FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000773

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/VO/KCC, AND NEA/MAG
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LY
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009

REF: 08 STATE 74840

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1.The following responses are keyed to reftel.

a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the
full range of American Citizen Services and has been issuing the
full range of non-immigrant visas since March 25, 2009. Because
of Libya's longtime isolation, there are few "pull" factors from
the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the United States
is very small. As Libya is a relatively wealthy country, "push"
instigators for Libyan citizens are also fairly minimal.
Official Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated and
usually handwritten, featuring few, if any, security features.
We also have heard reports that genuine documents with false
information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a
fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the
Libyan government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm
information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability
to conduct fraud investigations. Further to this, the GOL
requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed
through only one designated host government security service
point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our
inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits
ability to conduct anti-fraud work. Libyan applicants in
general are unfamiliar with U.S. laws and processes and have
proven susceptible to a number of fraudulent schemes in an
effort to obtain visas or American citizen services.

b. NIV FRAUD: Post only began processing visas other than A and
G in the past 6 months, and to date we have seen only a few
cases of conventional fraud involving presentation of false
documents. In one such case, an H1B applicant presented
documents that were clearly fake and stated that he paid a large
sum for them on-line. He believed this to be the process to
obtain a work visa in the United States. DHS has reported two
Libyan applicants turned back at point of entry and admitting to
lying during their interviews. In one case, the applicant
mentioned that a known visa-fixing agency in Tripoli had coached
him on successful interview techniques and recommended borrowing
money to enhance his bank account statement. In addition, we
have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their
personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get
a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We
have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all
of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have
usually issued the visas in accordance with the request. We
continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the
applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new
instances of overstays. We will continue to monitor such cases
closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan
visa applicants sometimes procure false employment letters from
friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has
implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member
companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of
all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa
applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have
involved petitions from international oil companies; we have
detected no evidence of any fraud thus far.

c. IV FRAUD: Over the past year, Tripoli began to accept
petitions for immigrant visas from resident American citizens,
but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not yet
seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships. We
do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book"
rather than separate birth and marriage certificates. While
this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage
certificate, both of which are available. All three documents
are handwritten, and contain no security features. We have no
exposure to employment-based IV cases.

d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has
received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other
Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants and other
Libyans who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail
from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV
forms, and have placed a general warning about the use of
service providers for any visa services on our website.

e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full
passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from
first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth
in the United States while a parent was attending university.
These cases require more time to review than most, in large
part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the
identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of
applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the
time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming

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presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast
amounts of supporting documentation. We routinely ask for two
forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants
because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability
of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a
national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most
Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents
include a photo, but are only in Arabic.

f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of
a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident U.S.
citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a
dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Embassy
Tripoli has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption
in Libya, and has not seen a case. A pending case involves an
American family in France seeking to adopt an illegal TCN
immigrant child in Libya; the outcome remains uncertain.

g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for
DNA testing to date.

h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent
reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these
cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and
Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or
misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS
92/93 cases.

i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST
TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both
for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially
from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the
production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers
operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to
Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya
does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely
difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2 million
irregular (illegal) migrants are present in-country but live
outside mainstream Libyan society. Post knows that European
Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a
Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has
received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or
other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another
Western country. In the 6 months we have been processing NIVs,
we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be involved
in smuggling or trafficking. Most TCN applicants are
executive-level employees of international oil or construction
companies.

j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's RSO served as ARSO/I
and FPM in his last assignment while the ARSO's previous
assignment was as an RSO-I. Post has an SOP for referring fraud
cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases to
refer to DS with the exception of the H1B fraudster.

k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL
REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly
handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any
security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable
features. While both marriage and birth certificates are
available, the document in everyday use to demonstrate
relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue
or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A
man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his
wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family
book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who
can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity
cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a
photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite
how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have
not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified.

The Libyan passport is the only official government document
that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last
pages. The GOL has indicated that in the future, it plans to
assign a single national ID number which will identify a person
from the registration of their birth through their entire life.
Under this plan, passport numbers would remain the same for a
person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register
lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports
would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its
passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates
for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last
year. The new passport and identity documents are currently
slated for release in the next few months. The GOL has not
shared an exemplar of the new passport.

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The Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries
in Libya, has identified several genuine Libyan passports issued
with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the
passport is a replacement for an older passport. This notation,
according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior
passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's
travel history. This calls into question the integrity of the
Libyan passport as an identity document. Post is not aware of
any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency
and civil registry has reportedly begun a process of
"correcting" the last names of Libyan citizens, many of whom, as
is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as
their last name. One visa applicant told us that this practice
was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the
use of "family" or clan last names instead. There are routinely
four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name,
the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family
name. The handwritten English translation of the passport
rarely contains a full translation of these four names - more
frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an
initial only. When changes are made, no mention of any previous
passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned.
We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications
to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by
mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the
passport number on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis
detected numerous duplicates in their database. Contact with
the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the
six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used. The
Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter"
serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not
appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to
find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications
without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where
inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the
passport data page.

l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our
relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated.
Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and
even then, are often ignored. The Consular section is not
permitted by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law
enforcement, as all such contact is required to be between RSO
and a designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with
RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated
requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has
repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens'
personal data with foreign governments, which will further
complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud.

m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: We are working with other
Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop
our
understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome
214(b). Early indicators are that few unqualified applicants are
presenting themselves for interviews.

n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The deputy section chief serves as
FPM. He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in
the past
five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position.
All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the
importance of both internal controls and our external image in
relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa
or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular
Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has
influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are
required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their
orientation.
CRETZ