FRF COALITION DISCUSSIONS A "DOGFIGHT"

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002884

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/J
DOD FOR OSD/APSA-GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASAL LA/HAMM
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: MARR PGOV PINR PREL JA
SUBJECT: FRF COALITION DISCUSSIONS A "DOGFIGHT"

REF: TOKYO 2868

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JAMES P. ZUMWALT, REASONS 1.4(B)
AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The discussion within the Japanese coalition
government over the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) is a
"dogfight" with no input from the Japanese bureaucracy, MOFA
North American Affairs Bureau Deputy Director General Koji
Tomita told Political Minister-Counselor 16 December. The
leadership has not provided clear direction to the working
level, according to Tomita, who further noted that none of
the senior bureaucracy had received a readout of FM Okada's
15 December meetings with the Ambassador. Both Tomita and
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Division Director Takahiro
Funakoshi emphasized it was important for the United States
to remain firm in our position on FRF in order to avoid
misinterpretation by the Japanese government and media. In
spite of this, Tomita was skeptical about the prospects for
FRF success as the plan stands today. Celebrating the 50th
Anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty will be
important for the Alliance, although some within the Japanese
government may seek to co-opt the occasion in an attempt to
revise the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or negotiate for
reductions in Host Nation Support (HNS). End Summary.

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Coalition FRF Discussions: "Dogfight" (but for nothing)
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2. (C) Tomita described the cabinet-level discussion on FRF
as a "dogfight," but one that was occurring without input
from the Japanese bureaucracy. MOFA officials have yet to
receive direction on how to proceed on FRF discussions in the
coming months, Tomita bemoaned, adding that the next steps in
the process "need clarification" by the political leadership.
There is a "common understanding" between Hatoyama and
Okada, but it is unclear to the working level how the
leadership intented to implement FRF.


3. (C) Funakoshi concurred with Tomita's assessment, but was
frustrated that the cabinet dogfight was "for nothing" and
the government is "trying to decide not to decide" by pushing
the date for a response into next year. Both expressed
frustration with Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano, noting he
was failing in his responsibility to give the coalition a
cohesive structure and get the entire cabinet, especially SDP
President Fukushima, on board with the agreed upon timeline.


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Misunderstanding of the U.S. Position?
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4. (C) Funakoshi stressed that the United States must remain
firm in its stance that FRF is the best and only viable
option and avoid creating an impression that there might be
room for negotiation. The State Department's 15 December
Daily Press Briefing was misinterpreted in some Japanese
media reports as indicating that U.S. acquiesence to the
GOJ's delay indicated that there might be some willingness to
renegotiate Futenma. Funakoshi further noted it was
important for both the United States and Japan to counter
reports in the Japanese media calling the current situation a
"crisis." The firmer the United States stays on FRF, the
smoother the process will be, Funaksohi advised.

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Prospects for FRF Success?
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5. (C) Noting that by May 2010 the GOJ will have enacted the
JFY2010 budget and other important legislation, Tomita said
the DPJ would have substantially less need for the coalition
to remain together. He said, though, that he was skeptical
that the government would endorse the FRF plan in its current
state. He also noted that if the government mishandles the
FRF discussions, it will have a negative impact in the July
2010 Upper House elections, running the risk of the DPJ not
able to achieve majority control in both chambers of the
Diet.

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50th Anniversary: Celebrate but be Cautious
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6. (C) Tomita agreed that it was important to shift the
bilateral discussion to focus on other issues and said FM
Okada was supportive of celebrations of the 50th Anniversary
of the Alliance. It would be important to focus the
celebrations around the theme of common strategic objectives,
he added. Tomita emphasized, however, that the celebration
agenda could be "hijacked" by those in the Japanese
government and media who believe the 50th Anniversary should
be used as an opportunity to revise the SOFA or discuss
reductions in HNS. The U.S. and Japan should keep their
statements short and "punchy" and should suggest a very
positive agenda making utmost efforts to avoid any efforts on
the part of those who would attempt to exploit the process,
Tomita cautioned. Both Tomita and Funakoshi cited recent
examples of Japanese Communist Party involvement in GOJ
meetings, including a base affairs-related meeting late last
week, and noted this was a possible indication of
left-leaning elements in the DPJ gaining increased sway in
policy discussions.

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Comment
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7. (C) While our meeting was a good opportunity to share
views on the recent Hatoyama government's announcement of a
delay in a decision on FRF, the tone of the discussion and
the body language of our counterparts (Tomita in particular)
was further confirmation of what we've heard from all
quarters of the bureaucracy - a growing frustration with
being cut out of major policy discussions. The frustration
was particularly evident when Funakoshi asked for the Embassy
to seek U.S. notetaker presence in senior-level meetings in
order to justify similar participation for MOFA. Further
seeking to ensure that MOFA remains involved in policy
discussions, in addition to the Ambassador's discussions with
FM Okada and Hatoyama, Funakoshi asked for the United States
to use MOFA N.A. Affairs Bureau DG Umemoto to deliver
messages to the GOJ.
ROOS