IAEA/2020: A LOW-RISK FORUM FOR DISCUSSING THE

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000011

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IAEA AORC KNNP UN PREL
SUBJECT: IAEA/2020: A LOW-RISK FORUM FOR DISCUSSING THE
IAEA'S FUTURE

REF: 08 UNVIE 598


1. (U) Summary: IAEA Board Vice Chair Kauppi intends to
preside over informal deliberations on the long-term future
of the Agency, putting to use, guardedly, the Commission of
Eminent Persons report of spring 2008. Kauppi's plan entails
monthly meetings on six major topics, such as nuclear power
and technical cooperation (see para 5). The light schedule
and open-ended nature of the process reflect Kauppi's
conclusion she could do little more with 2020 than turn it
into a team-building exercise for Member States, and that any
substantial reconsideration of the IAEA's work will have to
await signals of intention from the new U.S. administration.
Mission continues to view the process as an important
opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate goodwill, leadership,
and an active, multilateral approach to the future of the
Agency. However, if we do not lead this process, further
drift is likely. End Summary.


2. (U) In a January 8 meeting of the Western European and
Others Group (WEOG) ambassadors, Board Vice Chair Kirsti
Kauppi (Finland) outlined her plans for managing the "2020"
process through the next year. Kauppi opened by warning WEOG
members that the process would be different than many Member
States had anticipated, and that it would be wise to lower
the level of ambition and focus on the potential benefits of
an inclusive and open-ended discussion between Member States.



3. (U) Kauppi went on to make seven points, beginning by
"forbidding" further reference to the process as 2020 (given
the poor reception of the Eminent Persons and 2020 reports),
and asked that the process instead be called "The Future of
the Agency." Kauppi's remaining six points are summarized
below:

-- The process will be open, frank, and governed by Member
States. The Secretariat will be represented in an auxiliary
role.

-- All Member States will be invited to participated (not
just Board members).

-- The two reports on The Future of the Agency (by the
Commission of Eminent Persons) and Vision 2020 (by the
Director General) will be treated solely as resources. (This
implies that Kauppi intends to avoid referring to specific
recommendations from the CEP report.)

-- There are no pre-determined outcomes or hidden agendas.
The goal is not to make recommendations to the Board, though
this may eventually occur.

-- This is a separate process from other, formal discussions
at the IAEA (such as Technical Cooperation, the Program and
Budget Committee, etc.)

-- Discussions will take place under the aegis of the
existing IAEA Statute and will not seek to change it.


4. (U) Kauppi also touched on operational issues, explaining
that the process would begin with a general discussion, then
move to each of the IAEA major programs (at a rate of one
subject-matter session per month, with one-and-a-half days
allotted to each). The process would wind up with another
general discussion of outstanding items. As a final step,
Kauppi anticipated submitting an informal report to Board
Chair Ambassador Feroukhi. She would not "negotiate" the
text before submission.


5. (U) Kauppi's overview generated little in the way of
comments from the WEOG. Kauppi distributed a schedule of
meetings, which are scheduled back-to-back with regular IAEA
meetings, in order to facilitate attendance:

-- February 19: General discussion

-- February 26-27 or March 5-6: Nuclear Power, Fuel Cycle and
Science

-- April 28-29: Nuclear Techniques for Development and
Environmental Protection

-- June 18-19: Nuclear Safety and Security

-- July 9-10: Management of Technical Cooperation for
Development

-- September 3-4: Nuclear Verification

-- October TBD: Policy, Management and Administration

-- November 19-20: Outstanding Issues and Agency Activities
as a Whole


6. (SBU) In a separate meeting a day earlier, IAEA External
Relations Chief Vilmos Cserveny confessed to DCM that
Ambassador Kauppi intended to keep the process in a holding
pattern until 2010, after the installment of a new DG.
Cserveny felt the DG selection process and U.S. transition
introduced too many complications this year to conduct a
process aimed at binding decisions about the Agency's
long-term future. Conversations with Member States from both
NAM and WEOG also revealed a general reluctance to move
aggressively on any process, even an "open-ended" one
(reftel). Cserveny expressed the hope that a new U.S.
administration would be able to enunciate a positive vision
for the IAEA (and its budget) as part of a wider
non-proliferation policy review. Likewise, at the conclusion
of the acrimonious November Board debate on 2020, DG
ElBaradei appealed for a strong U.S. role in this exercise
going forward, noting the alternative is petty squabbling
among IAEA missions over second tier issues.


7. (SBU) Comment: Ambassador Kauppi is conscious of trying
to do some good in the circumspect atmosphere surrounding the
process-formerly-known-as-2020. She has sought to assuage
fears that the process might produce anything substantive.
Instead, her emphasis has been on "feel-good" catch phrases
that stress inclusiveness while minimizing commitment. The
light meeting schedule reinforces the perception that this
process could become more a team building exercise among
Member States than a serious effort to address the "crisis"
of IAEA resources and authorities to which DG ElBaradei
regularly points. Nevertheless, Mission continues to view
Kauppi's framework as the one forum where the U.S. can
demonstrate active leadership on efforts to improve the
IAEA's performance and focus over the long term. We can use
the selected format of discrete issue discussions to set and
present our priority areas, drawn from CEP recommendations or
otherwise, in a la carte fashion. But we must have a very
few, central structural reforms as the explicit goals of our
interventions. These will aim at strengthening Agency
programs in nuclear security, safeguards and safety while
advancing the modernization and reform of Agency processes
and other programs. Septel will offer UNVIE thoughts on what
this short list of big ideas might consist of, bearing in
mind the expectation of ElBaradei and others that before too
long the Obama administration will come to the table with its
own blueprint for enhancing the IAEA's effectiveness and
managing the Agency's real resource constraints. End
Comment.
SCHULTE