TUNISIA AND UNGA THIRD COMMITTEE: COUNTRY SPECIFIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 000830

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR IO/RHS AND DRL/MLGA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019
TAGS: PHUM PREL TS UN
SUBJECT: TUNISIA AND UNGA THIRD COMMITTEE: COUNTRY SPECIFIC
RESOLUTIONS

REF: A. TUNIS 801 (NOTAL)

B. TUNIS 788 (NOTAL)

C. STATE 116268

D. STATE 109397

Classified by Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The Ambassador explained U.S. opposition to no-vote
actions, and requested Tunisian support (or at least
abstention) on pending human rights resolutions concerning
Iran, Burma, and North Korea in a November 12 meeting with
Mokhtar Chaouachi, the MFA's Director-General for UN and
International Organization Affairs at the Tunisian MFA. This
discussion followed a detailed conversation between the
Ambassador and Minister of State Saida Chtoui, one of two
deputies to Foreign Minister Abdallah, on October 30 (ref A),
and a general presentation the Embassy made to the MFA on
October 23 (ref B). In the November 12 meeting, Chaouachi
was non-committal but took on board the USG's high level of
interest in the resolutions. In order to secure Tunisian
support, the Embassy recommends the following steps: A) A
call from Under Secretary Burns to MFA Secretary of State
Chtoui; B) Consider offering U.S. support for Tunisia's "Year
of the Youth" proposal (ref A) in exchange for favorable
Tunisian votes on the country-specific resolutions; C)
Convoking Tunisia's Ambassador in Washington to press the
case. End summary.

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No-Action Motions and Country Specific Resolutions
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2. (C) In a November 12 meeting, the Ambassador pressed
Mohktar Chaouachi, MFA Director-General for UN and
International Organizations, for Tunisian rejection, or at
least abstention, in the anticipated no-action motions on the
draft resolutions concerning human rights in Iran and Burma,
and for a vote in favor of the draft resolution on the DPRK.
Underlining the long-standing U.S. view that no-action
motions are frequently abused to undermine the UN's mission,
the Ambassador also stressed that the outrageous crackdown on
Iranian democracy advocates in June, and Burma's ongoing
atrocious practices, merited vigorous international
condemnation. Chaouachi offered a non-committal response,
but acknowledged that Tunisia recognized the USG's strong
views on these country-specific resolutions. As reported in
ref A, the Ambassador's October 30 conversation with MFA
Secretary of State Saida Chtoui was almost identical.

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What the Tunisians Want: The "Year of the Youth"
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3. (C) Chaouachi, like Chtoui two weeks earlier, pressed the
Ambassador for U.S. support for Tunisia's proposal to
designate 2010 the "International Year of the Youth."
Chaouachi stressed the "great importance" and "urgency" of
seizing this moment in history to inculcate the world's youth
with a "universal" and "noble" spirit of moderation,
tolerance, solidarity, and high moral values. Procedural
objections raised by other countries were substantively
flimsy, he argued: There is already a preponderance of
international activities benefiting youth that would fall
neatly under the umbrella of the Tunisian "Year of the Youth"
proposal. One (apparently face-saving) compromise the
Tunisians might find acceptable was the Turkish proposal to
commence the "Year" in August 2010, Chaouachi underlined.


4. (C) Comment: As noted ref A, the Tunisians are marketing
their youth-year idea as a personal initiative of President
Ben Ali. The proposal is an outgrowth of a 2008 domestic
campaign (of dubious merit) to engage Tunisian youth by
establishing a new "pact" stressing mutual loyalty and
solidarity between the state and the country's youth. We
believe the MFA is working overtime to give the presidential
palace a deliverable it can use domestically, showing the
whole world lining up behind a Ben Ali initiative. End
comment.

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Securing Tunisian Support
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TUNIS 00000830 002 OF 002



5. (C) Tunisia's voting record, and its own vulnerability to
criticism on human rights, suggests it is unlikely we will
secure Tunisia's vote in favor of any of the three
resolutions - Iran, Burma, or the DPRK. Tunisia did, in
2008, absent itself from the votes on Burma and the DPRK (it
voted in favor of Iran's no action motion). We believe
taking the following actions would offer the best chance of
securing Tunisian support, or at least abstention, on the
three country-specific resolutions:

A) A telephone call from Under Secretary Burns to MFA
Minister of State Saida Chtoui: Chtoui, one of two deputies
to Foreign Minister Abdallah, told the Ambassador during
their October 30 meeting that Under Secretary Burns is held
in very high regard in Tunis. The Minister of State appears
to be the Foreign Minister's point person on multilateral
issues; in addition to convoking Ambassadors on the "Year of
Youth," she led the Tunisian delegation to the Forum for the
Future in Marrakech. Foreign Minister Abdallah, by contrast,
is not always as well-versed on UN issues.

B) Trade votes: We fully agree with the Department's
inclination to remain neutral on Tunisia's "Year of the
Youth" proposal. Nonetheless, the Department may wish to
consider trading our support for the Tunisian plan, which
they care about deeply, for affirmative Tunisian votes on the
three resolutions we care about.

C) Convoke the Ambassador: The Department may wish to
convoke Habib Mansour, Tunisia's Ambassador in Washington, to
press its case. We note Ambassador Gray has twice been
convoked by the MFA to discuss the "Year of the Youth."
GRAY