LESSONS LEARNED FROM H1N1 OUTBREAK IN JAPAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001253

DEPT FOR OES/IHB AMBASSADOR LOFTIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J, EAP/EX, CA
USDA PASS TO APHIS, FAS FOR BURDETT
HHS PASS TO CDC
HHS FOR OGHA
DEPT PASS TO AID/GH/HIDN

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFLU AEMR AESC CASC EAGR KFLO TBIO KSAF KPAO PREL
PINR, AMGT, MG, JA
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM H1N1 OUTBREAK IN JAPAN

REF: A) STATE 54435; B) TOKYO 1171 and previous

TOKYO 00001253 001.2 OF 002


Sensitive but Unclassified. Please handle accordingly.


1. (SBU) Summary. Effective coordination among multiple agencies at
Post, our five consulates general, and United States Forces Japan
(USFJ) helped the Mission to prepare for the spread of H1N1 in
Japan, inform official and non-official Americans in Japan of
developments, and report to Washington on Japan's response to the
outbreak. Embassy tripwires were a helpful guide for Post's
Emergency Action Committee (EAC),but Post took action based on the
specific characteristics of the H1N1 outbreak. The EAC linked in
Consulate and USFJ officers by teleconference. Post relied on USG
and GOJ information sources and Department guidance in disseminating
information, including via two warden messages. Clarifying GOJ
procedures regarding quarantined Amcits helped us to better respond
to Americans' inquiries; however, users at Post reported some
difficulties with the Consular Task Force (CTF) application. The
Embassy helped USFJ to arrange virus sample testing at a GOJ lab; a
step that saved USFJ both time and resources and showcased
cooperation between the Japanese government and the U.S. military in
Japan. Washington messages helped to keep open markets for pork and
sustain the GOJ's positive and constructive approach on pork imports
and sales. New cases of H1N1 continue to be reported in Japan. End
Summary.

Mission Japan H1N1 Coordination Efforts
--------------

2. (SBU) Mission Japan's H1N1 Task Force, led by the Econ Section's
ESTH Unit and including Embassy offices and five consulates general,
worked in close coordination with Washington agencies, USFJ, and the
GOJ to keep official and non-official Americans in Japan informed of
developments, prepare for the spread of the disease, and report on
Japan's response to the outbreak. Personnel from the different
offices and agencies in Mission Japan had daily contact with
officials at Foreign Affairs, Health, Agriculture, Transportation,
and other Ministries to engage and report on Japan's
rapidly-changing border screening and quarantine procedures. The
Mission's five consulates general reported to the Embassy on actions
taken by local governments, airports, private companies, hospitals,
and educational institutions throughout Japan. Post's Economic
Section coordinated the Mission's regular front-channel H1N1 updates
to Washington.

Post Management
--------------

3. (SBU) Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) reviewed Embassy
tripwires originally set for a possible outbreak of Avian Influenza
or SARS in considering actions to respond to the H1N1 outbreak.
While the tripwires were a useful guide, the EAC considered actions
in light of the fact that the outbreak originated in North America,
rather than in Asia. The EAC met prior to a five-day holiday
weekend to identify specific triggers for further action should the
situation change during the Embassy's closure. To ensure staff and
families had information over the long weekend, Post sent a notice
to all staff and arranged for round-the-clock broadcast of the
Department's pandemic influenza video on the residential compound
television channel. Once H1N1 had appeared in Japan, the EAC met
via teleconference with officers from the Mission's five constituent
posts and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to coordinate action and
preparations for the spread of H1N1 in Japan.

American Citizens and Consular
--------------

4. (SBU) Post's Consular Section relied closely on

TOKYO 00001253 002.2 OF 002


frequently-updated USG and GOJ Internet sources to convey timely
information on the H1N1 outbreak to Americans in Japan. Post
disseminated information in accordance with Washington guidance and
the "no-double standard" policy, including links to official
information sources via Post's ACS webpage, ACS newsletters, and two
warden messages that followed the useful template produced by
CA/OCS/ACS.


5. (SBU) Although many Americans arriving in Japan were delayed by
Japanese airport screening procedures, and a number were
quarantined, Post received few phone calls regarding the procedures
or the GOJ's H1N1 response. The limited number of inquiries
suggests U.S. and Japanese media coverage of quarantine procedures,
along with Post's efforts to disseminate information, went a long
way towards informing the traveling public. Among the Americans who
did contact Post about screening procedures, many sought assurances
from the Embassy that Japan's relatively strict procedures were
being applied fairly and in accordance with law.


6. (SBU) Although Post had already been in direct contact with
relevant GOJ offices, Post needed to ask the GOJ to clarify
procedures for notifying the Embassy of Americans, including U.S.
service members on SOFA status, detained in quarantine procedures
and for allowing Americans held in quarantine access to telephones.
Embassy efforts to reach out to quarantined Americans and their
families and friends helped to ease the situation. Regular contact
with representatives of U.S. and other international airlines
provided helpful insights into airport screening delays and the
impact of the H1N1 outbreak on travelers to and from Japan.


7. (SBU) Users at Post reported the Consular Task Force (CTF)
application was awkward to use and did not allow Post to designate
the specific locations of cases. As each location in the CTF
application required coordination with the Department, the
rapidly-evolving situation led us to use other tools to track our
cases. The utility of the CTF application would be enhanced if
posts were able to designate their own locations in the
application.

Coordination with U.S. Military
--------------

8. (SBU) The Embassy coordinated with USFJ and the GOJ to update
U.S. military bases in Japan on GOJ border procedures in order to
mirror GOJ efforts with arriving air and sea passengers. When a
suspected H1N1 case was reported at Yokota Air Base May 1, the
Embassy coordinated with USFJ and the GOJ to test the virus sample
at Japan's National Institute for Infectious Diseases. The test
results confirmed the following day that the virus was not H1N1,
allowing USFJ to release quarantined passengers and enabling Japan
to swiftly reassure the public that the U.S. military had not
brought the H1N1 virus into Japan. While Post and USFJ worked with
the GOJ to establish procedures for utilizing local laboratory
capacity during the H1N1 outbreak, Post will continue to coordinate
with the GOJ to clarify the process to help in dealing with any
future events.

USG Messages Supported GOJ's Stance on Pork Trade
-------------- --------------

9. (SBU) Public comments by senior USG officials praising the GOJ's
scientific approach to the trade in pork meat was extremely
important in supporting Japanese policy makers' decisions. Japan is
the largest export market for U.S. pork, buying $1.5 billion
annually.

ZUMWALT