Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TOKYO603
2009-03-18 09:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN: CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES

Tags:  PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3311
PP RUEHCHI RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHPB RUEHRN
DE RUEHKO #0603/01 0770910
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180910Z MAR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1585
INFO RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRIORITY
RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 3036
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA PRIORITY 0798
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 5376
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 6828
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 3580
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000603 

C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDED CAPTION

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR S/CT:SRCLARK, SGROBERTSON, EAP/J:MJACKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN: CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES

REF: A. STATE 15113

B. STATE 6461

C. 08 TOKYO 727

TOKYO 00000603 001.4 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000603

C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDED CAPTION

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR S/CT:SRCLARK, SGROBERTSON, EAP/J:MJACKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN: CRITICAL FOREIGN DEPENDENCIES

REF: A. STATE 15113

B. STATE 6461

C. 08 TOKYO 727

TOKYO 00000603 001.4 OF 002



1. (U) This is an action request, see para 6.


2. (SBU) Summary: Japan is deeply dependent on key
infrastructure sectors and, given the depth of the U.S.-Japan
economic and security relationships, a major disruption here
would likely have immediate consequences in the U.S. Embassy
Tokyo sees future areas where the U.S. and Japan could
exchange views on critical infrastructure, possibly building
on the annual event organized by Vanderbilt University's Jim
Auer. With respect to ref A list of Critical
Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) in Japan, see Post
comments below. End summary.

Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources in Japan
-------------- -


3. (SBU) Post concurs with the list contained in ref A for
Japan and would note the following:

-- ICT (Information and Communications Technology)
Infrastructure: Post concurs with listing of undersea cable
landings and, without approaching GOJ officials, offers no
additional items. However, the focus on hard infrastructure
neglects softer components critical to the functioning of the
ICT grid. Other additional areas bearing on U.S. public or
private interests include: cyber-security, information/data
security and integrity, and public confidence in the Internet
and the digital economy.

-- Transportation Infrastructure: Post concurs with listing
the ports of Kobe, Nagoya and Yokohama, but suggests striking
Chiba (likely reference to port of Tokyo) and adding the
ports of Tokyo and Osaka. Japan's major airports are also a
critical link for cargo as well as passenger traffic, with
Narita Airport handling more U.S.-Japan trade by value than
any maritime port. We suggest adding Tokyo (Narita) and
Kansai airports to the list.

-- Industrial Inputs: Post has no basis to assess degree of
dependence or criticality of industrial inputs. We suspect
cross-dependencies between U.S. and Japanese industries are
far more extensive than those items listed. Industry is in a
better position, however, to identify and mitigate risks in
these private sector processes. Post anticipates industry
would be reluctant to openly discuss such vulnerabilities and
suggests a more effective approach is to consider what
(dis)incentives industry has to protect its own critical
processes.

-- Financial Infrastructure: Financial systems in Japan, the
world's second largest economy, are also critical to U.S.
interests as well as the function and integrity of
international financial and payment systems.

CI/KR Authority and Coordination
--------------


4. (U) Responsibility for critical infrastructure in Japan
rests with the Prime Minister, with general coordination by
the Disaster Management Office. Resources, authority, and
expertise over infrastructure sectors in question, though,
are held by relevant line ministries. Response assets belong
to other entities, including Defense, police, and local
authorities.


5. (SBU) Concerning risks to infrastructure and systems in
Japan, Post offers a few observations. Japan is highly
dependent on imports: the country imports roughly 96 percent
of its energy needs and over 60 percent of its food. Between
1996 and 2005, 20.8 percent of the world's major earthquakes
(magnitude 6.0 or greater) occurred in Japan, and Mount Fuji,
located about an hour's drive from Tokyo, is considered
active. Japan's concentrated urban populations and
dependence on mass transit increase vulnerability to a
potential pandemic, although excellent public sanitation and
medical care mitigate the vulnerability, lower risk relative
to other Asian countries. And while the current economic
difficulties were triggered primarily by events in the U.S.,
Japan's exports and GDP have been far harder hit than those
of the U.S.

TOKYO 00000603 002.4 OF 002




6. (SBU) Action Request: Post notes the point in last year's
report regarding plans "to engage constructively with foreign
governments to mitigate vulnerabilities." Post also notes
the report listed Japan as Category 1 (countries with which
the United States is currently, or has previously engaged in
critical infrastructure protection programs not directly
related to the critical asset/system or asset system's
sector). Request Department clarify these programs or
activities. Mission notes that a general exchange with Japan
on critical infrastructure could be valuable, but should not
be limited to security.
ZUMWALT