TRIPOLI-BASED DARFUR REBELS BELIEVE GOL'S ATTENTION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000109

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/3/2019
TAGS: PREL LY SU AU
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI-BASED DARFUR REBELS BELIEVE GOL'S ATTENTION TO
DARFUR HAS DIMINISHED

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 871, B) TRIPOLI 70, C) KHARTOUM 92

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CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, PolEcon Chief.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Representatives of the Sudan Liberation
Army/Unity (SLA/U) faction resident in Tripoli find their days
largely unoccupied despite renewed fighting in Darfur as Libyan
officials have shifted their attention to crises in Gaza and
Somalia. The late-2008 lull in fighting weakened their military
potential and yielded no progress on rebel unification as Abdul
Wahid continued to ignore calls to reunify SLA. SLA/U was
heartened by UN/AU Mediator Djbril Bassole's January 7 field
visit, but good feelings were dashed by January 24 when they
suffered combat losses at Um Saruna that included the death of
an important military commander. SLA/U leaders view the
Secretary's call for a "No Fly Zone" in Sudan favorably, but
worry that an ICC indictment against Bashir will open the
floodgates for Islamist foreign fighters to join government
forces in Sudan. They are increasingly pessimistic that the GOL
will resurrect the Sirte process, in part because the GOL has
shifted its attention elsewhere, and are preparing to leave
Tripoli for greener pastures. End Summary.

GOL CONTACT WITH SLA/U WANING; UN/AU MEDIATION FILLS THE GAP



2. (C) Poloff met with SLA/U representatives Saayid Sharif and
Osman Muhammad Busra on January 28 at their Tripoli headquarters
(a run-down room at the state-owned Grand Hotel),where they had
been "spending time without much to do" since meeting last
November. Their contact with the GOL had steadily decreased
since late summer, and all but ceased in December when GOL
officials became seized with crises in Gaza and Somalia and
their efforts to win Libya the chairmanship of the AU (ref B).
With UN/AU Chief Mediator Djbril Bassole's planned trip to
Tripoli in December 2008 apparently postponed indefinitely and
no active movement by the GOL to facilitate talks between rebel
movements, Sharif and Busra held out little hope that Libya
would ramp up engagement with Darfur rebels in the near term.
While personally disappointed that cooperation had slowed,
Sharif reported that Bassole's visit with SLA/U leaders in Um
Saruna was promising. He quoted Bassole as having characterized
SLA/U as a real movement with real support from the people,
allegedly contrasting it with Abdul Wahid's faction. SLA/U
remains skeptical of the Qatari peace initiative and believes
Darfur is an African problem that needs an African solution.

LULL IN FIGHTING ENDS WITH GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN ATTACKS


3. (C) The relative lull in fighting through mid-January led to
reduced supplies (fewer opportunities to raid government caches)
and little incentive for foreign-based leaders like Abdul Wahid
to discuss unification, according to the Tripoli-based SLA/U
reps. In addition, the relative calm allowed the GOL, which has
limited bureaucratic capacity, to focus on more pressing "Arab
crises" in Gaza and Somalia. (Note: the GOL places both Sudan
and Somalia within its Arab affairs administrations. End Note.)
While they blamed increased fighting in Darfur on Khartoum's
plan to manufacture a crisis in advance of the ICC's expected
indictment of Bashir. Sharif and Busra offered no convincing
argument as to why Khalil Ibrahim would cooperate in the
government's plan to divert attention from international
politics. Repeating reports SLA/U leader Abdallah Yehia
conveyed to Embassy Khartoum (ref C),our interlocutors said
SLA/U positions in Um Saruna were bombed first by GOS Antinov
aircraft and then attacked by "over 100" GOS trucks full of men.
Thirteen SLA/U fighters were wounded and another six killed in
action, including An'kou Hussain, a key SLA/U commander. Sharif
confirmed Yehia was in the camp at the time of the attack, and
claimed he spoke to SLA/U field commanders via satphone
throughout the day on January 24.


4. (C) Despite claiming that the GOS attacked Um Saruna en route
to JEM/KI positions further north, both Sharif (who is younger
and claims field experience) and Busra were optimistic that
renewed fighting would enhance their negotiating position with
both other rebel groups and the international community. On
materiel and supply, Sharif noted, "when there is war, it is
good...you can steal what you need from the government." An
uptick in violence also increases the number of SLA/AW
commanders who would fight with SLA/U leaders in the field,
shifting the balance toward leaders willing to fight and away
from those "not talking to anyone in Paris" (i.e., Abdul Wahid).
Despite being outnumbered and surrounded, Sharif saw the battle
as rejuvenating for the SLA cause, saying, "10 cars for SLA can
beat 1,000 government cars because our people believe in the
movement."

REBEL THOUGHTS ON US POLICY AND THE POST-ICC WORLD


TRIPOLI 00000109 002.2 OF 002



5. (C) Urging more USG and international involvement in the
region, Sharif insisted that a "free zone" for inter-movement
negotiations be set up, responded positively to the Secretary's
call for a no-fly zone over Sudan, and looked for Western
diplomats to focus on the "real movements". Apparently missing
the irony of deriding so-called rebel leaders resident outside
Sudan while sitting in a Tripoli hotel himself, Sharif noted
that "if you count everyone who calls themselves a rebel in
London, Geneva or Paris you could have 100 or 1,000 movements,
but there are really only two-and-a-half: SLA, JEM, and Abdul
Wahid's people who are fighting with us."


6. (C) Better understanding of the realities in Darfur is
urgent, according to Sharif, because Bashir's indictment will
compel Islamist fighters to stream into Sudan, intensifying the
fighting and suffering. When asked why Islamists would choose
"an African fight" over an Islamist one in Gaza or Somalia, he
cited Sudan's open borders and lack of international attention
as opportunities for foreign fighters that would deter them from
the fight in Gaza. Despite the urgency, rebel leaders hold out
little hope that Libya will renew its efforts to engage both
governments and rebel movements in earnest and Sharif plans to
depart Tripoli February 5 for a coordination meeting in Geneva
and will possibly seek to travel to the United States after
that. (Note: Sharif holds a passport from The Netherlands and
asked about Visa Waiver procedures. End note.)


7. (C) Comment: Libya's focus has recently shifted from Darfur
to other issues perceived to be more exigent, such as securing
Muammar al-Qadhafi's selection as 2009 Chairman of the African
Union (septel). Having suffered public humiliation at Sirte in
2007 and been frustrated in their efforts to effect stronger
government-to-government cooperation to the south, it appears
Libya's Africa hands may have decided to declare diplomatic
victory and move on to the broader goal of transforming the AU
into Muammar al-Qadhafi's vision of a United States of Africa.
Rebel leaders here have whiled away the past two months waiting
for other crises to subside, but appear to be waking up to the
reality that Libya doesn't have the bureaucratic capacity to
engage effectively on more than a handful of issues at a time.
With the confluence of Libya's non-permanent UNSC seat, its
newly acquired chairmanship of the AU and the 40th anniversary
of the al-Fatah revolution in September 2009, the GOL is
stretched thin. End Comment.
CRETZ