JAPAN-RUSSIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT AIMED

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001477

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/NESS, ISN/MNSA, EAP/J
DOE FOR OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, NA-24

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL PUNE ENRG TRGY KNNP RU JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN-RUSSIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT AIMED
AT ENRICHMENT, SAFEGUARDS

Classified By: EMIN Robert F. Cekuta, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Japan's goal in concluding its recently
signed nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia is to
acquire fuel services, both to supply domestic needs and to
permit Japanese companies to sell reactors with fuel
contracts. The GOJ is pleased with the Russian concessions
to submit some facilities to IAEA safeguards. End summary.


2. (SBU) Econoff and DOE attache met Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) International Nuclear Cooperation Division
Principal Deputy Director Zentaro Naganuma June 26 to discuss
the Japan-Russia nuclear cooperation agreement. Naganuma
noted time constraints had prevented MOFA Director General
for Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Science Toshio Sano
from fully describing the agreement during his June 18
meetings in Washington, and so Naganuma wanted to provide a
more detailed summary.


3. (C) Naganuma reported the GOJ had expended significant
effort to achieve an agreement with strict non-proliferation
clauses. All items connected with the new nuclear
cooperation agreement transferred from Japan to Russia are to
be placed only at IAEA eligible facilities and at IAEA
selected facilities if possible. If an eligible facility
cannot be found for any given set of materials, the
governments will take supplementary measures, e.g., material
substitution, to ensure an equivalent amount of material
remains under safeguards. Furthermore, the existence of at
least one selected facility in Russia is required for any
cooperation to begin. Naganuma said discussions are underway
about which facility Russia would make eligible and noted it
might be Angarsk International Center. Naganuma noted MOFA
would not submit the agreement to the Diet for ratification
until Russia had selected an eligible facility.


4. (C) The agreement also contains provisions related to
retransfer. All items subject to the agreement are not to be
retransferred without written consent. In the event of a
violation by either Russian government or corporate entities,
Japan is authorized to stop cooperation. Naganuma said the
GOJ felt the concessions extracted from Russia are "strict",
but Russia was so enthusiastic to begin cooperation that it
accepted the Japanese requirements.

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Enrichment services, not joint enrichment, the goal
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5. (C) Naganuma said cooperation in the front end of the
nuclear cycle will be useful for Japanese companies, which
need to increase fuel imports and want to buy enrichment
services from Russia. Also, if Japanese companies sell
reactors to third countries, those countries may want an
integrated package containing fuel services, which means
Japan might again benefit from Russian enrichment services.
Regarding whether future Japanese nuclear power plant
contracts would include fuel services, Naganuma noted it is
an option, one Toshiba is considering.


6. (C) Recent press reports predicting joint enrichment
projects are not based on a correct understanding of the
agreement, Naganuma said. Under the agreement, transfers of
enrichment and reprocessing technology or equipment are
prohibited. When pressed for details, he conceded Japanese
companies could still invest in Russian enrichment projects
and create joint ventures, but such cooperation would be
limited to financial support. Regarding press reports
suggesting Japan and Russia will build a joint enrichment
plant in a third country, Naganuma said it would be
"ridiculous" to build such a facility, but in any event, that
kind of effort would be beyond the scope of the agreement.
ZUMWALT