JAPAN: ASO EKING OUT POSITIVE REVIEWS ON CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000033


DEPT FOR EAP/J

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN: ASO EKING OUT POSITIVE REVIEWS ON CHINA

REF: A. TOKYO 3416

B. TOKYO 3155

C. TOKYO 3069

D. DAILY ACTIVITIES REPORT DECEMBER 18 2008

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso has forged
modest success on China. Facing plummeting approval ratings,
a sputtering economy, and a Diet divided with the opposition
Democratic Party of Japan, PM Aso has managed to keep
bilateral ties to China on an even keel by actively engaging
Chinese leaders, culminating last month in the first ever
stand-alone summit between Japan, China, and South Korea in
Aso,s home prefecture of Fukuoka (ref A). The Fukuoka
Summit was the latest in a string of high-level encounters
with the Chinese and has led Japanese academics, Foreign
Ministry officials, and Chinese Embassy contacts to praise
the Prime Minister for downplaying his anti-China leanings in
pursuit of a "mutually beneficial relationship based on
common strategic interests" (senryakuteki kogei kankei). The
meetings produced little concrete progress on outstanding
bilateral issues but were significant nonetheless because of
their symbolism and their role as building blocks for future
dialogues, stress several Embassy contacts. Difficult
questions remain, however. It is not clear if goodwill alone
can solve longstanding bilateral disputes or carry over when
Japanese leadership changes. END SUMMARY


2. (C) Since becoming Prime Minister in September 2008,
Prime Minister Taro Aso has faced internal and external
challenges that have hamstrung his administration and
threatened to make him one of the shortest serving premiers
in post-war Japanese history. Plunging approval
ratings*recently in the high teens and low twenties,
according to most Japanese public opinion polls*and
dwindling support from ruling party stalwarts reflect
dissatisfaction over his ability to stimulate Japan,s
economy during the current global economic recession,
discontent over his management of the divided Diet, and
disdain for his verbal gaffes and personal quirks. The PM,s
manga reading and late-night bar hopping were once seen as
benign character eccentricities, but are now considered flaws
by many observers.


3. (C) Despite his troubles, the Prime Minister is garnering
positive reviews from Embassy contacts on China policy.
Dispelling concerns about his anti-China leanings, Aso has
worked to continue recent improvements in ties by holding a
series of exchanges with Chinese leadership on the margins of
international fora such as the Asian Europe Meeting (ASEM) in
October and the APEC Summit in November, and in stand-alone
venues such as the Trilateral Japan-China-South Korea Summit
in December. Aso has met minimal requirements by sustaining
the goodwill generated by Yasuo Fukuda, his China-friendly
predecessor who visited Beijing early in his own tenure and
later hosted Chinese President Hu Jintao, and former Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe who warmed ties after a freeze during the
Koizumi Administration.


4. (C) Noting China,s economic growth and the importance of
tying China into international rules-based systems, Japanese
academics regularly applaud Aso's willingness to reach out to
Japan,s Asian neighbor. Tokyo University Associate
Professor Yasuhiro Matsuda and Chuo University Professor
Takashi Inoguchi say Aso is exuding pragmatism toward China
through venues such as ASEM and APEC. Aso has moderated his
hardline views toward regional neighbors and has suspended
his personal judgment on China, these contacts add. The
Prime Minister, for example, is downplaying his "Arc of
Freedom and Prosperity" ideal*a concept geared toward
strengthening partnerships with like-minded democracies from
the Baltic region to Southeast and Northeast Asia*and is
prioritizing a future-oriented perspective geared toward
building what Japanese Foreign Ministry officials hail as a
"mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic
interests." Aso, these contacts note, resembles Abe, who
also assumed the premiership amid regional concerns about his
conservative views but whose early engagement of Hu helped
soften his tough-on-China image. Most interlocutors agree
that Aso learned the value of restraint and pragmatism from
his experience as Foreign Minister during 2005-07.


5. (C) Aso,s outreach is not lost on Chinese officials.
Chinese Embassy contacts in Tokyo point to the goodwill the
PM has generated through recent summitry and the "practical"
approach he is adopting overall. They confirm that
discussions with Hu and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao have gone
smoothly and bode well for additional encounters as promised
during the Trilateral Summit. They add that Aso helped his
cause in November when he swiftly sacked Japanese Air Self
Defense Force Chief Toshio Tamogami following the general,s
controversial essay exonerating Japan from World War II
culpability (refs B, C).


6. (C) MOFA officials are trumpeting the march toward a
"mutually beneficial relationship" and see Aso,s efforts has
helping build the foundation for future dialogues. They
point to the special nature of the trilateral dialogue in
Fukuoka, particularly the signed pledge to hold additional
trilaterals in China in 2009 and South Korea in 2010. MOFA
contacts add that the meetings were "laughter filled," and
that Aso, despite confronting Hu on recent Chinese ship
incursions during a pre-Summit sit-down in Fukuoka, chose to
downplay outstanding bilateral issues (ref D). Aso, they
claim, successfully worked with partners Hu and South Korean
President Lee Myung Bak to address the global financial
crisis, North Korea, disaster preparedness, and climate
change, and to establish the Trilateral Summit as a
complement to, vice replacement of, existing regional
mechanisms. Contacts from MOFA,s China and Mongolia
Division have also emphasized on multiple occasions Aso,s
outreach and the positive prospects for additional dialogue.
They regularly highlight several initiatives that have
already received public attention including the decision in
October on the sidelines of ASEM to reestablish a joint
hotline between Tokyo and Beijing and to forge a bilateral
customs agreement. They add that Aso,s attendance during
ASEM at the ceremony celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the
Peace and Friendship Treaty also symbolizes the strength and
future-oriented approach of bilateral relations.


7. (C) Questions remain, however, whether recent goodwill
alone can solve outstanding issues pressing the relationship,
such as contaminated food products, territorial and maritime
rows, Taiwan, and China,s military expansion, including
recent announcements signaling Beijing,s intention to build
two new aircraft carriers. Some Embassy academic contacts
observe that Beijing, despite Aso,s activist approach, is
still taking a "wait-and-see" posture before initiating
deeper and more frank discussions on contentious items
because of general concerns about "getting burned" by
Japanese conservatives and rightwing nationalists. Beijing
wants to avoid public embarrassment at the hands of outspoken
Liberal Democratic Party leaders and of even Aso, whose blunt
observations and gaffes have offended China and Korea in the
past.


8. (C) Japanese political uncertainty and leadership
fluctuations are additional restraints. The second
Japan-China high-level economic dialogue slated for December
2008 was postponed in part because of Chinese concerns about
Aso,s staying power. Additionally, Fukuda,s resignation in
September as prime minister led to a slow-down in progress on
food safety and on an agreement on joint development of East
China Sea (ECS) resources. Tokyo University,s Matsuda
claims that the ECS agreement signed in May was merely a
symbolic gesture and will need significant bilateral
attention to address substantive concerns about sovereignty
and demarcation. Proving his point, Tokyo lodged public
complaints earlier this week about Chinese gas field
exploration undertaken since the agreement.


9. (C) Other issues portend tough times ahead, particularly
as both sides work to build on recent summits. On joint
disaster preparedness, for example, MOFA regional policy
officers told Embassy Tokyo that the role of Japan,s
Self-Defense Force in a post-disaster scenario could be a
topic of discussion for future meetings but would have been
inappropriate for the early stage set in Fukuoka. While
skeptical that Aso can gain any political capital from his
efforts on China, Embassy contacts nonetheless agree that
Japan-China relations is a modest success for the embattled
Prime Minister.


SCHIEFFER