DEMIL: LITTLE MOVEMENT LIEKLY BEFORE ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TIRANA 000221

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV MASS AL
SUBJECT: DEMIL: LITTLE MOVEMENT LIEKLY BEFORE ELECTIONS
WITHOUT PRESSURE

REF: A) TIRANA 7 B) TIRANA 146 C) TIRANA 96

Classified By: Ambassador John L. Withers II for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) Summary. One week before the April 4 NATO Summit, the
Ministry of Defense ordered the temporary suspension of all
demilitarization activity. The stated reason was to avoid
any accident that might mar events around Albania's NATO
accession (as the Gerdec tragedy did only two weeks before
Albania's invitation to join NATO in 2008). However, viewed
alongside delays in almost all other areas of demil, it is
clear the current government lacks motivation for - and
indeed is nervous about - progress on demil before this
summer's national elections. Post believes a call from
Washington to Defense Minister Oketa to urge progress on
demil - specifically on the Polican demilitarization
facility, where substantial U.S. money has gone unused for
almost eight months - could be useful in unlocking paralysis
in the MOD. Any message to the GOA should stress that
continued lack of progress on demil will jeopardize continued
U.S. funding and support for demil activities. End Summary.

CONTINUED DELAYS
--------------


2. (C) Of greatest concern is the continued delay at Polican.
A U.S.-funded line to dismantle 82mm mortars (the largest
stock in Albania's inventory) was originally scheduled to
begin with supervision from U.S. contractor Armor Group on
August 1, 2008. However, bureaucratic delays and
disagreements (who pays for what, the level of contractor
involvement in initial preparations, complaints from
community residents, etc.) delayed commencement of Polican -
as well as the other major industrial demil facility, Mjekes
- beyond the end of 2008. After strong U.S. pressure during
a visit by Defense Minister Oketa to Washington in December,
Oketa committed to beginning industrial demil at Mjekes and
Polican in early 2009.


3. (C) While successfully beginning work at Mjekes in
February, a fatal accident at Polican in January increased
jitters over demil at Polican (ref a). (Note: As opposed to
Polican, Mjekes is currently run by Albanians without foreign
support. End Note.) MOD mid-level staff have continually
found new issues that must be solved before work at Polican
can begin, including such minor concerns as reducing the
noise made by the incinerator. After several discussions
with Albanian officers, EUCOM EOD Specialist LTC Mike Buckley
has expressed his opinion that MOD mid-level officers
(especially General Staff J-4) do not want work to begin at
Polican at all if possible. This would be a great
disappointment, as significant U.S. money has been dedicated
to this project - around USD 4 million to date.


4. (C) In addition, during an inspection of Mjekes in March,
the CHOD felt the plan to take care of residue from demil
(propellant, fuses and explosives) was inadequate and ordered
the suspension of demil at Mjekes until a plan was
established (It is worth noting that such a plan has always
been required of Polican even before work there begins).


5. (C) Other delays have also given the impression of an MOD
staff that is reluctant to move forward on demilitarization.
While Oketa drafted a National Demil Plan in June 2008, MoD
staff (particularly General Staff J-4) have dragged their
feet on its implementation by claiming the plan has never
been signed by the Minister, and is thus not official (ref
b). Each time the Minister has requested the Plan so he can
sign it, J-4 officers continually claimed that they are
correcting minor details in the plan and will send it to the
Minister once it is ready. We believe MOD staff has no
desire or intention of obtaining a singed National Demil Plan.


6. (C) Further, U.S. contractor Armor Group has agreed to
import a portable incinerator to destroy small arms and light
weapons, but for over four months, J-4 staff has objected to
its use and has complained that small arms are not a
priority. As a result, Armor Group has been unwilling to
import the machine until the Minister has issued a signed
order for the machine's use. While the Minister has verbally
agreed to this, J-4 staff has stalled on paperwork necessary
for such an order. Lastly, while the Minister and CHOD have
insisted that open detonation of the most dangerous munitions
would commence at eight designated sites on April 1, the

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Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) have done little to nothing to
prepare these sites, and commencement of open detonation has
been postponed indefinitely.

LACK OF MOTIVATION
--------------


7. (C) The February 11 indictments in the Gerdec tragedy (ref
c) have increased fear throughout the Ministry of Defense.
While Minister Oketa himself is motivated to deal with the
problem of demilitarization, he wields little political
clout, even within his own Ministry. He is young (40),has
no previous military experience, is not closely tied to Prime
Minister Berisha, is rarely outspoken, and has not played the
rough politics necessary to increase his political stature.
As a result, there is speculation that even if the majority
party wins a second mandate in the June 28, 2009 national
elections, it is unlikely that Oketa will remain as Minister
of Defense. Moreover, last week, Berisha promised
significant minister positions to all political parties who
join his election coalition, which would also rule out Oketa,
who is from the same party as Berisha.


8. (C) MOD staff is aware of all of this and takes advantage
of these facts, ignoring deadlines and stalling on requests
in the hopes they will be forgotten, which they often are.
Oketa has rarely been willing to hold his own staff's feet to
the fire to meet deadlines or carry out orders. However,
pressure applied at the right time (such as in December) can
be useful. This was also seen when dealing with the issue of
leftover RDX and propellant at Mjekes. When LTC Buckley
brought the danger of these explosives - as well as continued
stalling of Oketa's staff on this issue - to Oketa's
attention (followed by a similar message from the Ambassador
to Prime Minister Berisha),the very next day Oketa fired the
chief of the General Staff J-4. Since then LTC Buckley has
been working with the MOD staff to put together an effective
plan to destroy these explosives.

ACTION REQUEST
--------------


9. (C) For these reasons, we believe a call from Washington
at either the DAS level or higher, or at the appropriate
level from PM/WRA, to Minister Oketa could be useful in
urging Oketa to make progress on demil before this summer.
Oketa should understand that significant U.S. capital, both
in terms of manpower and finances, have been dedicated to
this problem, including millions of dollars for the line at
Polican and the assignment of an active EOD officer from
EUCOM (an extremely scarce commodity in high demand) to
Tirana. But U.S. "stake-holders" are becoming concerned at
the lack of return on these "investments." We understand the
political risks as we move forward with demil, but we believe
there are greater risks in stalling - the greatest risk being
that of a catastrophic explosion that could have been
prevented with timely progress on demil.


10. (C) In conjunction, these points could also be used in
any meetings the Albanian CHOD may have during his April
13-17 visit to Washington and New Jersey.


11. (C) We believe a call to Berisha may not be as effective
and could be counter-productive. Berisha is solely focused
on his re-election campaign and seems to believe progress on
demil causes greater risk to his political future than does
ignoring the problem. Attention on the problem may increase
his efforts to stall progress until after the elections. That
said, when the Ambassador next meets the Prime Minister, he
will note these issues to Berisha and test his reaction.
WITHERS