Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TOKYO512
2009-03-06 08:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

FORMER JAPANESE OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON NPT REVIEW

Tags:  AORC KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV UNGA IAEA NPT JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #0512/01 0650804
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060804Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1295
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0518
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4062
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1305
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000512 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

ISN/MNSA FOR SCOTT DAVIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: AORC KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV UNGA IAEA NPT JA
SUBJECT: FORMER JAPANESE OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON NPT REVIEW
CONFERENCE ISSUES

REF: STATE 6970

Classified By: CDA James P. Zumwalt, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000512

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

ISN/MNSA FOR SCOTT DAVIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS: AORC KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV UNGA IAEA NPT JA
SUBJECT: FORMER JAPANESE OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON NPT REVIEW
CONFERENCE ISSUES

REF: STATE 6970

Classified By: CDA James P. Zumwalt, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Econoff met March 4 with Ambassador Nobuyasu
Abe, head of the MOFA-affiliated Center for the Promotion of
Nonproliferation and Disarmament (CPNPD) to discuss Japan's
position on the 2010 NPT review conference. Abe said Japan
understands "nothing gets accomplished at the conferences"
and noted Japan's main goal is to avoid an appearance of
failure that would negatively affect non-proliferation and
disarmament efforts in other fora. In a wide ranging
discussion, Abe provided thoughts on the questions posed in
ref, as well as suggestions for ways to overcome previous NPT
conference problems. These included sending a more senior
level representative to address non-weapons state skepticism,
strengthening safeguards funding to maintain IAEA
capabilities, and helping developing countries with civil
nuclear energy, in order to reduce incentives and excuses for
those countries to develop indigenous fuel cycles. End
Summary.

-------------- --------------
Japan Wants Good Atmosphere but No Specific Goals for NPT
Revcon
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Econoff met March 4 with Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe,
head of the MOFA-affiliated Center for the Promotion of
Nonproliferation and Disarmament (CPNPD) to discuss Japan's
position on the 2010 NPT review conference. Abe is a former
MOFA Director General for Disarmament who, in addition to
directing the CPNPD, is a member of the board advising the
Australia-Japan International Commission on Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Disarmament and a special assistant to
the Foreign Minister. While not the authoritative statement
of the GOJ positions, Abe's comments, given the influence of
former officials in Japan, likely reflect the thinking at
senior levels of the GOJ.



3. (C) According to Abe, the most important outcome for the
conference is to avoid the appearance of failure. He noted
while "everyone knows nothing gets accomplished at the
conferences", the resulting feeling of success or failure has
implications for disarmament and non-proliferation efforts
conducted in other venues.


4. (C) Abe discussed how to avoid the difficulties
experienced at the 2005 Conference, specifically the gap
between the weapons and non-weapons states on the relative
importance of disarmament versus non-proliferation and
Egypt's dissent relating to the Middle East situation. Abe
stated progress on disarmament should be "paid back" by
progress on non-proliferation. However, he wondered whether
such progress could actually be achieved. He noted Japan
ultimately wants to see progress on both issues, but progress
does not have to happen in the review conference. It could
happen independently between Washington and Moscow, or in
Geneva related to the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
Thus, Japan has no specific goals for the NPT Conference,
other than to support progress in these other arenas.


5. (C) Abe expects the weapon states will want to make a
clear, strong statement confirming their commitment under
Article 6. However, because they have done this several
times previously, it likely will not hold as much weight with
the non-weapons states. Abe noted a U.S. assistant secretary
usually makes the USG presentation at the Conference and
suggested that for the U.S. to be taken seriously, a more
senior, political official should attend, perhaps the
Secretary herself. Such a step would, in Abe's view, help
improve the atmosphere between the weapon states and
non-weapon states.


6. (C) Abe also discussed possible actions for some of the
sub-committees that are to be established. Regarding the
Verifications and Safeguards Committee, he suggested that
given increased demands on the IAEA safeguards mission, it is
important parties agree to strengthen safeguards to maintain
existing competence levels. Abe noted since some countries
object to the idea of strengthening safeguards beyond current
levels, this action may have to be couched in different
terms, perhaps along the lines of "maintaining" adequate
safeguards capability. The Peaceful Use Committee should
discuss the multilateral fuel cycle idea; the creation of a
successful but still voluntary program in this area would
help identify and single out those "problem countries" still

determined to create their own fuel cycles.

--------------
Response to Questions in Ref
--------------


7. (C) On the issue of parties violating and withdrawing
from the treaty, the idea of an extraordinary session in case
of withdrawal is worth pursuing, as it is a shame, Amb. Abe
said, that review conferences can occur as if nothing
happened in the time between their occurrence.


8. (C) Regarding universality, Abe said parties must
continue to try to get India, Israel, and Pakistan to join
the NPT, but this has been made even more difficult by the
U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation deal, as India has no
reason left to consider joining the NPT. The real question
is what to do about Israel. Egypt will remain dissatisfied
with the lack of a UNSC resolution on a nuclear free zone in
the Middle East and, absent any progress on such a
resolution, will likely create problems.


9. (C) Abe said a Safeguards Agreement and the Additional
Protocol (AP) should be made mandatory, but doing so will not
be easy because the non-aligned movement will be determined
to object. In this context, it may be useful to reverse NAM
tactics and ask those states when they would be prepared to
accept the AP as a standard.


10. (C) The issue of enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities is tied to that of the multilateral approach to
the fuel cycle, Abe stated. Some countries resent the
multinational approach as a challenge to the "inalienable
rights" to peaceful nuclear energy stated in the NPT. But,
Abe suggested, the NPT does not specify that those rights
apply to enrichment, merely to the benefits of nuclear
energy, which might be made obtainable from a multilateral
fuel cycle. Certainly, work towards a national fuel cycle
should not be used to hide hidden intentions related to
weapons development. To address this issue, developed
countries, Abe continued, should facilitate developing
countries access to the benefits of nuclear energy, including
medical applications, so that they have less incentive to
make this argument. The effort should include support with
the safety and security aspects of nuclear power.


11. (C) On obligations under the treaty to pursue
negotiations related to disarmament, Abe said non-weapons
states can "make noises" on this issue, but the onus is on
weapons states to deliver. There is resistance from Russia
on the inclusion of non-strategic weapons in any disarmament
regime because of the difficulty in verifying non-strategic
arms reductions. However, Abe believes this issue must be
overcome because China sees little difference between
strategic and non-strategic weapons, and will not be willing
to move on disarmament if non-strategic weapons are not
addressed.


12. (C) Abe believes entry into force of the CTBT would have
a positive impact on disarmament efforts, not so much perhaps
in regards to the U.S. and Russia, which no longer need
testing, but on China, India, and Pakistan, which would be
affected more by the ban. Similarly, Abe suggested, FMCT
negotiations would also strongly affect China, India, and
Pakistan, especially if parties could declare a moratorium on
fissile material production during the negotiations period.


13. (C) Abe said transparency in forces and policies is not
an issue for the conference. The NAM countries and possibly
Russia will ask for disarmament with verification. But China
will remain difficult on transparency, as it continues to see
ambiguity as benefiting the weaker state. On the issue of a
no-first use policy, Japan cannot accept a requirement of
no-first use, because Japan's defense depends on strategic
ambiguity on the part of the U.S. on this issue. Abe
questioned whether China's no-first use policy really had any
meaning and suggested it might be useful to ask China if it
could demonstrate in any meaningful physical way how that
policy is enforced.


14. (SBU) Econoff also posed the questions in ref to MOFA
officials, who replied that they will respond when the GOJ
has completed its official policy paper on the subject. Post
will relay official comments from MOFA as soon as they become
available.
ZUMWALT