Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TRIPOLI268
2009-04-01 07:22:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Tripoli
Cable title:  

FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009

Tags:  KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5976
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0268/01 0910722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010722Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4668
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0403
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0504
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5195
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000268 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND NEA/MAG
FOR CA/VO/KCC
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LY
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009

REF: 08 STATE 74840

TRIPOLI 00000268 001.2 OF 003

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000268

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND NEA/MAG
FOR CA/VO/KCC
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LY
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009

REF: 08 STATE 74840

TRIPOLI 00000268 001.2 OF 003


1.The following responses are keyed to reftel.

a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the
full range of American Citizen Services, but until January 2009,
only processed those visas for which applicants are exempt from
biometrics and personal appearance requirements, primarily A and
G visas. As of January 25, 2009, we began to process selected
categories of nonimmigrant visas, and opened for full services
on March 25, 2009. Because of Libya's longtime isolation, there
are few pull factors from the United States, as the Libyan
diaspora in the US is very small. Because Libya is a relatively
wealthy country, push factors are also mitigated. Libyan
documents are generally unsophisticated, featuring few, if any,
security features, and we also have heard reports that genuine
documents with apocryphal information are obtainable from the
authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family
connections. In addition, the host-country government is
extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its
citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct
investigations. Further to this, the GOL requires that all
law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one
designated host government security service point of contact.
While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to
develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to
conduct anti-fraud work.

b. NIV FRAUD: Because Post has only begun to process visas other
than A and G, we have seen little conventional fraud involving
presentation of false documents. However, we have seen cases
where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections
to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal
travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We have confirmed with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that
the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have issued the visas in
accord with the request. We continue to follow up in these
cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya,
but have seen no new instances of overstays. one stayed far

longer than his putative job as a diplomatic courier could
possibly require. We continue to monitor these cases closely.
Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa
applicants sometimes get false job letters from friends who work
at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a
Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register
with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees
authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our
employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from
international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any
fraud.

c. IV FRAUD: Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant
visas from resident AmCits, but Tunis continues to interview
these cases. We have not seen any instances of fraud or
questionable relationships. We do note that Libyan applicants
often present the "Family Book" as both birth and marriage
certificates. While this is a valid civil document, we require
a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available.
All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security
features to speak of. We have no exposure to employment-based
IVcases.

d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has
received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other
Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants who have
either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service
providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, andhave
placed a general warning about the use of service providers for
any visa services on our website.

e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full
passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from
first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth
in the United States while a parent was attending university.
These cases require more time to review than most, in large
part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the
identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of
applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the
time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming
presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast
amounts of supporting documentation . We routinely ask for two
forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants
because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability
of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a
national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most
Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents

TRIPOLI 00000268 002.2 OF 003


include a photo, but are only in Arabic.

f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of
a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident US citizen
who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can
adopt in this country. To date, Post has received only one
general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a
case.

g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for
DNA testing to date.

h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent
reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these
cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and
Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or
misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS
92/93 cases.

i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST
TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both
for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially
from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the
production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers
operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to
Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya
does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely
difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2m irregular
(illegal) migrants are present here but live outside Libyan
mainstream society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely
require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa
for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries
or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S.
travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In
the few months we have processed NIV's, we have not noted any
TCN applicants who appear to be possibly involved in smuggling
or trafficking-most are executive-level employees of
international oil or construction companies.

j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's ARSO's previous
assignment was as an RSO-I, and Post has an SOP for referring
fraud cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases
to refer to DS.

k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL
REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly
handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any
security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable
features. While both marriage and birth certificates are
available, the document in everyday use to show relationships is
the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover,
and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book
contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children.
Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in
the case of widows, who are the only women who can have their
own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers
licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these
as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be
to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of
cases where identity is falsified.

The Libyan passport is the only document that has an English
translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has
said that it is planning to use one national ID number which
will identify a person from the registration of their birth
through their entire life. Under this scheme, passport numbers
would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not
clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under
the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is
in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us
with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more
modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport
and identity documents are currently slated for release by
September. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of any new
passport. More troubling are reports from the Maltese Embassy,
one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, that they
have identified genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous
data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a
replacement for an older passport. This notation, according to
the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would
reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history.
This calls the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity
document into question. Post is not aware of any trend in
alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil
registry began the process of "correcting" the last names of

TRIPOLI 00000268 003.2 OF 003


Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world,
use an ancestor's first name as their last name. The applicant
told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that
the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names
instead. In Arabic, there are routinely four names in the
Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and
grandfather's first names, and then the family name. The
handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains
a full translation of these four names--more frequently, one or
both of the middle names is written as an initial only. When
changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in
another identity is necessarily mentioned. We routinely use the
"alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the
potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide
applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number
on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous
duplicates in their database. Contact with the Libyan Passport
Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport
number, three "series" letters are used. The Arabic letters
"wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to
differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear
on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a
way to capture these letters in the consular applications
without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where
inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the
passport data page.

l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our
relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated.
Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and
even then, are often ignored. The Consular Section is not
allowed by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law
enforcement, as all such contact must be between RSO and a
designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with RSO,
working through this channel often requires repeated requests
for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly
expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with
foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to
investigate identity fraud.

m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: As we open for visa processing,
we anticipate applications from Libyans for whom travel to Tunis
has been a financial burden. Most of these applicants will
likely be unqualified, and will have more reason to resort to
fraud in their applications. We are working with other Embassy
sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our
understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome
214(b). Early indicators are that demand is lower than expected,
and few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for
interviews.

n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The section chief serves as FPM. He
has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past
five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position.
All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the
importance of both internal controls and our external image in
relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa
or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular
Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has
influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are
required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their
orientation.
CRETZ