ELECTIONS 2009: DOWN AND OUT IN CENTRAL TUNISIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000780

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL TS
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS 2009: DOWN AND OUT IN CENTRAL TUNISIA

REF: A. TUNIS 746

B. TUNIS 741

C. TUNIS 694

Classified By: Ambassador Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) As in recent pre-election visits to Tunisia's second
and third largest cities, and a trip to Tunisia's south,
poloff's mid-October visit to the central Tunisian interior
revealed overall public indifference and resignation toward
the presidential and legislative elections set for October

25. Civic activism in Central Tunisia has been stifled by
government repression, a dearth of ideas, and infighting.
When asked about elections, contacts responded with a sense
of resignation and defeatism, expecting no surprises. Rather
than focusing on politics, our interlocutors in central
Tunisia were more concerned with the flight of the younger
population from poverty and unemployment in the region. End
summary.


2. (SBU) Poloff spent three days traveling in the
south-central cities of Kairouan, Sidi Bou Zid, and Sbeitla
in central Tunisia. Historically a major center of Islamic
learning in North Africa, Kairouan is today primarily a
tourist town, famous for the Great Mosque of Sidi Uqba and
the basins built by the Aghlabite Dynasty. The city suffers
from administrative neglect and apparent mismanagement of
tourism revenues, as well as an influx of citizens from
neighboring towns seeking employment. Sidi Bou Zid, an
hour's drive southeast of Kairouan, is an impoverished town
largely devoid of sustainable employment opportunities for
the city's many native university graduates. Sbeitla is a
smaller town compared to Kairouan but is a significant
tourist destination due to its Roman ruins.

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Kairouan: Civil Society is "Literally Dead"
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3. (C) The entrance into Kairouan is crowded with "Ben Ali
2009" posters and other political posters that some contacts
claimed have been there for years. The ruling Democratic
Constitutional Rally (RCD) headquarters, located prominently
near the city's entrance, heavily adorned with Ben Ali
banners, cuts an imposing figure. By contrast, opposition
activists are obliged to hold official meetings in their
private homes or unofficially in coffee shops. Contacts
noted that the ban on campaign banners outside of the
official campaign period (October 11-24) was strictly
enforced for opposition parties and uniformly unenforced for
materials posted by the ruling party.


4. (C) Poloff met in Kairouan with representatives from the
Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) and the Tajdid
("Renewal") Party. Ahmed Kilani, founder of the LTDH chapter
in Kairouan, former member of the Democratic Socialists
Movement (MDS),and current Democratic Forum for Labor and
Liberties (FDTL) sympathizer, embodied the frustration of
civil society within the city and the region in general.
Kilani repeatedly stated that civil society was "literally
dead" in Kairouan, the population showed no interest in civil
society and the conditions under which civil society
attempted to function were "abysmal." According to Kilani,
Kairouan residents were "immune" to the elections and
expected no surprises in the results. The ordinary resident
was basically ignorant of the existence of opposition parties
or their alleged ideological independence from that of the
RCD. Kilani stated that citizens were so jaded by the
controlled political environment that they tended to lump all
political parties together with the ruling RCD, and had no
interest in any (purported) ideological differences amongst
them.


5. (C) A strong advocate of human rights and the patriarch of
Kairouan civil society, Kilani claimed that the city was
originally "Tunis in miniature" when it came to civil society
activism. However, over the years, infighting among civil
society activists, combined with the GOT's repression and
control, had effectively inhibited progress and eliminated
any public interest in civil activism. The ruling RCD had
stepped in to fill the void. Kilani alleged that local
leaders of two prominent opposition parties, Tajdid and the
Progressive Development Party (PDP),had been feuding.
Tajdid leaders criticized the PDP for the ever-shifting
alliances of its leader, Najib Chebbi, while local PDP
activists also accused Tajdid of playing both sides of the
political fence. Although he claimed to support the
Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (FDTL),he admitted
that the FDTL had no real presence in the city. Kilani
stated that stories of internal fighting within the local RCD
regarding the composition of the party's 2009 elections
legislative list had leaked, but as expected, were not
reported in the press. Kilani received several calls from
unidentified GOT personnel asking about the purpose and
content of his meeting with poloff. Kilani told Poloff this
was a "normal occurrence" for civil society activists in the
region and said such harassment had been on the increase in
the advent of the October 25 elections.


6. (C) Tajdid member Moncef Wouhabi cancelled his planned
meeting with Poloff, reportedly due to government harassment.
Wouhabi informed Poloff through an intermediary that plain
clothes police followed him to the agreed-upon meeting
location, but concerned for his security, he decided to leave
and postpone the meeting.

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Sidi Bou Zid: Jobs Before Politics
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7. (C) In Sidi Bou Zid, public ambivalence toward the
elections, was also evident. Atia Athmounsi, local member of
the PDP and head of the PDP list for legislative elections in
the region, told Poloff that the party's list in the region
was summarily rejected with no official explanation
provided. According to Athmounsi and several other private
citizens who crowded the small storefront where they met, the
economic situation, rather than the elections, was of primary
concern to local citizens. Earlier in 2008, residents had
officially requested that the GOT attract manufacturing
investments, and set up a university in the region, but
nothing had materialized.


8. (C) Interlocutors claimed there were approximately 4,000
unemployed university grads who had returned to Sidi Bou Zid
after their studies but could not find employment. The lack
of economic opportunity facilitated recruitment into the
ruling party according to Athmounsi and local residents,
since the prospects of employment that accompanied ruling
party membership were more attractive options than civil
society activism and unemployment.


9. (C) Athmounsi claimed that in Sidi Bou Zid, RCD militants
and residents were regularly enlisted to do the party's
"dirty work." He referenced the incident earlier in the
year, where PDP members led by Maya Jribi were attacked by
the public in the presence of police in Sidi Bou Zid. The
GOT also applied economic pressure against militants to deter
political activism, since the only sustainable and lucrative
employment in the city were government jobs doled out by the
RCD. Athmounsi also stated that civil society was regularly
denied access to public halls for meetings, and landlords
were pressured by the government no to rent venues for civil
society activities. So far in 2009, Athmounsi claimed, the
PDP along with Tajdid had tried to rent halls for independent
meetings four times and had been denied.

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Sbeitla: Of Roman Ruins and Nonexistent Civil Society
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10. (C) Sbeitla offered similar challenges for civil society
activists: heavy and repressive government oversight of NGO
activities, public disinterest in the elections, and
paralyzing disputes among local opposition activists. Poloff
met with Ammar Hamdi, head of the PDP's legislative list in
the Governorate of Kasserine, who stated that all civil
society in Sbeitla was stifled by the GOT. Activists were
constantly monitored by plain clothes police and colleagues
loyal to the ruling party regularly reported on civil society
members, he believed. Hamdi claimed that he had applied to
be principal at his school on four separate occasions, and
thought, as the most senior teacher, he was well qualified,
but believed he had been repeatedly rejected due to his
political activism.


11. (C) Hamdi said Sbeitla civil society meetings were mostly
held out of town for security reasons. Hamdi claimed that
the FDTL had barely any presence in Sbeitla nor were students
active or present in the political discourse. Citizens in
Sbeitla had access to the PDP's opposition newspaper,
Al-Mawkef, but distribution remained low. Hamdi stated that
local residents were more concerned with tourism money and as
long as they believed the GOT was facilitating the tourism
trade, elections and general political participation remained
a non-issue. Local residents expected no surprises in the
elections (i.e. Ben Ali would win by a landslide),and the
legislative elections were even of less interest to the local
citizenry. The relationship between the PDP and Tajdid (for
the same reasons as in Kairouan) was also tense in Sbeitla.

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Comment
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12. (C) In all of our recent pre-election travel outside of
Tunis, public ambivelance has been the principal theme. The
government's effective monopolization of political space, its
marginalization of the opposition, and its solid lock on the
electoral process, were also evident. Disunity and an
absence of new ideas further weakened the cause of civil
society activists. We saw no signs of public interest in
political participation and activism to spur the government
into addressing the region's poverty and unemployment.
Instead, public ambivalence has facilitated the RCD's
continued dominance and local authorities' "business as
usual" attitude. End comment.
GRAY