BERISHA VS. RAMA: NO END IN SIGHT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TIRANA 000812

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (GARBLED TEXT)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS KDEM PHUM AL
SUBJECT: BERISHA VS. RAMA: NO END IN SIGHT

Classified By: BY CDA DEBORAH A. JONES, REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: After three weeks of increasingly sharp
rhetoric and provocative actions, neither Prime Minister
Berisha nor opposition Socialist Party (SP) Chairman Edi Rama
appear willing to enter into dialogue with one another or to
extend any kind of olive branch in an effort to end the
current political impasse. On the contrary, both sides
appear to believe that they are winning, and see concessions
or dialogue as unnecessary or signs of weakness. In the past
week, rhetoric and threatened actions have only intensified,
with the GOA increasing pressure on prominent businessmen
closely tied to Rama and threatening impeachment proceedings
against him, and Rama threatening to continue demonstrations
into to 2010 "leading to Berisha's removal from office." It
is still unclear at this point whether either Rama or Berisha
have a real strategy going forward, or whether both are
simply improvising tactics as they go along with no clear
goal in mind. Although the political stalemate appears
likely to continue for the foreseeable future, most observers
discount the possibility of political violence or civil
unrest. END SUMMARY.

Both Sides Upping the Ante. . .
--------------


2. (C) Almost immediately following the SP's November 20
demonstration, at which the SP first began calling for early
elections, PM Berisha ordered his Democratic Party to sharpen
political rhetoric at all levels in its verbal attacks on the
SP (led by the PM himself, who in a fiery speech in
Parliament named numerous SP MPs and SP-linked businessmen as
members of a "builders mafia"). At the same time, the GOA
has put pressure on many of Rama's major financial backers
through stricter enforcement of tax and building codes,
including the partial demolition by construction authorities
of a building owned by the brother of an SP MP. (NOTE: The
GOA claims that the structure was built illegally. END
NOTE). On December 8, the GOA staged a large rally,
ostensibly to mark the 19th anniversary of the founding of
the student movement that eventually toppled the communist
government in 1991. However, DP MPs told PolOff that the
primary goal of the rally was to "show GOA resolve" in the
face of SP protests and calls for early elections and prove
to the SP that the DP/GOA could itself stage large rallies in
Tirana.


3. (C) For its part, the SP has also upped the ante in
recent weeks, largely dropping previous calls for opening
contested ballot boxes from the parliamentary elections and
instead calling for early elections and vowing to topple the
Berisha government via these early elections. The new SP
motto in recent weeks has become "Open the Boxes or Leave!"
The SP has also sharpened its rhetoric against PM Berisha in
recent weeks, engaging in a tit-for-tat exchange of petty
insults and charges of corruption with the DP. On December
14, Rama told an SP rally in Durres that SP protests will
continue into 2010, leading to "Berisha's removal from
office" (presumably via early elections). The SP boycott of
parliament, now in its fourth month, shows no sign of ending
soon, with observers from all sides telling PolOff that the
boycott could easily last for many more months, if not until
the 2011 local elections. During a December 9 meeting with
Ambassador Withers, Rama expressed the view that the SP's
boycott and protest strategy was becoming increasingly
effective in putting pressure on the PM.


4. (C) During a December 16 meeting with PolOff, Erion
Veliaj (head of the SP allied G-99 party and very close to
Rama) told PolOff that GOA efforts to pressure Rama's
financial backers are taking a toll, claiming that Rama's
finances were drying up as SP-linked businesses pull back
support. However, Veliaj added, Berisha's attacks had also
convinced Rama that the boycott and protest strategy was
gaining traction, with Rama believing that Berisha's
steadfast refusal to open the ballot boxes means Berisha has
something to hide. Veliaj said that even if Berisha were to
make real concessions at this point, Rama would likely press
ahead with demonstrations and stronger calls for early
elections in the belief that "the SP has no other option."


. . .But to What End?
--------------


5. (C) What Rama actually hopes to achieve from his "boycott
and protest" strategy remains unclear. Rama and his
supporters continue to claim (as they have from the
beginning) that the boycott and demonstrations will continue
until the GOA agrees to numerous demands, including opening
contested ballot boxes from the parliamentary elections in
order to fully investigate alleged electoral fraud. The GOA,
for its part, says it will meet any and all SP demands except
the opening of ballot boxes, claiming that to do so is
illegal (a view ODIHR informally agrees with). (COMMENT: The
SP claims of fighting for "transparency" are almost certainly
disingenuous. Numerous sources have told PolOff that opening
the boxes would likely prove nothing, but would in fact
expose many minor irregularities such as missing voter
signatures from some voter lists that while having no effect
on the election outcome, would serve to cast doubt on the
election results and back up SP claims that the parliament
elected in June is "illegitimate". The sad fact is that much
if not most electoral fraud committed during the
parliamentary elections was done via SP-DP collusion at the
expense of the smaller parties. Observers from all sides,
including the SP, have told PolOff that the SP cannot expose
serious DP electoral fraud without also implicating itself,
and that the call to open the ballot boxes is little more
than a red herring. END COMMENT).


6. (C) Former Foreign Minister and SP MP Kastriot Islami (a
critic of Rama's) told PolOff that Rama has two goals: to try
and take power via early elections; and/or find a way of
strengthening his position as he approaches what is certain
to be a tough re-election campaign for Mayor of Tirana in

2011. DP MP Ilir Rusmajli agreed in part with Islami's
assessment, saying that calls for early elections are mainly
red meat to fire up the SP base and that Rama has no
reasonable expectation of ever actually getting to early
elections. Rusmajli claimed Rama's main goal is to obstruct
the work of the parliament and create a crisis atmosphere in
order to damage DP election prospects in 2011. Islami
lamented to PolOff on December 15 that no matter Rama's real
goals - whether early elections or a stronger position for
2011 or both - no one, be they the international community or
PM Berisha, can or will deliver on them, meaning Rama will
either push harder and risk a more dangerous political crisis
to achieve them, or face an embarrassing defeat.


7. (C) It is also unclear what Berisha's goals and strategy
are at this point. Numerous sources have told PolOff that
since the November 20 SP rally, Berisha appears to be fueled
by little more than rage at the SP and Rama over calls for
early elections and Rama's refusal to end the boycott.
(NOTE: Berisha's reaction is all the more curious in that for
nearly three months, the PM largely avoided provocative
language or actions in response to the SP boycott, with the
GOA mainly sticking to legalistic arguments as to why ballot
boxes cannot be opened, and avoiding the personal attacks
that have figured prominently in DP rhetoric in recent weeks.
Nevertheless, Berisha is well-practiced in the art of slash
and burn politics, and all too often his default response to
pressure is to try and destroy his opponent. END NOTE) DP
MPs told PolOff that many in the DP believe the DP's
relatively low-key initial reaction to the boycott only
encouraged the SP to become more aggressive in its demands.
Islami speculated that Berisha perhaps hopes to cut off
Rama's bases of support by going after SP-linked oligarchs
and wealthy SP MPs in an effort to weaken Rama. Rusmajli
essentially confirmed this view, telling PolOff that Berisha
sees the SP today not as the SP of old, but as a party
dominated by builders and other businessmen that control Edi
Rama. Rusmajli speculated that Berisha was going after these
businesspeople "because they dominate Edi Rama."

Internationals To the Rescue?
--------------


8. (C) During a December 11 dinner with PolOff and an OSCE
rep, two SP MPs close to Rama insisted repeatedly that the SP
and DP cannot resolve this stalemate on their own and that
intervention by the internationals was the only solution.
When asked what the SP hoped to achieve by internationalizing
the dispute, neither MP could answer. In a separate meeting
with PolOff, Kastriot Islami agreed, saying that Rama and
some around him have deluded themselves into believing that
international intervention could somehow lead to early
elections or other major concessions to the SP by Berisha.
Islami claimed any hint of impending intervention will only
cause Rama to become even more intransigent, as Rama would
see this as legitimizing his "obstruct and boycott" campaign.


Little Fear of Violence, but Political Stalemate Continues
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Observers on all sides dismissed fears of widespread
civil disorder or violence resulting from the political
standoff. Both Rusmajli and Islami told PolOff that Rama's
ability to cause instability is limited in that SP actions
and protests are not gaining any following outside of the SP
base. Both agreed, however, that continued demonstrations
and the boycott could cause an ongoing political crisis and
stalemate. In recent weeks the SP appears to have backed off
of plans to order SP-led municipalities to shut down services
to the public out of fear of public backlash or possible
criminal prosecution. And so far, none of the oft-rumored
"provocations" by the SP in hopes of prompting an
overreaction by the GOA or police have come to pass.
Nevertheless, with neither side willing to ratchet back
rhetoric, and SP demonstrations taking place nearly daily, it
would only take one incident to potentially touch off a
physical confrontation between the two parties.

COMMENT: Albania's Two-Man Political System
--------------


10. (C) The current standoff is an unfortunate but
predictable result of the Electoral Code passed nearly one
year ago, which effectively sidelined nearly all of Albania's
smaller political parties and created a de facto two party
system. But because Rama and Berisha so dominate their
respective parties, Albania has become in effect less a
two-party than a two-man political system, with the entire
structure held hostage by the whims and emotions of Sali
Berisha and Edi Rama.


11. (C) COMMENT CONT'D: At this point, neither side appears
willing either to ratchet back tensions or make the first
effort towards real dialogue. Although it is unclear whether
either Berisha or Rama have any real long-term strategy, both
appear to believe that they are winning and thus see no need
for concessions or dialogue. It is possible that after a few
more weeks of flailing away at each other, both Rama and
Berisha will get winded and become more open to finding a
resolution, although the opposite case - that tensions will
continue to go only higher with both sides escalating the
dispute - is probably just as likely, at least in the short
to mid term. In a recent development, Foreign Minister and
leader of the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) Ilir
Meta said publicly on December 17 that a meeting between
Berisha and Rama would be "positive." We do know that Meta
has disagreed privately with the current trajectory of the
political dialogue. We should be under no illusions that the
dispute will burn itself out anytime soon. Bare knuckles
politics is the Albanian norm, and both sides appear, at
least for now, to have painted themselves into respective
corners via their rash actions and harsh rhetoric.
JONES