DPJ VP OKADA ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, DPRI, AND DPRK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000051

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR JA
SUBJECT: DPJ VP OKADA ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, DPRI, AND DPRK

REF: A. 08 TOKYO 1051

B. 08 TOKYO 3435

C. 08 TOKYO 3102

D. 08 TOKYO 2976

E. 08 TOKYO 1641

F. 08 TOKYO 2808

G. 08 TOKYO 3387

H. 08 TOKYO 1517

I. 08 TOKYO 2508

J. 08 TOKYO 1657

K. 08 TOKYO 3405

L. 08 TOKYO 2376

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Opposition DPJ VP Okada assured the DCM
January 6 that his party would act very differently in
government than it has in opposition. Okada said that DPJ
President Ichiro Ozawa would completely change stripes after
an election and that the party would not appoint members of
its current "Next Cabinet" to an actual DPJ-led government.
On DPRK policy, Okada stated that while abductions and
denuclearization are both important for Japan, the two issues
needed to be delinked and denuclearization given the
priority. Okada characterized the DPJ's official position on
the relocation of Futenma MCAS as "irresponsible," adding
that revising the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan is
not a major priority for the party. Okada expressed strong
opposition to reinterpreting Japan's constitution to allow
for collective self-defense, but said that Japan should be
able to defend U.S. military assets and bases in Japan under
the current interpretation. Okada reiterated his
long-standing position that Japan should distance itself from
any U.S. move to support Taiwan in an armed conflict with the
PRC. End Summary.


2. (C) Comment: While Okada's main message was that the
United States should not be overly concerned about the DPJ's
pre-election policy positions, he did not articulate how the
party would go about formulating a responsible and coherent
set of policies after taking power given the diversity of
ideologies within the DPJ. (See Ref A for a description of
the different groups constituting the DPJ and Okada's
factional affiliation.) On security policy in particular,
Okada made clear that his views did not mesh with more
conservative members of his own party. He was also reluctant
to characterize DPJ President Ozawa's real policy agenda,
which remains a mystery to Embassy interlocutors across the
spectrum of the DPJ. Okada did signal, however, that the DPJ
wants a positive relationship with the Obama Administration
and appears ready to make compromises on policy -- within
limits -- to make that happen. End Comment.


3. (C) Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Vice President Katsuya
Okada expressed his desire to expand contacts with the
incoming U.S. Administration, during a cordial January 6
dinner hosted by the Deputy Chief of Mission. Okada urged
the U.S. not to focus on the DPJ's current party platform or
statements made by party President Ichiro Ozawa. (See Refs B
and C for a summary of DPJ security and economic concerns.)
He said that Ozawa would be very different once the DPJ came
to power. Okada added that an actual DPJ government would
differ in personnel as well as in policies. Just before the
next Lower House election the DPJ is likely to scrap its
"Next Cabinet" and announce its real intended ministerial
line-up, which will probably include non-political figures

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for key policy posts. Okada downplayed Ozawa's pledge to
send 100 politicians into the ministries. There are already
70 Political Vice Minister, Parliamentary Secretary and
similar positions in the government. The DPJ would
marginally increase the number of these posts rather than
displacing senior bureaucrats, Okada said.

Election Timing in LDP's Hands
--------------


4. (C) Okada was reluctant to speculate on timing for the
next election. He said that the DPJ could slow the
legislative process, but not to the extent of forcing a
dissolution of the Diet. The real variable will be unity
within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). (See Ref D
for background on DPJ electoral prospects.) If 17 or more
LDP Lower House members break ranks on a vote that requires a
two-thirds majority re-vote to overcome a rejection in the
opposition-controlled Upper House, the government will
collapse and an election could happen with little warning.
He noted that when he was DPJ President in 2005, he was taken
totally off-guard by then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's
decision to call a snap election in response to internal LDP
dissent over postal reform. That said, if Prime Minister
Taro Aso can hold his party together, he will likely wait
until the DPJ reaches its nadir in terms of public support to
call an election. The best case for the LDP, he added, would
be to elect a new leader in August and then dissolve the Diet
in September.

DPRK Policy: Denuclearization First
--------------


5. (C) Turning to policy, Okada said that the issue of North
Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens is deeply emotional
for the public and something no Japanese politician can
ignore. (See Ref E and F for DPJ views on DPRK policy.) At
the same time, Okada noted, the nuclear issue presents a
fundamental challenge to Japan's national security and should
be delinked from abductions. Okada expressed support for the
current Six-Party approach towards North Korea, and said that
Japan should provide humanitarian aid to North Korea if it
would help move the DPRK towards denuclearization. Okada
commented that time is now shifting to the U.S. side. The
Obama Administration will be in office for the next four, if
not eight, years. Meanwhile, Pyongyang is facing prospects
of major domestic instability if Kim Jong-il's health were to
fail again soon.

Cautious Security Approach
--------------


6. (C) Okada downplayed media reports that the DPJ is
planning major revisions to the May 1, 2006 Realignment
Roadmap. (See Refs G and H for additional DPJ thinking on
Alliance issues.) The issue, he continued, is simply not a
major priority for the party. Okada said that the DPJ's
current platform calling for Futenma MCAS units to move out
of Okinawa is both "irresponsible" and unrealistic. That
said, Okada commented that it may be worthwhile reviewing
whether there is a real need to maintain two separate U.S.
air bases on Okinawa.


7. (C) Regarding broader Alliance issues, Okada said that
Japan should focus its defense policy on working with the
United States in Northeast Asia rather than joining U.S.-led

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operations further afield. Okada objected to LDP efforts to
reinterpret the Constitution in order to permit the exercise
of collective self-defense. While the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) should be permitted to defend U.S. military assets and
bases engaged in the defense of Japan, the current
Constitution should not be interpreted to allow the SDF to
conduct out-of-area coalition operations or defend U.S.
territories. While there may be good reasons to revise the
Constitution's Article 9 to allow greater bilateral
operational flexibility, he continued, opening that door
would inevitably lead to Japan giving itself the right to act
independently of the United States. This would increase
suspicions among Japan's neighbors and negatively impact on
regional security. Okada allowed, however, that if there is
a legitimate need to stretch constitutional interpretations,
such as to allow intercepts of missiles heading for the
United States, "a way can theoretically be found to do so,"
as was the case when Japan created the SDF.


8. (C) While Okada said he personally opposed the dispatch of
the SDF for coalition operations, he advocated greater
Japanese contributions to UN peacekeeping operations in
places like Sudan. Nevertheless, Okada said he was against
sending military forces to Afghanistan, even though coalition
operations there are clearly authorized by the UN (See Refs I
and J for DPJ Afghan views). The solution to the conflict in
Afghanistan, he continued, must involve political
accommodation with armed opposition groups through the
electoral process and a withdrawal of foreign forces. The
Embassy noted that Japan could play a role now in moving
Afghanistan in that direction by funding security for
upcoming Afghan elections and the expansion of the Afghan
National Army.


9. (C) Regarding the dispatch of SDF forces for anti-piracy
operations off the coast of Somalia, Okada acknowledged that
his party did not have a clear position. When asked how the
DPJ would respond if PM Aso sent forces under existing
authorities, Okada said he would personally oppose it but
others in the party would react very differently. (See Ref K
on DPJ Anti-Piracy concerns.) "As for Ozawa," he continued,
"since there is a UN resolution, he will probably support it."

China/Taiwan
--------------


10. (C) Okada repeated his familiar warning to U.S. officials
not to ask Japan to help defend Taiwan in a conflict with the
PRC. Okada asserted that U.S.-China relations would recover
in a matter of years after such a war. (See Ref L for DPJ
views on Taiwan.) However, it would be "60 or a hundred"
years before China would restore diplomatic relations with
Japan if it helped the U.S. defend Taiwan. The Embassy
cautioned that while no one in the United States or Japan
wants a war with China over Taiwan, signaling to Beijing
through words or actions that Tokyo would sit out any
Cross-Strait conflict only decreases the deterrence value of
our alliance. Okada said he understands the need to send the
appropriate signals, and praised the U.S. government's
efforts to prevent former Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian
from moving too far towards independence.
SCHIEFFER