SE GRATION AND LIBYAN FM DISCUSS DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000874

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/C, AND S/USSES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2019
TAGS: PREL, CD, SU, LY
SUBJECT: SE GRATION AND LIBYAN FM DISCUSS DARFUR

TRIPOLI 00000874 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa expressed
pleasure with U.S.-Libyan cooperation on the Darfur crisis and
encouraged Special Envoy Gration to apply pressure to
dis-unified factions of the Sudan Liberation Army. He cautioned
that without increased pressure from international actors, rebel
leaders in Addis Ababa, Tripoli, and other capitals would grow
comfortable in "five-star hotels" and seek to enhance their
personal image at the expense of unification and peace talks.
Kusa agreed with SE Gration's assessment that the humanitarian
situation and the upcoming national elections added urgency to
the resolution of the Darfur issue and that returns and
reconstruction would be impossible without lasting security.
Kusa characterized Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil
Ibrahim as a Turabist and pledged Libya's continued support for
"capable and competent" nations' -- like the U.S. -- initiatives
for peace in Sudan. End Summary.

KUSA ENCOURAGES INCREASED PRESSURE FOR UNIFICATION

2. (C) In an October 8 meeting with Foreign Minister-equivalent
Musa Kusa, SE Gration outlined his overall strategy for Sudan
and thanked Kusa for Libya's interventions to find a political
resolution to the Chad-Sudan conflict and to unify splintered
factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). He said he
appreciated Kusa's assistance in facilitating the travel of
Addis Ababa-based SLA leaders to Tripoli in an effort to promote
their unification in advance of the re-launch of the Doha
process slated for October 28 (Note: This date has since
slipped to mid-November as the Joint-Chief Mediator announced
that he needed to be present at the African Union's Peace and
Security Council Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria schedule for the end
of October. End note.). Gration said his purpose in Libya was
three-fold: to ensure that Libya and the U.S. presented a united
position to the rebels, to work on facilitating the rebels'
participation in a unification conference, and to make sure no
new factions were created as a byproduct of SLA unification.

3. (C) Kusa expressed gratitude for SE Gration's attention to
the Darfur issue and his consultations with Libyan officials
handling the portfolio. As a neighboring country, Libya "feels
the depth" of the suffering caused by the Darfur conflict, and
appreciates the seriousness with which the U.S. has approached
the crisis. Other international actors, Kusa said, lacked the
capacity and the knowledge to achieve results. Kusa encouraged
SE Gration to push the "apathetic" faction leaders to quickly
resolve the conflict with Khartoum. He said that some,
including Ahmed Abdel Shafi, sought international sympathy and
attention and were more interested in staying in "five-star
hotels" and being shuttled from capital to capital. Unification
and peace talks, Kusa said, would end the benefits that some
rebel leaders have come to enjoy.

4. (C) Kusa expressed concern about the effect of Darfur's
lingering IDP and refugee problems on regional security, calling
for greater international monitoring and reporting. Without
internal security in Darfur, Kusa saw little opportunity for
Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees to return to
their homes and resume their lives. This, in turn, exacerbated
regional security concerns and compounded the challenge of
humanitarian relief. Kusa was particularly concerned with the
smuggling, arms traffic, and extremism that was fed by the
instability in Darfur. Characterizing the the janjaweed as
Islamic extremists, Kusa reported that the Libyan External
Security Organization had interdicted several smuggling groups
with ties to Islamist groups in Algeria.

5. (C) SE Gration agreed that more attention needed to be paid
to the situation in IDP camps and preparations made for eventual
returns and reconstruction. Laying out the timetable of
important events -- the renewal of Doha talks and the November
start of voter registration in preparation for the national
elections in the spring of 2010 -- Gration cautioned that any
gains would be fragile. He asked that Libya continue to apply
pressure on JEM, Abdul Wahid Nur, and "anyone with technicals
and guns" to prevent spoilers from affecting the unification
process. Gration argued that the conditions were ripe for quick
unification: Sudan seemed increasingly serious about peace
talks while Chad President Idriss Deby was growing tired of
JEM's tactics. The unique window of opportunity, however,
should not lead to a rushed pact between groups that had no
roots and would dissolve before serious negotiations with
Khartoum could take place.

6. (C) Kusa and SE Gration agreed that Khalil Ibrahim had
designs of national leadership and would attempt to disrupt any
push for unity among SLA factions. Kusa assessed that Khalil
had the same mentality as Turabi and was essentially a member of

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the Muslim Brotherhood. Calling Khalil "unreliable," he
cautioned that he would turn away from any agreement he made
with either Khartoum or the International Community. Saying
that Libya had to give Khalil some aid to ensure he would
continue his relationship with the GOL, he said both Libya and
Deby would need to pressure him to cooperate.

7. (C) Kusa closed the meeting by reiterating Libya's gratitude
for the productive relationship with the U.S. on the Sudan
conflict. Kusa said he hoped to establish a broader dialogue
with the U.S. on a range of African issues, and would welcome
visits from other U.S. officials in this regard.

8. (U) SE Gration cleared this message.
CRETZ