan
were adamant that forces would not be allowed to cross into
each others' territory. Arbitrio shared that Pakistan
remains especially distrustful of Iran, and nearly two months
ago, Iran threatened to cross into Pakistani territory to
conduct an operation against Jundallah, to which Pakistan
stridently objected. He argued that this event was part of
what convinced Pakistan to take part in the March 8 joint
operation, but that these fears are the biggest obstacle to
future joint operations. Additionally, it was decided that
the JPC would be the center for intelligence sharing and that
the information would be shared only with the three states
party to the Triangular Initiative. De Leo noted that Iran
is ready to share intelligence on insurgents in Sistan va
Baluchistan, but that if it did so, it would want to be able
to follow the insurgents into Pakistani territory. In the
context of this discussion, Afghanistan raised concerns that
it would need to be able to share intelligence with outside
parties if necessary to carry out its commitments in a joint
operation. Arbitrio noted that there was common
understanding that Afghanistan might lack the capacity to
follow through with its portion of a joint operation, thus no
one raised objections.


8. (C) The first meeting of the JPC took place about a
month ago and led to the first joint counternarcotics
operation on March 8, the plan for which was completed on
March 5. (Note: In response to Msnoff's question about
Iranian press that described operations against Jundallah on
March 7, Arbitrio emphasized that the counternarcotics
operation took place only on March 8, starting at 0800 local
time and that none of the countries had thus far mentioned a
Jundallah angle.) Arbitrio noted that UNODC was involved in
facilitating the involvement of all three states, but was not
involved in the operational planning of the operation per the
UN mandate. UNODC asked that operational plans not be shared
with them before the operation, although they are now
receiving briefings from each country on the details of the
event. Although the operation did not seize the ton of
narcotics that was set as a goal (or the amount Iran claimed
in domestic press),it was still successful: the operation
seized 473 kilograms of opium, 59 kilograms of heroin, and 98
kilograms of hashish, "dismantled" three criminal gangs, and
resulted in the arrest of 16 people. Arbitrio said Iran
reported that its counternarcotics police conducted its
portion of the operation, but he was not sure which Pakistani
forces were used, only that Pakistan contributed troops and
helicopters. To the best of Arbitrio's knowledge, the troops
only operated within their own borders, in accordance with
the earlier agreement. Arbitrio also noted in a March 19
meeting with Msnoff that Pakistan was fairly happy with the
operation, although they were disappointed that their troops
did not seize any drugs. In addition, it was clear from
Arbitrio's meeting earlier that day with the Pakistanis that
they still mistrusted Iran, but nevertheless were looking
forward to another joint operation.


9. (C) Thus far, the biggest problem discovered in the
operation was that Afghanistan never reached the
"operational" stage. Information was not passed from
Afghanistan's Counternarcotics Ministry to the Interior
Ministry so their forces stayed on the sidelines. Although
Pakistani and Iranian forces were operational, their
communications systems were not compatible; UNODC may request
donor funding to provide compatible communications equipment
so that these regional operations can be stepped up.
Arbitrio on March 19 expanded on the problems the Triangular
Initiative faces, noting a need to consolidate the JPC. He
worried about leaks given the large number of people involved
including JPC-associated personnel, DLOs, and the inclusion

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of UNODC on open telephone lines but noted that there was no
evidence of leaked information from this operation-the gangs
targeted were not sophisticated enough to have been able to
take advantage of these weaknesses. Additionally, it was
impossible for the JPC to be fully responsible for this
operation because the Pakistani and Afghan liaison officers
were not police officers, thus other "available channels" had
to be used. Arbitrio believes that the appointment of
permanent appropriate liaison officers would solve this
problem in the future. Arbitrio told Williams that an
upcoming technical meeting will more fully assess lessons
learned from the operation, and UNODC hopes that a second
operation will be undertaken in the coming months since the
goal set at the second ministerial meeting of the Triangular
Initiative was to complete two operations (subject to
appropriate intelligence and conditions on the ground) before
the third ministerial meeting set to take place in Islamabad,
probably in June. Arbitrio found this operation illustrative
of a positive trend with Iran and argued that having Iran as
a regional interlocutor on drug control should present
"additional opportunities."

--------------
UNODC Expresses Needs for Additional Support
--------------


10. (C) External Relations Officer Muki Jernelov and
Arbitrio described the severe funding shortages that UNODC is
facing for projects such as those associated with the
Triangular Initiative. Jernelov noted that this year UNODC
is facing a 75 million dollar shortfall and its Iran budget
for 2010 is currently only 250,000 dollars, down from the 3.3
million dollars they have to work with this year. Without
additional funding, they are afraid that the Tehran office
will have to close. Arbitrio stressed UNODC's need to keep a
presence in Iran, to stay operational, and to continue to be
in a position to promote dialogue. In response to Williams'
request for specifics on funding needs, Arbitrio said that
identifying deliverables and what is needed for operational
command and coordination is a priority while Jernelov noted
that, in addition to the funding needs for increasing the
operational capabilities of the three states in the
Triangular Initiative, UNODC has a number of other
initiatives and equipment needs that it will present to
donors.


11. (C) Arbitrio also noted that they intend the Rainbow
Strategy to go regional and operational, including through
further development of Central Asia Regional Information
Center (CARIC) and the Joint Planning Cell, which they hope
will be a pilot if it goes well. These organizations should
be mutually supportive, especially with Pakistan and
Afghanistan as members of both. (Note: Iran was not
approached for membership in CARIC because it is funded by
the U.S.) On March 19, Arbitrio requested that USG officials
repeat to Executive Director Costa and other high-ranking
UNODC officials Williams' request for UNODC's thoughts on
concrete future actions in order to decide where the U.S. is
best able to and interested in contributing. He thought this
would help them gain management support for work to identify
additional needs for donors funding and peak interest that
might help address UNODC's current funding crisis.

-------------- ---
Pakistan Facing Capacity-Building, Funding Needs
-------------- ---


12. (C) West/Central Asia Expert Smera Rehman said that she
considers the Triangular Initiative a success at the working
level in terms of increasing teamwork and that UNODC is
looking to expand portions of the Initiative to include India
and China because of a trafficking route that crosses those
countries. In response to Williams reiterating the U.S.
concern about border security in the Baluchistan area,
Jernelov reiterated UNODC's need for additional funding to
get UNODC through the current lapse and noted that such
funding could be used for precursor control and computer
training to make sure that the computers recently provided
are adequately utilized. Rehman noted that she was looking
at possible new projects that would need funding, such as
expanding judicial cooperation between Afghanistan and
Pakistan that would include extradition agreements and
capacity building in Pakistan. Williams noted that USAID has

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the lead on rule of law issues in Pakistan but encouraged
Rehman to continue to pass on ideas to improve border
security and counternarcotics to the USG, emphasizing our
interest in regional approaches. Jernelov noted that UNODC
is necessarily donor driven and that this sometimes stands in
the way of regional projects and perspectives. Williams also
noted that programs focusing on border security rather than
only on counternarcotics could provide useful flexibility.
Although admitting that the Anti-Narcotics Force sometimes
takes credit for successes beyond its own contribution,
Rehman noted that it has recently been more cooperative. She
attributes part of this success to the provision of a law
enforcement handbook that indentifies the roles of the
different actors that not only lets them know their limits,
but also has encouraged them to act by conveying a better
understanding of what they are allowed and expected to do.
Jernelov also noted that UNODC is hoping to expand their
container control program to Dubai and that they are hoping
that Dubai will pay for it. She promised to follow up with
some specific proposals that would address security and other
issues.


13. (C) Williams' meeting with UNODC Director of Operations
Francis Maertens centered on Pakistan. Williams encouraged
UNODC to examine its Pakistan program through an Af-Pak lens
to determine if current and planned representation were
coherent. The INL Bureau saw substantial needs in Pakistan
for greater border security efforts, for example, to include
greater interdiction capabilities. Given increased focus on
border efforts, to include the recent ground-breaking
counternarcotics operation under the Triangular Initiative,
DCM suggested UNODC may wish to consider the signal that
would be sent by downgrading its Pakistan head of mission
position. Operations Deputy Bernard Frahi and later Maertens
responded that they are being forced to cut 6-7 positions in
Pakistan mainly as a result of the lack of general purpose
funds. Although UNODC is considering downgrading the office
director's position from a D-1 to a P-4/5 position, Maertens
stated he has a couple of solid candidates for the position
despite the downgrade. Maertens welcomed heightened U.S.
interest in Pakistan, and noted that the Japanese were also
interested in increasing their program funding in the
country, focusing mainly on terrorism. However, he said,
while Pakistan is interested in such technical assistance, it
has expressed a preference for assistance that is independent
of Af-Pak or the Triangular Initiative. Williams also
identified money laundering as a problem that the U.S. would
like to address and noted our interest in regional approaches
to address drug-related money laundering which should
usefully include greater efforts with the Gulf states.
Maertens reiterated that UNODC estimates place the amount of
money laundered through the gulf at around 3.6 billion USD.
Finally, Maertens stated that Costa is interested in
attending the March 31 meeting, scheduled to be held in
Brussels, as a member of the Secretary General's delegation,
and also having a speaking role at the event.

--------------
Getting a Hold on the Afghan Poppy Problem
--------------


14. (C) In a meeting with Europe, West and Central Asia
Section Project Coordinator Andrea Mancini and Studies and
Treaty Analysis Section Research Expert Hakan Demirkuken,
Williams began by expressing concern over the message that
UNODC could send if they implied that low levels of
development encouraged higher levels of poppy cultivation.
Mancini then turned the discussion toward eradication,
arguing that eradication can be effective, but is a very
expensive activity to undertake. Mancini suggested that the
Afghani government should lead all eradication efforts, thus
applying the 'stick' to the poppy farmers. Coupled with
this, he argued that the international community (especially
the U.S.) should focus more on alternative development
assistance to build trust with the population. This strategy
of Afghan 'stick' combined with international 'carrot' would,
in Mancini's opinion, provide the best opportunity to
successfully reduce poppy cultivation in Afghanistan's
southern provinces.


15. (C) Williams noted strong USG support for efforts to
control precursor chemicals because of the regional law
enforcement cooperation such activities engendered. He

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cautioned, however, that it is important to be realistic
about the likely impact of such activity-it represented an
important element of a comprehensive counternarcotics
effort-but was not and should not be seen as a stand-alone
silver bullet that would solve the Afghan drug problem. The
USG does not view precursors as the silver bullet that can
effectively kill poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Mancini
agreed with Williams' assessment and noted his belief that
alternative development programs should be structured with
counternarcotics objectives in mind. Mancini expressed
concern that without a broad-based plan of action against
poppy cultivation, further efforts would lead simply to the
migration of poppy cultivation from Afghanistan into Iran.
SCHULTE