Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TUNIS179
2009-03-27 17:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tunis
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR PRESSES DEFMIN FOR GREATER INFORMATION

Tags:  PREL PMIL MASS TS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0179/01 0861701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271701Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6121
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000179 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PMIL MASS TS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DEFMIN FOR GREATER INFORMATION
SHARING; MORJANE CAUTIONS AGAINST OPPOSITION CONTACTS

REF: A. TUNIS 173

B. IIR 6 897 0049 08 (DTG 040813Z JUN 08)

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000179

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PMIL MASS TS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DEFMIN FOR GREATER INFORMATION
SHARING; MORJANE CAUTIONS AGAINST OPPOSITION CONTACTS

REF: A. TUNIS 173

B. IIR 6 897 0049 08 (DTG 040813Z JUN 08)

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Meeting with Defense Minister Morjane in preparation
for the mid-May Joint Military Commission (JMC),the
Ambassador underscored the importance of a robust information
exchange and closer cooperation. In addition to helping
avoid the problems that led to the recent cancellation of the
Atlas Drop exercise, better information will allow us to
offer training and exercises that are tailored to Tunisian
needs. Moreover, we need to better understand Tunisia's
security needs to develop and defend appropriate security
assistance requests. Morjane pleaded with the Ambassador not
to read any negative signals into the GOT's handling of Atlas
Drop. With more time, he explained, the answers the US side
was looking for would have come from the palace, allowing the
exercise to go forward. Morjane informed the Ambassador that
the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry had intended to split
the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) the USG is providing
under Peacekeeping Assistance funds equally between the
Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Interior; he
did not seem surprised by the Ambassador's response that this
assistance would be limited to the military. Shifting gears,
Morjane, noted the continuing trend of anti-American
sentiment in the Arab world, as expressed in its popular
media outlets. Presumably speaking on instruction, he warned
the Ambassador that contacts with the opposition can be
construed as support for them, which ultimately hurts the US
cause. He cautioned, "You should not underestimate the
message that you're giving to those who have always been on
your side." The Ambassador made clear that he has contact
with all legal opposition parties but that this should not be
interpreted as US support for them. End Summary.

--------------
Laying the Groundwork for a Productive JMC
--------------


2. (C) In his hour-long meeting with Defense Minister Morjane
on March 25, the Ambassador sought to lay the groundwork for

a productive Joint Military Commission (JMC) in May by noting
the status of USG deliberations on the FY09 FMF level,
reviewing preliminary USG planning for the JMC, and
underscoring the need for better information exchange and
closer cooperation. Morjane, who was accompanied by
Captain-Major Mohamed Khammassi, who is responsible for
bilateral and multilateral relations at the Ministry of
National Defense (MND),and Colonel-Major Mohamed Ghorbel,
MND Director of Cooperation and International Relations, was
receptive. He welcomed the news of DASD Whelan's planned
in-country travel on the margins of the JMC, and said the GOT
would ensure that she has an informative and enjoyable visit.


--------------
Training and Exercises: Better Info Exchange
To Avoid Another Atlas Drop Imbroglio
--------------


3. (C) Previewing possible JMC agenda items, the Ambassador
noted that the US side would want to have an in-depth
discussion about training and exercises. Referring to the
recent problems in the Atlas Drop exercise, which was
canceled as a result of conditions imposed by the GOT that
were not acceptable to the US military, the Ambassador
explained that the USG will seek clear GOT guidance on what
it wants out of such exercises. The United States would be
prepared to tailor exercises according to Tunisian needs and
desires, he said. For example, given the Ministry of
National Defense's focus on civilian works, perhaps we could
offer a program with the Army Corps of Engineers.


4. (C) Morjane pleaded with the Ambassador not to read
anything negative into Tunisia's late response to US requests
with respect to Atlas Drop. "It was a question of timing for
us," he said, "nothing more." He acknowledged missing the US
side's suspense date for a response, and he conceded the
USG's right to impose a deadline for its internal
decisionmaking. He noted, however, that such deadlines do
not work in Tunisia. "You know how our system is," he said,
apparently referring to the GOT's renowned capacity for
bureaucratic inertia. He made clear that he had sent the US
questions "up," presumably to the palace, for approval; by
the time the approval came back "down," however, it was too
late. The Ambassador noted that it was unfortunate that so

much time and so many resources had gone into an exercise
that never materialized. (Note: In a one-on-one pull aside
after the meeting, the Ambassador spoke even more frankly to
Morjane about US frustration over the cancellation of Atlas
Drop. Morjane asked, again, that the Ambassador understand
the MND's "special status", clearly referring to the need to
refer even minor questions to Carthage for decision. End
Note.)

--------------
Better Info Also Helps
Security Cooperation
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador offered that DASD Whelan would be
prepared to give a briefing to GOT counterparts on the
various pots of money the USG can tap to provide security
assistance to Tunisia. He explained these moneys are often
apportioned in a competitive process in which multiple
Embassies put forward proposals to meet the security needs of
their host country governments. The better our understanding
of the Tunisian military's needs, he continued, the better
our ability to defend our assistance requests.

-------------- -
UAVs Provided Under PKO:
No-go on Palace/MFA Intent to Give Half to MOI
-------------- -


6. (C) Morjane broached the subject of the US $4.1 million
worth of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) about which
then-Secretary Rice informed President Ben Ali during her
September, 2008, visit to Tunisia. (Note: This assistance is
being provided under Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account
funds. End Note.) Morjane said that following Rice's
announcement, the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry,
without consulting the MND, had decided to split the PKO
assistance equally between the Ministry of National Defense
and the Ministry of Interior. The Ambassador explained that
the assistance being provided under the PKO account was for
the military only and could not be shared with the MOI. He
said that if the MOI had particular needs, we would be happy
to consider them. Morjane did not seem surprised that the
assistance would be limited to the military; indeed, he
seemed pleased. He asked that the Ambassador formally convey
this message to the Foreign Ministry. (Note: The Ambassador
did so in a March 26 meeting with MFA Chief of Staff Mahmoud
Khemiri and Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister Mehrez
Ben Rhouma. He also undertook to convey this position via
diplomatic note. See Ref A.)

--------------
Opposition Contacts Not Welcome
--------------


7. (C) Midway through the meeting, Morjane became
philosophical. He said he had been following with interest
and admiration the new direction President Obama is taking
vis-a-vis the Middle East. He characterized the President's
decisions as "more realistic" and "respectful." He
contrasted this with the resurgence of anti-American
sentiment and other "backwards thinking" has been taking
place in popular Arabic media outlets over the past couple of
years. He pointed out that such popular sentiment poses
difficulties for the GOT, which is known for its tolerance,
openness, and modernity. Illustrating the point, he referred
to the June 2008 NATO ship visit to Bizerte, which was met
with a small protest against the Iraq war. (Note: The
protest was organized by the independent opposition
Progressive Democratic Party, and was covered in al-Mowqif,
the party's newspaper. See Ref B.) "You may think that a
NATO ship visit is no big deal," he said, clearly implying
that the opposite was true.


8. (C) Morjane went on to chastise the Ambassador for
"supporting" these very people. "You should think about who
your friends are," he continued, "and you should not
underestimate the message that you're giving to those who
have always been on your side." We should be helping one
another, he concluded. The Ambassador said he was well aware
of the sensitivities involved with cooperating with the
United States, and he said that we are prepared to do our
part to help mitigate difficulties. He also clarified that
he has contact with representatives of all legal political
parties in Tunisia. He emphasized that such contacts do not
constitute "support." Moreover, he said, he always gives
Tunisia credit for its accomplishments, whether talking to
GOT or ruling party officials, or representatives of the
opposition. Even so, Morjane insisted, opposition figures
take advantage of these contacts, which they seek to construe
as US support.


--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Although Morjane tried to couch his comments about
dealing with the opposition as off-the-cuff, we believe he
was speaking on instruction. And though he did not mention
the opposition Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) by name, he
was clearly referring to it, and by extension, its founder
and would-be presidential candidate Nejib Chebbi, against
whom Ben Ali harbors an intense animus. This is not the
first time that the Ambassador has received such a message.
Other highly placed interlocutors, such as appointed Senator
Roger Bismuth, have sought to steer the Ambassador away from
contacts with Chebbi, also likely at the behest of senior RCD
officials. It is probable that the Palace chose Morjane to
convey the message this time, because Morjane is seen as
someone who can communicate effectively with US counterparts.
Of course, the Embassy will continue to have contacts with
the PDP and other legal opposition parties, in addition to
the ruling party, but we will seek a lower profile in the
coming weeks in response to this apparent message.


10. (C) On a separate note, we were struck by Morjane's
admission that the permissions the US side had been seeking
for the Atlas Drop exercise had to go "up" to the Palace for
approval. This should have been a purely technical, military
call. It is no surprise things move so slowly in this
country. End Comment.

Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm
Godec