EU ON "HARM REDUCTION": THROW US A BONE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000001

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958
TAGS: SNAR, UNODC, UN
SUBJECT:EU ON "HARM REDUCTION": THROW US A BONE

REF: A) UNVIE 00666, B) UNVIE 00660
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Summary
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1. In negotiations leading to the March 2009 meeting of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the European Union has insisted that
any review of the 1998 UNGASS Political Declaration Addressing the
World's Drug Problem include the ever-controversial term "harm
reduction." Thanks in part to recent senior-level engagement by A/S
Johnson and others, we believe the EU is starting to soften is
hard-line stance although it will insist on language beyond what has
previously been used in UN resolutions. In order to capitalize on
this development, it would be helpful to: 1) engage the EU and
clarify the parameters within which it is willing to negotiate "harm
reduction" 2) work with allies on this issue to determine their
tolerance for flexibility as well as assess their preferred manner
of future engagement and 3) craft alternative language that will
satisfy our concerns and provide the EU with a chance to resolve
this thorny issue. By following this three-step approach, the U.S.
will more likely appear as a proactive, constructive, and able
leader to the other delegations, a role that we hope will produce a
successful conclusion of the 10-Year Review of the 1998 UNGA
Special Session (UNGASS) resolution to fight drugs. END SUMMARY.

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Background
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2. Some European Union members include in their drug demand
reduction strategies the concept of "harm reduction," an ill-defined
term which could encompass everything from counseling to medically
prescribed heroin injected in clinics. Although "harm reduction" is
a secondary issue in the overall efforts to reduce the demand for
illicit drugs, it plays no role in reducing the world's drug supply
or the control of chemical precursors. However, the EU has
increasingly placed primary importance on "harm reduction" in their
approach to the UNGASS review exercise, referring to it in opening
remarks to this fall's UNGASS working groups, as well as insisting
on referring to the term throughout the text of the draft action
plan that has emerged from these working group negotiations.

3. The U.S. and its allies have consistently pressed the point that
the primary goal is to reduce demand of drugs, not the harm
associated with drug use. In the past the U.S. and like-minded
countries have kept the term out of UN drugs-related resolutions,
including the 1998 Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Drug
Demand Reduction, and the November 2008 UNGA drug resolution.
Nevertheless, recognizing that some countries identify "harm
reduction" measures as part of their national comprehensive
strategies to reduce demand, delegations in the 1998 UNGASS were
able to reach compromise language that reads, "Demand reduction
programmes should cover all areas of prevention, from discouraging
initial use to reducing the negative health and social consequences
of drug abuse..." The 1998 language has proven to be quite durable,
consistently being used as a substitute for any explicit "harm
reduction" reference, as happened in resolutions at the annual UN
Commissions on Narcotic Drugs (CND) after 1998, and in the UN
General Assembly in November 2008. (Note: in 2006 a UNGA Political
Declaration on HIV/AIDS included the term in relation to drug use
and when reaffirming that prevention of HIV must be the mainstay of
any response to the pandemic. End note.)

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EU: Softening but also
Insisting on "Progress"
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4. Over the past few weeks UNVIE has engaged in "harm reduction"
discussions with EU members in a variety of fora complimenting the
strong message that A/S David Johnson delivered here in early
December. (reftel A) We have detected an EU willingness to soften
its hard-line stance on the issue of "harm reduction." At a dinner
Ambassador hosted in honor of INL Assistant Secretary Johnson, UK
Ambassador told DCM and missionoff that the EU's main goal was to
"move the ball forward, however incrementally." His main concern,
he stated, was that whatever comes out of the March 2009 CND, the EU
cannot afford to "go backwards." In subsequent conversations, our
UK interlocutor told missionoffs that the EU needs "something more"
than the 1998 Political Declaration language, or the November 2008
UNGA omnibus drug resolution language. An EC representative and a
Czech Health Ministry official acknowledged to missionoff that
getting the term "harm reduction" into the 2009 CND documents would
be difficult, but insisted that they needed "something that would
show the increasing realization that harm reduction measures are a
part of many nation's drug demand reduction strategies." In short,
they insisted that any agreement show an "evolution" of past
language.

5. Germany has been carrying the "harm reduction" ball for the EU
in the UNGASS discussions in Vienna. UNA Counselor urged her German
counterpart to be politically realistic about this issue, noting
that at the recent G-8 Lyons-Roma meeting in Kyoto, Russia, Japan,
and Canada, in addition to the U.S., opposed the EU's position on

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"harm reduction" language. In addition, she pointed out, a number
of G-77 (e.g., Pakistan) and GRULAC (e.g., Colombia) countries are
also opposed. On the margins of the annual Paris Pact Policy
Consultative Group meeting in Vienna December 15-16, UNA Counselor
made the same points to Axel Kuechle, a senior MOFA official from
Berlin, who also represented Germany at the Kyoto G-8 meeting.
Kuechle acknowledged the political realities and expressed a
willingness to find compromise language. However, he also made the
point that the 2009 documents should indicate some progress beyond
the 1998 language.

6. At the December 15 coordination meeting Ambassador hosted with
the incoming Czech presidency, UNA Counselor raised similar points
to the Czech ambassador and his colleagues (reftel B). Czech
counselor Petr Havlik gave the same response, noting the need to
show "progress" on this issue in the political declaration to be
negotiated for the high-level segment of the 2009 CND. The Czech
officials expressed willingness to work with the U.S. and asked us
to propose alternative language.

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Continue to engage with the EU
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7. From our perspective, the EU has been negotiating for some time
in "bad faith" on this issue When the UNGASS review process they
created failed to yield favorable results on "harm reduction," they
switched tactics and are now trying to undermine that very same
process. Their rather dogmatic stance on this issue -- which local
Ambassadors attribute to the Commission in Brussels -- seems to have
prevented constructive communication. Nevertheless, we need to
continue to engage with the EU and to offer alternatives, keeping in
mind their premise that the 1998 language needs to evolve "however
incrementally."

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Build Alliance with Like-Minded
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8. Since the U.S. is not the only country opposing "harm
reduction," UNVIE will continue to reach out to like-minded
delegations to gauge their tolerance for flexibility. Such efforts
could lead to a coordinated common position and/or agreed
alternatives. On the other hand, if some of the other states we
prepared to weather a confrontation with the EU, we may want to take
a harder stand and reject any proposal that does not hew exactly to
the 1998 or the 2008 UNGA language.

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Comment
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9. The EU seems to be softening its insistence on "harm reduction,"
apparently realizing that negotiations on the term itself have been
and will continue to be fruitless. And certainly at the
Ambassadorial level, there are a few in Vienna who are prepared to
see this issue scuttle the Commission on Narcotic Drugs meeting or
occupy much more diplomatic band width. Although they have made no
specific offer of alternative language, our European allies have
laid down a marker that the 2009 documents would have to show
"evolution" from 1998 and 2008 language. Their willingness to
compromise will depend not only on the strength of our (and our
allies') opposition, but also on our willingness to find a
constructive compromise. If we take the pen proactively, i.e.,
offer alternative language, we would more likely control the
process, demonstrate leadership to the like-minded, and secure
cooperation with all. A U.S. delegation seen as a leader who is
proactive, constructive and engaged is vital to the successful
outcome of the UNGASS Review at the March, 2009 CND.


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