REPORT FROM LA FRONTERA: BORDER PATROL'S BATTLES WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L TIJUANA 000883


E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/11/2019
TAGS: SOCI KCRM PREL MX
SUBJECT: REPORT FROM LA FRONTERA: BORDER PATROL'S BATTLES WITH
TRAFFICKERS

CLASSIFIED BY: ARADETSKY, Political Officer, Pol/Econ, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)



1. (U) SUMMARY: Migrant and drug trafficking patterns along the
Mexico-U.S. border vary from sector to sector and are difficult
to pin down because the routes and tactics used by traffickers
are in constant flux. Most traffickers prefer to avoid
confrontation with U.S. law enforcement, and the absolute number
of attacks against U.S. Border Patrol (BP) agents are down in
2009 compared to 2008. Unfortunately, the nature of the attacks
that do occur are increasingly violent, as demonstrated by the
July 22 murder of BP Agent Robert Rosas by unknown assailants.
This phenomenon may be due to rival drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) competing for dominance in certain
corridors, weakened DTOs using more violent tactics, and a
breakdown in the alliance between migrant traffickers
("polleros") and bandits. Some sources claim more "polleros"
are arming themselves. This cable was jointly drafted by
Consulates Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, Monterrey, Nogales, and
Tijuana. END SUMMARY

IF YOU BUILD IT, THEY WILL RE-ROUTE
-------------- -


2. (U) Most analysts believe DTOS and "polleros" prefer, when
possible, to avoid direct confrontation with U.S. law
enforcement and will alter their routes to avoid detection. As
a result, BP is playing a constant game of catch-up, trying to
keep track of changing trafficking patterns. In the El
Paso/Ciudad Juarez corridor, for example, DTOs have shifted to
more remote corridors in northwestern Chihuahua due to
construction of the border fence and increased patrolling
activities near El Paso. Urban border fence expansion and
fortification in Nogales, AZ has forced traffic into the
mountainous regions to the immediate east and west of town. In
the San Diego sector, trafficking has moved east to the desert
areas near Tecate, CA as the fence has been built inland from
the Pacific Ocean. In the Rio Grande Valley Sector, which
encompasses Brownsville and McAllen, TX, BP is noticing
trafficking moving westward, though BP analysts cannot yet
pinpoint the reason for this shift as the fence has not yet been
completed in this area.


3. (C) Despite an overall desire to avoid confrontation, the
risk for violence in the trafficking corridors appears to be
going up. While overall assaults against BP agents are down in
2009, Maritza Weaver, Supervisor of BP intelligence in the
westernmost sector, points out that the nature of the assaults
that do occur are becoming more aggressive and the overall
statistics of lower assaults mask sharp increases in violence in
certain sectors. For example, traffickers used to throw rocks
at BP vehicles to create a distraction, but not with the
intention to hurt the agent. Since the end of last year, BP
agents report bandits and traffickers are aiming rocks at the
agents themselves. Likewise, in the Rio Grande Valley Sector,
according to BP Agent Gilberto Perez, historically drug runners
would dump their drug loads and run when approached by BP, but
now these individuals are fighting to keep their product,
including shooting at BP agents, ramming agents or their
vehicles with cars, or throwing large rocks at the Rio Grande
patrols. A U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
agent in Monterrey believes traffickers may be getting more
desperate as the wall gets built and, if armed, are more willing
to shoot first.

THE STAKES ARE HIGHER THESE DAYS
--------------


4. (U) There are several explanations for the increase in
violent assaults. First, several trafficking corridors are
being disputed by two or more DTOs. In these cases, aggression
almost inevitably goes up. DTO "gatekeepers" regulate the drug
and migrant flow across the border by controlling smugglers'
access to the corridors and collecting "taxes" on illicit
shipments. "Polleros" who pay one DTO to gain access are
vulnerable to retaliation from the rival DTO. In western
Chihuahua, the Vicente Fuentes DTO and the Sinaloa DTO are
competing for control of routes. Similarly, in the rural
corridor west of Tecate, CA, where, bucking the overall
statistics, violence has seriously peaked in recent months, BP
believes rival remnants of the Arellano Felix DTO are playing
out their turf battles with a predictable uptick in migrant and
BP deaths and injuries (NOTE: BP Agent Rosas was killed in this
corridor July 22 and two migrants have died due to bullet wounds
in the sector so far in 2009, compared to zero migrant deaths in
the corridor in 2008). However, dominance of a particular
sector by one cartel does not guarantee peace. In the Rio
Grande Valley, the Gulf Cartel remains dominant but weakened by
constant pressure from the Mexican military and Mexican Federal
Police. BP believes the cartel is responding by threatening its
"staff" with death and/or holding their family as collateral if
they do not complete their delivery successfully. BP believes
this is a major factor in the uptick in violence between
traffickers and BP in this sector.


5. (C) Another reason violence is up in the trafficking
corridors is a breakdown in the alliance between "polleros" and
bandits, who have for years roamed the border preying on
migrants. Bandits used to work hand in hand with migrant
traffickers. The "polleros" would guide the migrants to a
pre-designated spot, the bandits would take money from the
migrants, and there was an unwritten rule that the "pollero" and
those working for him or her would not be robbed. This was bad
news for the migrants, but usually passed off without violence.
According to Jose Zoa, who monitors the violent Tecate corridor
for BP's Intelligence division, as the Arellano Felix DTO has
been pulled apart due to the arrest of much of its leadership,
undisciplined "narco-juniors" now see banditry as a second
source of income and have decided that "polleros" are also fair
targets.


6. (C) Some reports suggest "polleros" are arming themselves to
defend against the bandits. In Arizona, both Mexican and U.S.
law enforcement report an increased prevalence of detainees
being found with arms. BP in El Paso says it has been common
for years for "polleros" to arm themselves. However, San Diego
BP believes that most "polleros" in their sector are still savvy
enough to know they are better off, if caught, not having a
weapon on them, so the amount of armed traffickers in each
sector probably varies.


7. (U) COMMENT: BP faces many obstacles in combating the
violence. While BP does cooperate with Mexican law
enforcement through the "Operational Protocols for Border
Violence Incidents", the cooperation is irregular. The Mexican
responding agency varies depending on the situation, and
frequent rotation of personnel (for understandable reasons) mean
BP needs to routinely rebuild its relationships. Moreover, BP
believes that many officials at all levels on the Mexican side
fear retribution if they cooperate fully. Also, when an
incident occurs on the U.S. side, but the assailant is able to
flee south back across the border, even when Mexican authorities
detain the individual, they are required by Mexican law to
release the suspect within forty-eight hours if no charges are
filed. The procedures under the "Protocols" are too cumbersome
and lengthy for this timeline, and as a result, most incidents
go unpunished. On the U.S. side, BP faces manpower limitations
and cannot patrol all areas of the border consistently.
Unfortunately, as long as parts of Mexico are destabilized by
weakened, desperate, and competing DTOs, BP and migrants will
continue to face dangerous conditions. END COMMENT


KAHSKETT