READ-OUT ON COORDINATION MEETING WITH JAPANESE

S E C R E T TOKYO 000445

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/J, EAP/K
DOD FOR OSD/APSA - SEDNEY/HELVEY/BASALLA
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J2/J5
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J2/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KN KS JA
SUBJECT: READ-OUT ON COORDINATION MEETING WITH JAPANESE
OFFICIALS ON POSSIBLE TD-2 LAUNCH

REF: A. 06 TOKYO 4543

B. 06 TOKYO 5336

Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 (
b/d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (S/NF) Alliance and intelligence managers from the
Embassy, U.S. Forces Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Joint Staff Office and Ministry and Defense met on February
20 to discuss policy and intelligence coordination in
anticipation of a possible North Korean missile launch. The
meeting followed a request from the Foreign Ministry on
February 16 to activate mil-mil Bilateral Coordination
Centers (BCCs) at Yokota Air Base and MOD Headquarters. In
order to support a coordinated response to a possible launch,
the Japanese side offered to stand up informally
elements of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM). Both
sides recognized the importance of both discrete and flexible
coordination and the need to address intelligence sharing and
information security issues related to the process. The U.S.
side deferred policy discussions to separate diplomatic
channels and urged both sides to
focus on the mechanics of coordination. END SUMMARY.

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PARTICIPATION
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2. (S/NF) U.S. and Japanese Director-level Alliance managers
convened on February 20 a preliminary meeting to discuss
bilateral coordination modalities relating to a near-term
possible North Korean missile launch. Embassy Tokyo
Political Section, Regional Affairs Section (RAS),Defense
Attache's Office (DAO),and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) J-2 and
J-5 represented the U.S. side. The Japanese side included
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials from the
National Security Policy Division, Northeast Asia
Division, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division, Policy
Coordination Division, and First Division of the MOFA
Intelligence and Analysis Service (IAS). Ministry of
Defense (MOD) officials from the Defense Policy Division,
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, Defense
Intelligence Division, and Joint Staff J-5 also
participated. (Full participation list in para 17)

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STRUCTURING COORDINATION: THE ""AZABUDAI"" EXPERIENCE
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3. (S/NF) Embassy Pol-Mil Chief asked the Japanese side to
lay out its expectations on the bilateral coordination
structure necessary to prepare for a potential DPRK missile
launch. The 1997 Revised Defense Guidelines include
specific coordination mechanisms. In 2006, however, the
Japanese side turned down the U.S. request to activate
these bodies, leading the two sides to rely on an ad hoc
coordination body in the lead-up to the 2006 missile launch
(the ""Azabudai"" process). Before proceeding further, he
added, it would be useful to consider the extent to which
future coordination should be formalized. He added that
the focus for this discussion would be on the mechanics of
coordination. Separate diplomatic channels are more
appropriate for policy discussions, as all the content of
our response will be made in Washington.


4. (S/NF) MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director
Kazuhiro Suzuki noted that the Japanese government had
considered activating the BCM during the 2006 launch, but
decided against it out of concern that doing so would have
an escalatory effect. Embassy Pol-Mil Chief pointed out
that both sides had agreed during the September 2006
""Capstone Lessons Learned Conference"" for reviewing the
bilateral response to the 2006 DPRK missile launches (Ref
B) not to link the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM)
activation with a decision to invoke the Situations in Areas
Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) Law but instead, explore a wide
spectrum of policy coordination. Both sides had agreed at
the Capstone Conference on the need to begin consultations
well before any public announcement.

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FLEXIBLE OPTIONS: AN ""INFORMAL"" BCC, BCM?
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5. (S/NF) MOD Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division
Director Kiyoshi Serizawa said the Japanese government
formally decided in 2008 that there is no hard linkage
between activation of the two Bilateral Coordination Centers
(BCCs) and SIASJ in order to allow greater flexibility. USFJ
J-5 Director agreed that both sides should be as flexible as
possible about initiating the BCM. He added that the recent
Keen Edge bilateral exercise validated the BCM's utility. He
also noted that the Azabudai meetings in 2006 seem to play
the same role envisioned for the Policy Committee outlined in
the Guidelines. MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division
Director Suzuki agreed, but suggested that the two sides
not get too focused on the titles of various coordination
organizations, to allow for flexibility in responding to
inquiries if news of bilateral consultations got out.

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BCC SIZE/TEMPO/TIMING
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6. (S/NF) Regarding MOFA's suggestion of activating the two
BCCs, USFJ J-5 Director stressed that both sides needed
to pace the level of our activities carefully, as it could
take weeks until an actual launch. Embassy Pol-Mil Chief
asked whether JSO was planning an incremental BCC
activation -- such as a low-level exchange of liaison
officers -- or a hard start, with both sides standing up
24-hour watch centers. JSO J-5's CAPT Takashima responded
the Japanese side is flexible on the size and participation
of the BCC, noting, however, that sustaining full
participation over long stretches of time would be difficult.
The start time would depend on the intelligence
and analysis available at the time, as well as decisions by
policymakers. Takashima agreed with USFJ's assessment that
standing up the BCC at both MOD and USFJ Headquarters
during the Keen Edge exercise was useful.


7. (S/NF) MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director
Suzuki asked whether MOD Internal Bureau would also be part
of the BCC, or would participation be limited to uniformed
officers. He suggested that MOFA may also send liaisons to
ensure that they have visibility on any breaking
developments. MOD's Serizawa highlighted the need to discuss
the issue with JSO J-3 and MOD's Operational Policy
Bureau. Pol-Mil Chief suggested that both USFJ and MOD ask
their J-3 offices to develop a concept for the BCCs so that
we can better frame future discussions. It would be useful
to clarify whether both sides agree on what is the trigger
for activation, frequency and other modalities, and at what
stage are other government agencies brought in.

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KEEPING POLICY GROUP SEPARATE FROM JCG
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8. (S/NF) MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director
Suzuki asked whether Relevant Ministries and Agencies (RMAs)
responsible for supporting military operations should be
included in future coordination meetings. Embassy Pol-Mil
Chief noted that the BCM envisions separate bodies to discuss
policy-level (Policy Committee) and technical-level support
(Joint Coordination Group, JCG) issues. In this instance, it
would make sense to maintain this distinction in order to
protect sensitive information. We could convene a separate
JCG meeting to involve RMAs such as the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism (MLIT) and
Ministry of
Information and Communication (MIC) to assist with issues
such as frequencies, air space management, and other
technical support activities. These meetings could focus
on specific operational support issues without touching on
sensitive or compartmentalized information. He noted that
the existence of such a forum in 2006 could have helped
facilitate our request to accelerate the operation of the
FBX-T (X-band) radar in Shariki.

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NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION FLOW
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9. (C) Pol-Mil Chief recommended that both sides review
information sharing and notification procedures, as well as
ensure both sides have the physical means of sharing
classified information securely. MOFA National Security
Policy Division Director Shimokawa said MOFA, MOD, and
other national security ministries would normally pass all
classified information to the Cabinet Secretariat, which
would then disseminate to all organizations with a need to
know. He questioned whether it is feasible to establish a
single route for sharing information, as each agency has
its own channels with U.S. counterparts.


10. (S/NF) Embassy RAS representative pointed out that both
sides should examine existing channels for sharing
classified information. MOD Defense Intelligence Division
Director Atsuo Suzuki suggested that such intelligence
should only be dealt with in designated channels, even
though this may lead to delays in coordination and
dissemination. The need for maintaining established
channels runs counter, however, to the need for speed and
removal of stovepipes.


11. (S/NF) Pol-Mil Chief responded that the two sides need to
consider not only the flow of intelligence, but also
operational information. In 2006, one major gap was the
inability to get information on North Korean missile
launches to MOFA. MOD was receiving real-time feed from
USFJ, as was the Embassy, but there was no method to
accurately convey developments to MOFA. This led to a gap
in public statements between the Foreign and Defense
Ministers regarding the number of missiles that North Korea
had fired.


12. (S/NF) MOFA's Kazuhiro Suzuki noted that intelligence
accumulates in a matter of minutes when the situation
reaches a crisis level, making it impossible to share
information effectively if kept solely within established
channels. Having a MOFA liaison to Japan's BCC at MOD
headquarters would help, since there is a secure line
between MOFA and MOD. MOD's Atsuo Suzuki stressed that
intelligence channels should be kept separate from
operational channels. USFJ J-5 Director questioned the
utility of doing so.


13. (S/NF) USFJ J-2 representative highlighted the usefulness
of co-locating Japanese and U.S. officials during the Keen
Edge exercise, underscoring the importance of having a common
bilateral intelligence and operational picture. Pol-Mil

Chief suggested both sides clarify and expand on two points:
first, how should both sides share information if the threat
is imminent; and second, at what level should both sides
approach each other if conducting initial notification.

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CLEARANCES: NOT FEWER BUT SMARTER
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14. (S/NF) Embassy Pol-Mil Chief stressed that everyone
involved in bilateral coordination should possess the same
level of security clearances and be subject to the Defense
Secrets Act (Note: which mandates up to 10 years
imprisonment for unauthorized leaks). The aim is not to
narrow the number of people with access to information, but
to make sure those officials who will be making decisions
possess the appropriate security clearances. Embassy RAS
representative seconded this point, offering to help key
Japanese officials get cleared for information in order for
them to carry out their assignments.

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LAUNCH AUTHORITY POSSIBLY DELEGATED TO COMMANDERS
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15. (S/NF) MOD's Yamamoto said one major difference between
the current environment and 2006 from MOD's perspective is
the deployment of Japanese and U.S. ballistic missile
defense (BMD) assets. MOD might possibly issue -- for the
first time -- an advance order to the Air Defense Command
to shoot down a North Korean missile if it were heading
towards Japanese territory. USFJ J-5 Director asked if MOD
envisioned the advanced deployment of PAC-3 missile
batteries. Yamamoto responded that MOD does not plan to
deploy PAC-3 at this stage in order to avoid attracting
public attention.

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OTHER ISSUES
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16. (S/NF) MOD's Atsuo Suzuki pointed out that the two
governments need to discern the DPRK's intent and initiate
discussion on how to react in the event of a launch.
MOFA's Shimokawa commented that MOFA has already begun
internal discussions on a public press line to issue in
response to a DPRK launch. Once this is finished, MOFA will
provide to the U.S. side for coordination. Embassy Pol-Mil
Chief said that we would share this with Washington so that
we can consider complementary messages.

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PARTIPANTS
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17. (U)

U.S.:

Marc Knapper, Political Section Deputy, Embassy Tokyo
Raymond Greene, Pol-Mil Unit Chief, Embassy Tokyo
Steven Benfell, Regional Affairs Section, Embassy Tokyo
COL Jeffrey, Wiltse, J-5 Policy and Plans, USFJ
COL Edward McAllister, DAO, Embassy Tokyo
Joseph Flanz, DAO, Embassy Tokyo
Kevin Murrow, J-2 Intelligence, USFJ
Sangmin Lee, Pol-Mil Officer, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)

Japan:

Makita Shimokawa, Director, National Security Division, MOFA
Shigeo Yamada, Director, Northeast Asia Division, MOFA

Kazuhiro Suzuki, Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Division, MOFA
Satoshi Suzuki, Director, First Division, Intelligence and
Analysis Service, MOFA
Keiichi Ichikawa, Senior Coordinator, Policy Coordination
Division, MOFA
Mikito Tomiyama, Deputy Director, Policy Coordination
Division, MOFA
Yuriko Kuga, Deputy Director, Policy Coordination Division,
MOFA
Yutaka Kashiwabara, Deputy Director, Northeast Asia Division,
MOFA
Noriaki Abe, Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Division,
MOFA
Mayumi Fukushima, Deputy Director, First Division,
Intelligence
and Analysis Service, MOFA
Tatsuo Yamamoto, Director, Defense Policy Division, MOD
Kiyoshi Serizawa, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Division, MOD
Atsuo Suzuki, Director, Defense Intelligence Division, MOD
CAPT Tatsuhiko Takashima, J-5, Joint Staff Office
Osamu Ashizuka, Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation
Division, MOD
ZUMWALT