IAEA/ISRAEL/GAZA: ARAB STATES SILENT ON GAZA

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000107


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019
TAGS: AORC MNUC PREL SENV IAEA XF IS


SUBJECT: IAEA/ISRAEL/GAZA: ARAB STATES SILENT ON GAZA
DEPLETED URANIUM CLAIMS

REF: A. STATE 19853

B. 09UNVIEVIENNA25


Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)

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Summary
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1. (C) We expected that Arab states/NAM might use the IAEA
Board of Governors meeting the week of March 2 as a platform
for expressing outrage over the recent war in Gaza. Our
expectations were wrong. The Arab group had positioned
itself to link Gaza to nuclear safety by claiming a possible
health hazard arising from alleged Israeli use of depleted
uranium (DU) munitions. The ultimate lack of Arab polemics
was despite the fact that the Board Chair had told us prior
to the Board meeting that the Arab Group expected a response
to its letter on Gaza DU. Moreover, a friendly Arab
ambassador told us only minutes before "Any Other Business"
that Arab states would make statements on Gaza. We have not
queried Arab missions on this topic since the Board
meeting--in order not to risk unhelpfully resurfacing the
matter--so do not have confirmation as to the Arabs'
calculus. Mission believes, however, that the Arab silence
may have arisen in part from Arab recognition that the
Secretariat is not moving quickly toward any action in Gaza,
as well as from our efforts to dissuade Director General (DG)
ElBaradei from provoking a conversation on Gaza. Another
possible factor was a private message to the DG's staff from
the Israeli Ambassador that polemics on Gaza would cause the
Ambassador to publicly rebuke the DG for his inappropriate
press statements on Gaza. End Summary.

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The Dog That Didn't Bark...
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2. (C) Per Ref cables and subsequent interactions with
other IAEA missions in Vienna and IAEA Secretariat, the Arab
Group intended to: raise under the "Any Other Business" (AOB)
agenda item its allegations of Israeli use of depleted
uranium (DU) munitions in Gaza, call for IAEA assistance in
"investigating" the issue, and likely use the issue as a
platform to make statements abhorring Israel's actions in
Gaza more generally. However, the March 2009 Board meeting
concluded with no Arab statements on the issue. This is
despite the fact that only moments before the AOB agenda item
opened for discussion, Moroccan Ambassador Zniber (protect)
volunteered to MsnOff that there would be statements on the
Gaza issue. In response to MsnOff's query at the time,
Zniber claimed that the interventions would be focused on the
appropriate role for the Agency in supporting assessment of
any radiological risk, vice a broader "investigation."
Zniber also said that he and others had rejected suggestions
"from some" to attempt to link any IAEA sample-taking in Gaza
with the Syrian claims that uranium found at the Al-Kibar
site was somehow introduced via Israeli munitions.

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...But Why?
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3. (C) IAEA External Relations and Policy Coordiantion
(EXPO) chief Vilmos Cservery told Msnoff on March 13 that the
Secretariat had had no direct contact with the Arab Group on
the issue during Board week. The Arabs knew, Cserveny said,
that the WHO and UNEP viewed on-site work in Gaza as not
timely (due to the security situation). They knew further
that Israel had responded to the IAEA that it could help get
IAEA personnel into Gaza, but could not ensure their security
in the territory, and that Israel had provided a limited
written response to one but not to a second IAEA letter on
the matter. Cserveny said he surmised Arab ambassadors had
concluded there was nothing to be gained by raising the
matter in the Board. (Note: He added the Secretariat would
have to take appropriate action in Gaza with partner agencies
if Member States pressed their query. End Note.) Absent a
decision to press the call at this Board meeting for
Secretariat study of Gaza, the Arab states were without a
germane issue on which to append political criticism of the
military action. However, we expect at least two further
relevant factors may have helped persuade the Arab group to
stand down.


4. (C) First, Israeli Ambassador Michaeli told us he had
communicated to EXPO Chief Cserveny during the run-up to the
Board that, should the DG or Board members engage in polemics
on the Gaza issue, Michaeli was under firm instructions to
fire back by making reference to the inappropriateness of the
DG's public comments on Gaza. Michaeli said he would have to
suggest that in light of those comments the IAEA should
recuse itself from any involvement in Gaza (even if otherwise
appropriate in regard to determining any radiological
hazard). Michaeli did not disagree with MsnOff's repeated
expressions of concern that such an approach would only
provoke even more unhelpful dynamics in the Board room and
commented throughout the week of the Board to MsnOff that he
was doing what he could to persuade Jerusalem to take a less
provocative approach. Michaeli also told MsnOff in
confidence that, should the IAEA go to Gaza, "they will find
nothing." (Comment: Michaeli might also have conveyed to
Cserveny that there had been no Israeli use of depleted
uranium munitions in Gaza as part of Michaeli's personal
campaign to avoid further poisoning the atmosphere in the
Board on Middle East issues. End comment.)


5. (C) Further, we expect Mission efforts directly with
the Secretariat and others also may have helped avert Gaza
polemics. Ambassador cautioned the Board Chair (Algeria) in
pre-Board consultations against the Arab group stoking a
political debate on Gaza in the Board. DCM had earlier
secured a commitment from both Cserveny and IAEA Spokesperson
Melissa Fleming that the DG would steer clear of Gaza in his
opening statement to the Board; the DG's statement made no
mention of Gaza. As noted above, Mission was engaged with
Michaeli over the course of several days to encourage Israel
to hold its fire if possible. And finally, in the above
exchange with Moroccan Ambassador Zniber and others, Mission
has taken any opportunity to underline that while we would
have no objection to the IAEA playing the same role in Gaza
that it has played elsewhere in ensuring no radiological
hazard, it would only undercut collective desires for an
effective IAEA to politicize this issue and press for IAEA
activities beyond its mandate.


6. (C) As to future developments, the IAEA continues to
consider a possible visit to Gaza, but decisions/planning on
that front appear to be on a slow track. Mission understands
that United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) activities in
Gaza to date have included sample-taking, but the scope of
the UNEP effort does not include a search for depleted
uranium. Instead, all parties would look to the IAEA to
pursue the depleted uranium question as appropriate. Mission
will continue to monitor the evolution of the issue at the
IAEA. If IAEA were to plan and implement a radiological
survey in Gaza, it could cause the issue to re-emerge as a
possible catalyst for comment in the Board. Ambassador
Michaeli told MsnOff that he approached Egyptian Ambassador
Fawzi at the end of the Board session and joked about his
disappointment at missing the opportunity to respond to Arab
statements on Gaza. Fawzi returned the joke by commenting
that, "in the spirit of friendly Israeli-Egyptian relations,"
Fawzi would be sure to mention it next time. Until and
unless Mission sees signs that the Arabs are reinvigorating
momentum to make an issue of Gaza at the IAEA, Mission has
chosen not to raise the matter with Arab counterparts in the
wake of their silence at the Board, but rather to let this
sleeping dog lie.


PYATT