Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ULAANBAATAR257
2009-09-04 08:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Cable title:
AMBASSADORSHIPS AND POLITICS IN MONGOLIA
how-toR 040854Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3013 INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING AMEMBASSY BERN AMEMBASSY KUWAIT AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY SEOUL AMEMBASSY SOFIA AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM AMEMBASSY TOKYO USMISSION GENEVA
C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000257
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND INR/EAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORSHIPS AND POLITICS IN MONGOLIA
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000257
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND INR/EAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORSHIPS AND POLITICS IN MONGOLIA
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Mongolia has 33 diplomatic missions
worldwide, and many key ambassadorships are coming vacant at
the start of the Elbegdorj presidency. The handling of these
appointments provides significant insight into political
maneuvering in Mongolia. Financial, ethnic, religious,
social, and political considerations are all in play. Here
we examine the appointments to several key posts, including
Moscow, Beijing, Geneva, Stockholm, Kuwait, and Sofia. End
Summary.
--------------
THE AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS
--------------
2. (SBU) Ambassadors are appointed to three-year terms. When
a position becomes vacant, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MFAT) makes an initial suggestion to the president
regarding who might fill the vacancy. The president may
accept this recommendation or may nominate another candidate.
In either case, the president submits a name to Parliament's
Standing Committee (SC) on Security and Foreign Policy, which
must approve the nomination and send it forward to a plenary
session for simple-majority approval. The SC chair has the
power to delay or hold these nominations, and as such is a
key player. The current chair of the Security and Foreign
Policy Standing Committee is Z. Enkhbold, a DP member close
to Elbegdorj.
3. (C) Although the president has the power to recall
ambassadors before their terms are complete, in practice this
is not done without a compelling argument, since such a
recall might invoke the wrath of Parliament, of which Prime
Minister Bayar's Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
(MPRP) has a majority of seats. Such a scenario might
destabilize the MPRP-DP coalition government, which Elbegdorj
initially opposed last fall but now acknowledges as necessary
in this time of fiscal and economic crisis. Moreover, a
presidential recall of an ambassador might invite the
MPRP-controlled Parliament to vote down Elbegdorj's
replacement for that position.
--------------
CASE STUDY ONE: MOSCOW
--------------
4. (C) The new ambassador to Russia is D. Idevkhiten, a
former MP who lost his seat in 2008 and who is associated
with former President Enkhbayar (MPRP). Idevkhiten's
appointment is testimony to the lingering influence Enkhbayar
has in Mongolian politics. Enkhbayar is widely expected to
run for a vacant seat in Parliament in a by-election on
October 18; the MPRP will nominate its candidate on September
25.
5. (C) Elbegdorj's willingness to appoint Enkhbayar's
associate to this key position indicates a shrewd balancing
of the president's interactions with factions of the MPRP:
Former President Enkhbayar and Prime Minister Bayar are known
to dislike one another and to compete for influence within
the MPRP. Bayar is a former ambassador to Russia, and as
such would have preferred one of his own to fill this
position. However, Elbegdorj apparently would rather not see
the current PM's considerable power augmented in this way.
Instead, in this instance Elbegdorj has supported the
Enkhbayar faction, which is still reeling from Enkhbayar's
loss of the presidency to Elbegdorj.
--------------
CASE STUDY TWO: GENEVA
--------------
6. (C) Elbegdorj has appointed the former foreign policy
advisor to Enkhbayar, L. Orgil, to head the mission in
Geneva. This is another instance of keeping Bayar's
supporters mostly out of the diplomatic equation while also
claiming bipartisan handling of diplomatic appointments.
Orgil is not a member of the MPRP, but he and Enkhbayar are
ethnic Buriats with family connections to Khentii Province.
--------------
CASE STUDY THREE: STOCKHOLM
--------------
7. (C) Former MPRP bureaucrat B. Enkhmandakh is now the
ambassador to Sweden. Enkhmandakh is an Enkhbayar loyalist
whom many Enkhbayar opponents accuse of taking exclusive
blame for an incident several years ago involving alleged
bribes from Macanese casinos, thereby keeping Enkhbayar out
of trouble. Regardless of the accuracy of these accusations,
Enkhbayar likely assisted Enkhmandakh after the latter's
release from prison, eventually helping Enkhmandakh to become
a political attache at the embassy in London and, in a
dramatic career jump immediately thereafter, Vice Foreign
Minister in 2007. (Note: Vice Minister positions are largely
ceremonial, generally lucrative, and were nearly eliminated
prior to the formation in 2008 of the coalition government,
which necessitated more plum positions to hand out. End
Note.)
--------------
CASE STUDY FOUR: SOFIA
--------------
8. (C) Unfortunately for Enkhbayar, Elbegdorj's goodwill ends
with Moscow, Geneva, and Stockholm. Recall there is a strong
possibility that Enkhbayar will run for a seat in Parliament
in October. This seat is located in the DP-leaning
Chingeltei District of Ulaanbaatar; Elbegdorj vacated the
seat in June upon his inauguration. Earlier this summer, the
politically shrewd Civil Will Party (CWP) leader, Oyun (an MP
and former FM),suggested that her party would also run a
candidate in the October by-election, thereby pulling votes
from the DP. She indicated the candidate would likely be the
party's deputy chair, Ts. Gankhuyag. Such a scenario would
obviously benefit the MPRP.
9. (C) Soon after Oyun's announcement, Gankhuyag found
himself nominated ambassador to Bulgaria. In this way,
Oyun's party gets an ambassadorship from the DP in return for
not putting forth a candidate in October. The CWP also
refrained from running a candidate in the closely contested
presidential election in May that put President Elbegdorj in
office, so we can expect to see DP gratitude toward the CWP
(and the Greens, for the same reason) for some time.
Gankhuyag is no Russophile, having inquired with poloff
earlier this year about uranium cooperation prospects with
the United States.
--------------
CASE STUDY FIVE: KUWAIT
--------------
10. (C) The appointment of K. Sairaan as ambassador to Kuwait
is the most curious case examined here. Sairaan is a former
career diplomat (previously ambassador to Egypt) and an
ethnic Kazakh Muslim from Bayan-Olgii Province who left the
MFAT to become an MP for the Democratic Party in 2004. In
2008, Elbegdorj refused to allow Sairaan to run again, so
Sairaan did so as an independent and lost. This estrangement
from the DP led him to become the investment policy advisor
to PM Bayar. Despite there being little love lost between
Elbegdorj and Sairaan, the president has tapped him as envoy
to Kuwait in recognition of Sairaan's extensive influence in
the Muslim world. The most illustrative example of this
influence is Sairaan's engagement with the Kuwaiti leadership
during his time as an MP to obtain $12 million to build a new
complex for the Mongolian Parliament. (Note: Although the
money came to Mongolia, a building site has not yet been
identified and no one can say exactly where the funds now
are. End Note.)
--------------
CASE STUDY SIX: BEIJING
--------------
11. (C) Of course, Elbegdorj can be expected to nominate some
of his own top people to ambassadorships. In the case of
Beijing, the president tapped his foreign policy advisor, Ts.
Sukhbaatar, for the appointment. His previous position was
as International Secretary for the DP, and he earlier served
as ambassador to the United Kingdom. Sukhbaatar has not yet
departed for Beijing. (Biographical note: His wife,
Oyunchimeg, is the deputy chief of the Mongolian Customs
Office. End note.)
--------------
THE CAREER DIPLOMATS
--------------
12. (SBU) Yes, career diplomats also have a place in this
equation. Elbegdorj has tapped Kh. Ayurzana, the Director of
the Neighboring Countries Department at MFAT, to head the
mission to Mongolia's almost-neighbor, Kazakhstan. (Note:
The population of Bayan-Olgii, the westernmost province of
Mongolia, is 90 percent Kazakh. End Note.) T. Zalaa-Uul,
formerly a counselor at the MFAT, is heading to Ottawa, which
is a key relationship due to significant mining investments
in Mongolia by Canadian companies. B. Davaadorj, who was the
advisor to the ambassador in Berlin, has been elevated to the
top job there. Germany is Mongolia's most significant
Western European relationship and boasts robust cultural and
commercial ties. None of these career diplomats is known to
have notable political leanings.
MINTON
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND INR/EAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORSHIPS AND POLITICS IN MONGOLIA
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Mongolia has 33 diplomatic missions
worldwide, and many key ambassadorships are coming vacant at
the start of the Elbegdorj presidency. The handling of these
appointments provides significant insight into political
maneuvering in Mongolia. Financial, ethnic, religious,
social, and political considerations are all in play. Here
we examine the appointments to several key posts, including
Moscow, Beijing, Geneva, Stockholm, Kuwait, and Sofia. End
Summary.
--------------
THE AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS
--------------
2. (SBU) Ambassadors are appointed to three-year terms. When
a position becomes vacant, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MFAT) makes an initial suggestion to the president
regarding who might fill the vacancy. The president may
accept this recommendation or may nominate another candidate.
In either case, the president submits a name to Parliament's
Standing Committee (SC) on Security and Foreign Policy, which
must approve the nomination and send it forward to a plenary
session for simple-majority approval. The SC chair has the
power to delay or hold these nominations, and as such is a
key player. The current chair of the Security and Foreign
Policy Standing Committee is Z. Enkhbold, a DP member close
to Elbegdorj.
3. (C) Although the president has the power to recall
ambassadors before their terms are complete, in practice this
is not done without a compelling argument, since such a
recall might invoke the wrath of Parliament, of which Prime
Minister Bayar's Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
(MPRP) has a majority of seats. Such a scenario might
destabilize the MPRP-DP coalition government, which Elbegdorj
initially opposed last fall but now acknowledges as necessary
in this time of fiscal and economic crisis. Moreover, a
presidential recall of an ambassador might invite the
MPRP-controlled Parliament to vote down Elbegdorj's
replacement for that position.
--------------
CASE STUDY ONE: MOSCOW
--------------
4. (C) The new ambassador to Russia is D. Idevkhiten, a
former MP who lost his seat in 2008 and who is associated
with former President Enkhbayar (MPRP). Idevkhiten's
appointment is testimony to the lingering influence Enkhbayar
has in Mongolian politics. Enkhbayar is widely expected to
run for a vacant seat in Parliament in a by-election on
October 18; the MPRP will nominate its candidate on September
25.
5. (C) Elbegdorj's willingness to appoint Enkhbayar's
associate to this key position indicates a shrewd balancing
of the president's interactions with factions of the MPRP:
Former President Enkhbayar and Prime Minister Bayar are known
to dislike one another and to compete for influence within
the MPRP. Bayar is a former ambassador to Russia, and as
such would have preferred one of his own to fill this
position. However, Elbegdorj apparently would rather not see
the current PM's considerable power augmented in this way.
Instead, in this instance Elbegdorj has supported the
Enkhbayar faction, which is still reeling from Enkhbayar's
loss of the presidency to Elbegdorj.
--------------
CASE STUDY TWO: GENEVA
--------------
6. (C) Elbegdorj has appointed the former foreign policy
advisor to Enkhbayar, L. Orgil, to head the mission in
Geneva. This is another instance of keeping Bayar's
supporters mostly out of the diplomatic equation while also
claiming bipartisan handling of diplomatic appointments.
Orgil is not a member of the MPRP, but he and Enkhbayar are
ethnic Buriats with family connections to Khentii Province.
--------------
CASE STUDY THREE: STOCKHOLM
--------------
7. (C) Former MPRP bureaucrat B. Enkhmandakh is now the
ambassador to Sweden. Enkhmandakh is an Enkhbayar loyalist
whom many Enkhbayar opponents accuse of taking exclusive
blame for an incident several years ago involving alleged
bribes from Macanese casinos, thereby keeping Enkhbayar out
of trouble. Regardless of the accuracy of these accusations,
Enkhbayar likely assisted Enkhmandakh after the latter's
release from prison, eventually helping Enkhmandakh to become
a political attache at the embassy in London and, in a
dramatic career jump immediately thereafter, Vice Foreign
Minister in 2007. (Note: Vice Minister positions are largely
ceremonial, generally lucrative, and were nearly eliminated
prior to the formation in 2008 of the coalition government,
which necessitated more plum positions to hand out. End
Note.)
--------------
CASE STUDY FOUR: SOFIA
--------------
8. (C) Unfortunately for Enkhbayar, Elbegdorj's goodwill ends
with Moscow, Geneva, and Stockholm. Recall there is a strong
possibility that Enkhbayar will run for a seat in Parliament
in October. This seat is located in the DP-leaning
Chingeltei District of Ulaanbaatar; Elbegdorj vacated the
seat in June upon his inauguration. Earlier this summer, the
politically shrewd Civil Will Party (CWP) leader, Oyun (an MP
and former FM),suggested that her party would also run a
candidate in the October by-election, thereby pulling votes
from the DP. She indicated the candidate would likely be the
party's deputy chair, Ts. Gankhuyag. Such a scenario would
obviously benefit the MPRP.
9. (C) Soon after Oyun's announcement, Gankhuyag found
himself nominated ambassador to Bulgaria. In this way,
Oyun's party gets an ambassadorship from the DP in return for
not putting forth a candidate in October. The CWP also
refrained from running a candidate in the closely contested
presidential election in May that put President Elbegdorj in
office, so we can expect to see DP gratitude toward the CWP
(and the Greens, for the same reason) for some time.
Gankhuyag is no Russophile, having inquired with poloff
earlier this year about uranium cooperation prospects with
the United States.
--------------
CASE STUDY FIVE: KUWAIT
--------------
10. (C) The appointment of K. Sairaan as ambassador to Kuwait
is the most curious case examined here. Sairaan is a former
career diplomat (previously ambassador to Egypt) and an
ethnic Kazakh Muslim from Bayan-Olgii Province who left the
MFAT to become an MP for the Democratic Party in 2004. In
2008, Elbegdorj refused to allow Sairaan to run again, so
Sairaan did so as an independent and lost. This estrangement
from the DP led him to become the investment policy advisor
to PM Bayar. Despite there being little love lost between
Elbegdorj and Sairaan, the president has tapped him as envoy
to Kuwait in recognition of Sairaan's extensive influence in
the Muslim world. The most illustrative example of this
influence is Sairaan's engagement with the Kuwaiti leadership
during his time as an MP to obtain $12 million to build a new
complex for the Mongolian Parliament. (Note: Although the
money came to Mongolia, a building site has not yet been
identified and no one can say exactly where the funds now
are. End Note.)
--------------
CASE STUDY SIX: BEIJING
--------------
11. (C) Of course, Elbegdorj can be expected to nominate some
of his own top people to ambassadorships. In the case of
Beijing, the president tapped his foreign policy advisor, Ts.
Sukhbaatar, for the appointment. His previous position was
as International Secretary for the DP, and he earlier served
as ambassador to the United Kingdom. Sukhbaatar has not yet
departed for Beijing. (Biographical note: His wife,
Oyunchimeg, is the deputy chief of the Mongolian Customs
Office. End note.)
--------------
THE CAREER DIPLOMATS
--------------
12. (SBU) Yes, career diplomats also have a place in this
equation. Elbegdorj has tapped Kh. Ayurzana, the Director of
the Neighboring Countries Department at MFAT, to head the
mission to Mongolia's almost-neighbor, Kazakhstan. (Note:
The population of Bayan-Olgii, the westernmost province of
Mongolia, is 90 percent Kazakh. End Note.) T. Zalaa-Uul,
formerly a counselor at the MFAT, is heading to Ottawa, which
is a key relationship due to significant mining investments
in Mongolia by Canadian companies. B. Davaadorj, who was the
advisor to the ambassador in Berlin, has been elevated to the
top job there. Germany is Mongolia's most significant
Western European relationship and boasts robust cultural and
commercial ties. None of these career diplomats is known to
have notable political leanings.
MINTON