JAPAN-IRAN: FOREIGN MINISTER NAKASONE VISITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 001067

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/J, NEA/IR, CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PINR CASC KNNP KN AF IR JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN-IRAN: FOREIGN MINISTER NAKASONE VISITS
TEHRAN, MEETS AHMADINEJAD AND MOTAKI

REF: TOKYO 994

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Jim Zumwalt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone
visited Tehran May 2 where he met separately with President
Ahmadinejad and Foreign Minister Motaki. In a conversation
with Charge d'Affaires, MOFA Director General for Middle
Eastern and African Affairs Toshiro Suzuki characterized the
talks as "candid and cordial." Nakasone stressed to the
Iranians that Japan believes the United States is serious
about engaging with Iran and that, accordingly, Iran should
not miss this opportunity and must respond in a visible,
concrete manner. Both Ahmadinejad and Motaki responded that
they would welcome a change in U.S. policy but words are not
enough; Iran is waiting for concrete action. They added that
the U.S. has been sending mixed messages and, given the bad
relations of the last thirty years, Iran remains very
suspicious of the United States. Nakasone also raised the
case of Roxana Saberi. Ahmadinejad said a review of her case
by Iran's "independent" judicial branch is underway, and that
he hopes for a "positive" outcome. However, he warned that
since she has been accused of spying, overt pressure from
President Obama and the United States on her behalf would
likely prove counter-productive. On the nuclear issue,
Iran's position remains unchanged: Motaki insisted Iran is
developing nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes,
that it has every right to do so, and that Iran will
cooperate fully with the IAEA. Nakasone did not raise
Ahmadinejad's recent remarks in Geneva, or Iran's support for
Hamas or Hizbollah. As for their assessment of the meetings,
Suzuki reported that the Japanese believed they had raised
the subjects that needed to be raised, that they don't expect
any quick changes, but they hope Nakasone's visit will have
some impact on Iranian deliberations. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Foreign Minister Nakasone was pleased with his May 2
visit to Tehran, according to MOFA DG for Middle Eastern and
African Affairs Suzuki who briefed Charge d'Affaires on May
7, following Suzuki's return to Japan with the Foreign
Minister. He said that Nakasone had met with President
Ahmadinejad for approximately 50 minutes and with FM Motaki
for nearly three hours, and that he had "very candid and
cordial" discussions with both. Suzuki said that Japan and
Iran have tried to maintain friendly relations for the past
several years and accordingly, even though much of what
Nakasone had to say might have been offensive to the Iranian
side, they listened to Japan's message with sincerity.

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JAPAN'S MESSAGE ON ENGAGEMENT WITH THE U.S.
--------------


3. (C) According to Suzuki, FM Nakasone in both his meetings
sought to make the following points:

-- Japan believes the U.S. is very serious about engagement
with Iran, and Japan will cooperate to help make this happen,
if desired;

-- Secretary Clinton told Nakasone when they met at The Hague
that the U.S. is open to discuss diplomatic engagement with
Iran;

-- Iran should not miss this opportunity, as the U.S.
administration is pursuing the dialogue option in spite of
internal policy differences in Washington;

-- Iran must respond to the steps already taken by the U.S.;
this response must consist of visible, concrete actions.

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AHMADINEJAD RESPONDS
--------------


4. (C) President Ahmadinejad responded to Nakasone that Iran
would welcome "real change" in U.S. policy, and that it
welcomes the change of language being used by President
Obama. He asserted that in response to this new language,

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Iran has also altered its language. Ahmadinejad said he
wants to believe that the President is producing change, but
unfortunately Iran is still getting conflicting messages. He
cited recent statements by the P5 plus 1 and by Secretary
Clinton that sounded to him like the "old" policy of the
previous administration. "Threatening the Iranian population
will not work," he said. Ahmadinejad continued that given
the complex and negative nature of the U.S.-Iran
relationship, he doesn't think things will be solved easily,
and that the U.S. side must take concrete steps to repair the
relationship first, since it was the U.S. that unilaterally
decided to severe relations.

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MOTAKI'S VIEWS
--------------


5. (C) Motaki's response to Nakasone's message was similar.
According to Suzuki, Motaki said that it will be difficult to
resolve in the short term the issues that divide the U.S. and
Iran. Confidence building, he said, will not be easy and
will require patience. Iran wants to support President
Obama's engagement policy, and if the U.S. clearly
demonstrates its goodwill, Iran will reciprocate. However,
Iran is not getting a clear signal. He suggested the U.S.
should appoint a special envoy to engage in discussions with
Iran. He also said that Secretary Clinton's recent statement
was not helpful and that it was the same as the Bush
Administration's. (NOTE: The Japanese were not clear on
what statement Motaki was referring to and speculated it was
the release of the Department's report on terrorism. Motaki
mentioned that although the recognition of the MEK as a
terrorist group was a good first step, there was nothing else
new. END NOTE.) Mentioning thirty years of bad relations,
Motaki emphasized that the U.S. side must clearly show what,
exactly, engagement means, saying that the Iranians do not
understand what the scenario is. "Is there one? What is its
content? The U.S. is inviting Iran into a room, but we need
to know what's in the room waiting for us before we can
enter." Despite this, Motaki asserted that Iran is serious
about improving the relationship.


6. (C) Suzuki reported that Nakasone rejoined to both
Ahmadinejad and Motaki that if both sides are waiting for the
other to take the first step, there will be no movement. The
U.S., he said, has signaled its readiness and has taken a
number of steps. It is now up to Iran to respond seriously.

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SABERI CASE
--------------


7. (C) FM Nakasone also raised with both Ahmadinejad and
Motaki the case of Roxana Saberi, stating that Japan is
"seriously concerned" about her arrest and conviction, and
has been following her case very closely. He said that while
Japan respects Iran's judicial system, Tokyo hopes that
further proceedings will be highly transparent, that a just
outcome will result, and that she will be released as soon as
possible. Ahmadinejad responded that Iran's judicial branch
is independent, but that he'll do what he can to "coordinate"
to secure Saberi's rights. He said that since she has been
charged with spying, outside pressure only serves to
complicate the issue. He concluded that a review of the case
is underway and that he hopes for a "positive" outcome.


8. (C) FM Motaki's response was similar, said Suzuki.
However, Motaki stressed that Saberi is an Iranian citizen
and said that she will be treated like any other Iranian
citizen. Nevertheless, the government has asked the
judiciary to review her case, and he hopes it will be dealt
with in a "just and humane" manner. (NOTE: On the margins of
the meetings, the Japanese also discussed Saberi's case with
Iranian Ambassador to Tokyo Sayed Abbas Araghchi, who was in
Tehran for the visit. Araghchi, who personally knows Saberi
(ref.),said that he has discussed her case with Iran's
National Security Council, which is also involved, and that
he continues to hope for a positive outcome. END NOTE.)


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NUCLEAR ISSUE
--------------


9. (C) Suzuki reported that FM Nakasone also raised the
nuclear issue, noting that Japan is concerned about Iran's
enrichment activities and that it is imperative that Iran
comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions
pertaining to its nuclear program. It is important, Nakasone
continued, for Iran to restore trust with the international
community, and he urged them to take concrete steps to do so.
A good first step would be to respond to the P5 plus 1
overtures so that talks can proceed.


10. (C) The Iranian response, said Suzuki, was the same as
always. President Ahmadinejad repeated earlier statements
that Iran has no intention of producing a nuclear weapon,
that nuclear weapons are outdated, that those who possess
them bring danger to themselves, and that he doesn't want
them for Iran. It is the United States, he continued, that
must demilitarize nuclear power. Motaki, also, stated that
Iran's program is peaceful, that Iran opposes nuclear
weapons, is preparing a response to the P5 plus 1, and will
cooperate with the IAEA. In what Suzuki termed "strange
logic," Motaki continued that Iran just wants to be treated
like Japan, which has long had a nuclear program but has
never been asked to stop or cease production by the
international community. Nakasone rejoined that Japan has
always fully cooperated with the IAEA and pays it substantial
sums to finance it's own inspections.

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IRAN-DPRK COOPERATION
--------------


11. (C) FM Nakasone told the Iranians that Japan is anxious
about Tehran's relationship with North Korea, particularly to
the extent that there is any cooperation in the nuclear and
missile fields. According to Suzuki, Ahmadinejad did not
respond directly, saying only that Iran will help Japan solve
its problems with North Korea. Motaki stated that there is
no nuclear cooperation between the two countries and that
Iran has developed its own missile capabilities. (NOTE: One
press report following the visit indicated that Motaki stated
Iran is helping North Korea with its missile program. MOFA
Iran Unit Chief Junichi Sumi, who was an interpreter during
the visit, told Embassy he never heard Motaki make such a
statement. END NOTE.)

--------------
AFGHANISTAN, OTHER ISSUES
--------------


12. (C) FM Nakasone and FM Motaki also discussed several
bilateral and regional issues. On Afghanistan, they touched
upon their recent agreement to work together to train Afghan
border guards and to provide assistance to Afghan refugees
inside Iran who may be returning to Afghanistan. Motaki said
that Iran is addressing the problems in Afghanistan in a
serious manner and has invited both Afghan President Karzai
and Pakistani President Zardari to Tehran. Iran, he said,
wants to form a regional grouping to address this issue and
hopes the U.S. will support this idea.


13. (C) The two sides agreed to work to enhance cultural
exchanges and also discussed Japan International Cooperation
Agency activities in Iran, specifically those dealing with
energy conservation. Iran hopes to boost its economic
relations with Japan, but Suzuki reported that any talks on
this subject were in general terms only. Nakasone repeated
the same message that has been conveyed to the Iranians in
the past: Japan considers the bilateral relationship to be
generally good, but there are constraints, and further
developments to the relationship cannot be considered until
"better circumstances" exist.

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WHAT WASN'T SAID
--------------

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14. (C) Responding to a question from Charge, Suzuki admitted
that neither President Ahmadinejad's recent statements in
Geneva, nor Iran's support for Hamas and Hizbollah had been
raised during the meetings. He said that talking points had
been prepared but these subjects had not come up due to time
constraints. On Ahmadinejad's Geneva speech, Suzuki said
that Japan believes Iran "got the message" from the walkout
and the subsequent outcry. He also said that although not
raised explicitly, he believes the Iranians clearly
understand Nakasone's consistent Middle East Peace Process
message that "Iran must behave more responsibly."

--------------
JOINT PRESS STATEMENT
--------------


15. (C) Suzuki reported that the Iranians wanted to conclude
the visit with some type of formally signed memorandum, but
the Japanese held out for simple joint press briefing.
According to our unofficial translation of the Japanese text,
Nakasone was fairly blunt in his statement. He said that in
order to develop the bilateral relationship further, efforts
to improve the international environment are needed. "On the
issues of the international community, I, as a friend of
Iran, frankly shared the severe views the international
society, including Japan, has on the nuclear problem and the
regional situation." He noted that Japan shares the
international community's concern about Iran's enrichment
program and believes it is important for Iran to recover the
confidence of the international community by complying with
the UNSCRs, and that it is important for Iran to take swift
and positive responses for advancement of negotiations with
the EU3 plus 3. "About the Obama administration's new
engagement policy, I told FM Motaki that the U.S is truly
striving for dialogue with Iran, and Iran, without missing
this opportunity, should respond positively and take concrete
action." He also urged Iran to play a "constructive role" to
achieve regional stability, addressed Afghanistan, and noted
Japan's concerns about Roxana Saberi.

--------------
ATMOSPHERICS
--------------


16. (C) Suzuki described Ahmadinejad as "quiet and
composed." The meeting started three hours late, at 9:00 PM,
but the President did not look tired or distracted. Thirty
minutes had been allocated for the meeting, but it lasted
fifty minutes, including Farsi to Japanese interpretation.
Ahmadinejad made a short opening statement, but then asked
Nakasone what he had to say and listened patiently to the
Japanese presentation. Suzuki said he had expected him to
"speak more and listen less" but this was not the case. His
responses to Nakasone were delivered in a candid and
"ordinary" manner. He spoke with no notes and knew his
brief, although a couple of times Motaki interjected a point
to prompt him.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) Although Suzuki claims that the Japanese were
generally pleased with the visit, we think they can't help
but be disappointed. They were aware of our concerns about
the propriety of making the trip and had called in Ambassador
Araghchi prior to departing to emphasize that Japan expected
more than just talk (ref.). Apparently, that's all they got.
When asked to provide an overall assessment of the visit,
the best Suzuki could come up with was to say he and his
colleagues are "still discussing" the outcome. He rather
defensively said that "we said what we think needed to be
said" and although they don't expect there to be quick
changes in Iranian behavior, MOFA is hopeful that perhaps
Nakasone's comments will play a role in Iranian
deliberations. Suzuki also said that Iranian politics are
much more politicized than usual at present in the run-up to
next months elections, and that now is probably not the time

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to expect bold new policies. He concluded that Japan and
Iran have had a "solid" relationship for some time, and that
the Iranians listen to what the Japanese have to say, even if
it is painful for them to do so.


ZUMWALT