THE CENTER OF POWER ON THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TIRANA 000453

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PINR AL
SUBJECT: THE CENTER OF POWER ON THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT

Classified By: Ambassador John L. Withers, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Although the outcome of the elections on June 28 are
still uncertain and the next government lineup may not come
into focus until September, certain leadership styles are
likely to reign in the next government regardless of the
outcome. And regardless of which party forms the next
government, both Sali Berisha and Edi Rama are likely to play
prominent, if not dominant roles in Albanian politics for the
foreseeable future. Post spoke with journalists,
politicians, and current and former political insiders from
the left and the right to find a few general principles on
what kinds of people will likely be government ministers, how
decisions will be made, and who will likely have the most
influence. It is the general consensus that if either the
left or the right win, there is bound to be plenty of
unilateral decision-making as both PM Sali Berisha and
opposition leader Edi Rama have centralized leadership
styles. Ministers in either an SP or DP coalition also may
not be the most powerful or influential officials in
government as people outside politics, such as media moguls
and close associates, often have more influence with Berisha
and Rama than do members of the party leadership. However,
Rama, who has no experience running the national government,
will be more insecure about his leadership and will probably
seek guidance and approval from the international community
) particularly the U.S. - for his decisions. Berisha will
see a PD victory as positive affirmation for his policies and
unilateral leadership style.

Berisha: Holding on by the Skin of His Teeth
--------------

2. (C) If Berisha is eventually certified the winner of the
election and is able to form a government, he will likely
re-enter the parliament with the slimmest of majorities.
Even if Berisha and Ilir Meta's Movement for Socialist
Integration (LSI) do eventually enter into a coalition,
theoretically giving the PD at least 74 seats in the next
Parliament, Berisha's majority will be a tenuous one.
Berisha himself, however, will likely craft his re-election
as a renewed mandate for his policies. Furthermore, a new
electoral system that favors larger parties and a DP party
list chock-a-block with loyalists allows Berisha not to be as
concerned with balancing power within the coalition or the
party. As of July 1, it appears that only two other parties
in the DP coalition ) the Republican Party and the Party for
Democracy and Integration ) will get one seat each in the
next parliament, leaving the Democratic Party overwhelmingly
in control of its coalition. And although Berisha has agreed
"in principle" to a coalition with former PM Ilir Meta, it is
far from certain that Meta and Berisha will actually close
the deal or just how many ministries may be given to LSI
members. Nevertheless, according to political contacts,
Berisha is likely to fill most Minister positions with DP
loyalists. Former Foreign Minister Besnik Mustafaj and
journalist Mero Baze (please protect),both erstwhile Berisha
insiders, mentioned PM advisor Albana Vokshi as a likely
influential minister in the next government.


3. (C) The prospect of a government packed with DP members
increases the prospects of Berisha micromanaging policy
decisions, as Berisha grants more autonomy to ministers from
coalition partners than he does to ministers from his own
party, according to Baze and DP strategist Ilir Rusmajli.
Baze told Poloffs that Berisha keeps tight control over
government ministers from his own party because he wants to
prevent the emergence of any rivals within the DP. Baze
elaborated by saying Berisha appoints three kinds of people
as ministers: politicians with a track record of loyalty;
people on whom Berisha personally has incriminating
information; and unqualified politicians that will be
indebted to the PM. For example, Berisha dislikes former Def
Min Mediu on a personal level but invited him back into the
coalition only because Berisha and Mediu have dirt on each
other, according to Baze. (NOTE: Mediu is head of the
Republican Party, which is part of the DP electoral coalition
and part of Berisha's ruling coalition. END NOTE)


4. (C) Berisha's tendency to suppress potential rivals and
grant influence only to those who don't pose a political
threat suggests that ministers may not be the most
influential in formulating policy, should Berisha receive
another mandate. According to Baze, Berisha makes decisions
without consulting ministers and has tightened his inner
circle to the point that he only heeds advice from family

TIRANA 00000453 002 OF 002


members (especially his daughter) and from the owner of
pro-DP TV KLAN, Aleksander Frangaj. Berisha, however, does at
least inform government and party leaders of his decisions,
once they are made.

RAMA
--------------

5. (C) In separate meetings, Baze and former PM and PS leader
Pandeli Majko (please protect) described Rama's leadership
style as being similar to Berisha's with a few key
differences. Rama, like Berisha, makes political decisions
without consulting PS leadership, but Baze claimed Rama
one-ups Berisha by not even informing the party leadership of
the decisions he has made, leaving his close associates the
only recourse of watching tv to find out what's going on.
Many Embassy contacts confirm that Rama's tendency to take on
everything by himself often makes him a frantic and
capricious leader. Rama is also similar to Berisha in that
people outside the PS such as media moguls, businessmen, and
NGO leaders often have more influence on Rama's thinking than
party leaders, according to both Majko and Baze.


6. (C) Despite the similarities, Rama will likely differ from
the incumbent in his confidence level. Observers told PolOff
that Rama's lack of experience in running the national
government will probably prompt him to be more susceptible to
outside pressure and to persistently seek U.S. approval for
his decisions. Majko claimed that Rama would present the
Embassy with a list of potential ministers for approval prior
to making any appointments. In order to ingratiate himself
to the international community, Rama will seek a diverse
cabinet lineup with a positive image, and he will grant the
most influence to those with the most charisma and the
closest ties to the U.S., according to Majko. (NOTE: Majko's
assessment of potential ministers tracks with Rama's choice
of candidates for SP lists. Rama has given prominent roles
to several new faces such as Erion Veliaj and Vasilika Hysi,
both of whom are well-known and well-liked among the
international community. Rama often uses Veliaj to pass
messages to the Embassy, and Veliaj has been described by
many observers as Rama's "attack dog" during the campaign.
END NOTE.) Both Majko and Baze told Emboffs that Rama would
be more tolerant of rivals within the government and would
grant greater autonomy to government ministers, especially
ones that wouldn't play a role in his domestic agenda, and
both mentioned chairman of the G-99 party, Erion Veliaj as a
likely candidate for a prominent ministerial post should the
left win.

Maybe We're not so Different After All
--------------


7. (C) COMMENT: Certainly the most disturbing similarity
between Rama and Berisha's leadership styles is a distinct
authoritarian streak running through both men. Rama and
Berisha colluded over the past year and a half to undermine
the independence of the presidency via constitutional
amendments in 2008, and Rama and the SP have shown they are
at times willing to stand aside while Berisha attacks the
Prosecutor General and judiciary. Both Rama and Berisha are
known within their respective parties as near control freaks
who frantically texted candidates during live TV debates with
talking points and instructions. Berisha's penchant for
undercutting independent institutions will only be reaffirmed
with a second mandate - Tirana is already bracing for his
anticipated next assault on the judiciary as a means of
quashing the Gerdec case - and Rama's tendency to concentrate
decision-making power in his own hands suggests he might
furtively seek to weaken independent institutions should
those institutions challenge his authority. The media is
said to be Rama's bugaboo. No matter who ends up running the
country when Parliament convenes in the fall, apolitical
institutions and free media could continue to find
themselves under political pressure.
WITHERS