CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000088

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER)
NSC FOR FLY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
55TH SESSION, FEBRUARY 17-20,2009

REF: A. 08 THE HAGUE 1015

B. THE HAGUE 71

C. 08 THE HAGUE 898

D. THE HAGUE 40

E. THE HAGUE 59

This is CWC-04-09.

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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
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1. (SBU) With few scheduled meetings the past few weeks,
OPCW has been buzzing with corridor conversations on the
aftermath of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP)
in December and whether Iran will request a special
session of the Conference, and on potential candidates
for the office of Director-General (DG). Iran's tactics
for the upcoming Executive Council (EC) following its
isolation at the CSP will undoubtedly impact how much
business can be done. Iraq will become a State Party
(SP) to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) just days
before this EC; whether and how Iraq will participate is
not yet known. EC-55 will welcome Iraq's accession to
the treaty; more difficult questions lie ahead when Iraq
makes its initial declaration.


2. (SBU) The newest item on the EC agenda is the
appointment of a Director-General by the end of the year.
Iran has already signaled that it is "too early" to start
the search and that "informal informals" will be needed
first. Iran will also likely raise questions on the 90-
day reports on destruction progress and may try to push
for stronger language on future sites, specifically in
the U.S. Iran also has submitted additional changes to
its Schedule 1 Facility Agreement the EC deferred in
October.


3. (SBU) Industry issues lack prominence on this agenda,
with two open facilitations still waiting for volunteers
to lead them. The list of nominations for the Advisory
Body for Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF) has
grown to eight; Delreps have been quietly promoting
broader reform of ABAF to improve its expertise. The
election of a new EC chair and vice chairs may turn
contentious if the Iranians choose to pursue the Asian
vice chair without an Ambassador, or if they challenge
other groups' candidates, particularly the Mexican
Ambassador as the chairman.

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THE JOKER'S WILD - HOW WILL IRAN PLAY ITS NEXT HAND?
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4. (SBU) Following Iran's intransigence and near total
isolation at the Conference of States Parties in December
(ref a),OPCW officials and delegations are wondering who
will represent Iran at this EC. Mohsen Naziri Asl, the
de facto leader of the local Iranian delegation since the
departure of their ambassador in September, informed the
EC Bureau in January that he would be departing The Hague
before the EC. However, he has waffled on the precise
date of his departure in conversations with other
delegates, implying that he would attend the EC.


5. (SBU) Naziri Asl appeared for the informal
consultations on the EC-55 agenda on February 9, and
signaled questions on agenda items concerning
destruction, industry consultations, and the selection of
the Director-General. As the chief architect of Iran's
failure at the CSP, Naziri Asl's leadership at the EC
would confirm a continuing hard line and lack of
Qwould confirm a continuing hard line and lack of
compromise. A new face from Tehran, or a leading role by
Naziri Asl's savvy colleague Hassan Vejdani (a former
instructor at the Iranian diplomatic school),would
suggest a fresh start toward renewed consensus, or at
least fresh tactics on the floor. Del expects this next

round will continue to be led by Naziri Asl.

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IRAQ - THE NEW KID IN TOWN
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6. (SBU) Iraq's recent accession to the CWC has generated
some discussion, but is likely to be greeted at EC-55 by
congratulatory remarks. Del anticipates the difficult
discussions will begin only after Iraq has submitted its
initial declaration. In a meeting with Mexican
Ambassador Lomonaco, Del learned that Iraqi Ambassador
Banaa apparently believes his country is acceding to the
CWC as a "non-possessor," and has told Lomonaco that U.S.
forces have destroyed any chemical weapons that existed.
This points to a need to communicate several points to
Banaa and his delegation at the earliest possible
opportunity. First, Iraqi reps in The Hague should be
aware of the contents of their national declaration.
Second, they should clearly understand what recovery
activities have been undertaken so far, and the fact that
these do not mean that all Iraqi CW has been eliminated.
Third, it will be important for Banaa and his staff to
understand the current political dynamics in the
Executive Council and their likely impact on Iraq.


7. (SBU) Del recommends several meetings on the margins
of EC-55: a working level bilateral with the UK, a
bilateral meeting with the Iraqi delegation, and a
meeting with the Technical Secretariat (TS) and the UK to
discuss TS activities and possibly the forthcoming U.S.
and UK declarations.

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NEW HORIZON - THE SEARCH BEGINS FOR A DIRECTOR-GENERAL
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8. (SBU) Agenda item 13 requests the Council to consider
the matter of the appointment of a new Director-General
(DG). Del expects the Chairperson to outline a
nomination process, but it is not clear how much
consultation or blessing she wants from the Council.
Ambassador Javits and others have advised her not to open
the issue of procedures for choosing the DG to an EC
decision, at risk of endless debate. Algeria is already
openly stating its intention to nominate its OPCW
ambassador, Benchaa Dani, as a candidate (ref B). Many
delegates are assuming that Deputy Director-General (DDG)
John Freeman is running for the top job, and speculation
is rampant about other potential candidates from a
variety of countries. Delrep was even asked if
Ambassador Javits might be nominated.


9. (SBU) During the February 9 informal consultations on
the EC-55 agenda, the South African delegate asked what
delegations can expect to see for this agenda item. EC
Chairperson Tomova responded that it is important to
engage the member states and to provide time for the
process to unfold before the annual meeting of the CSP.
She also mentioned the possibility of an Open Ended
Working Group. The Iranian delegation stated that the
"time is not ripe" for such consultations and that
"informal informals" would be needed first. Tomova
replied that it is necessary to start the process, but
that there would be lots of opportunities to exchange
views. (Del comment: Following the meeting, Tomova
Qviews. (Del comment: Following the meeting, Tomova
spoke with several delegations, including ours, about
meeting later in the week to discuss this issue. End
comment)

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SHOWDOWN ON DESTRUCTION? - 90-DAY REPORTS
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10. (SBU) Two sets of 90-day reports on destruction
progress are on the Council's agenda. Given that
destruction progress was the topic that resulted in the

first failure of the Conference of States Parties to
agree to a final consensus report, this agenda item has
the potential for an Iranian reprise of CSP antics. Del
has heard from several sources that Iran has claimed only
to be seeking previously agreed report language. EC-54
language is, of course, acceptable, but Iran is unlikely
to be satisfied with this alone. The Russian delegation
has shared its concerns that Iran will come forward with
something far more creative, and has asked Delreps how
the U.S. plans to respond, and what might be done to
avoid another Friday-midnight finish. Having learned
that they have been overestimating the value of the final
report, Iranian reps are also far more likely to force a
showdown on the agenda item itself, instead of waiting to
fight the battle in report language.


11. (SBU) Iranian questions on prospects and dates for
Pueblo and Blue Grass will probably start in the
Destruction Informals, as they have at the past several
Council sessions. Del recommends the U.S. provide a
clear, consistent response, beginning with the Informals,
and remind Iran and other delegations that the purpose of
the reports is for the EC to review progress, as stated
in paragraph 28, Part IV A of the Verification Annex.
Del also recommends beginning the EC with a clear sense
of what (if any) report language beyond that agreed at
EC-54 would be acceptable to the U.S.

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FACILITY AGREEMENTS - IRAN'S AND OURS
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12. (SBU) Deferred from EC-54 in a tit-for-tat,
amendments to the Iranian Schedule 1 Facility Agreement
(originally approved by the EC in 2002) and the first-
ever U.S. Schedule 1 Facility Agreement are both up for
consideration and approval. To date, the Iranian
delegation has contacted neither the TS nor the Del with
any questions or comments on our facility agreement. The
Iranian delegation has been similarly reticent in
responding to questions raised by the U.S. Del and others
on the floor of EC-54 specifically regarding the reasons
why Iran is changing its facility agreement to a facility
arrangement. While the Del understands that a number of
countries (e.g., the UK and Japan) have chosen to
conclude arrangements with the OPCW to avoid having to
obtain domestic legislative approval, it is not clear if
this is the motivation behind Iran's sudden desire to
transform its agreement into an arrangement. Nor is it
clear if the original facility agreement ever was
approved by the Iranian parliament. Additionally, in
late January, Iran proposed a number of more substantive
changes -- most of which were copied from provisions in
the U.S. facility agreement -- without any explanation or
justification.


13. (SBU) Del requests that Washington provide
substantive comments to accompany any objections to
approving the Iranian amendments to their facility
agreement. Otherwise, Del recommends approval of the
Iranian facility agreement, as it is clearly within the
scope of what the U.S. considers acceptable at our own
Schedule 1 facilities.

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Q -------------- --------------
SETTING THE PRECEDENT - FORMER PRODUCTION FACILITIES TEN
YEARS AFTER CONVERSION
-------------- --------------


14. (U) The Russian delegation has made clear that they
will not join consensus on the Secretariat's
recommendations on continued verification measures at the
UK former CW production facility at Portreath. Russia
objects to the precedent these recommendations set for
other former production facilities that reach the ten-
year point following certification of conversion.

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INDUSTRY ISSUES - FADING FROM VIEW
--------------


15. (U) The DG's assessment of the revised site selection
methodology for Other Chemical Production Facilities
(OCPFs) is the only new Industry Cluster item on the
agenda. Industry Cluster consultations on OCPF
Declaration Enhancements and on Schedule 2A/2A* Low
Concentrations will take place during the week before EC-
55; Del does not expect any substantive discussion on
industry issues during EC-55. Without facilitators for
outstanding industry issues -- including OCPF site
selection methodology, industry issues will probably
continue to plod along. The concomitant danger is that
unresolved OCPF issues once again will dominate budget
negotiations in the autumn.

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AVOIDING ANOTHER SAB EXPERTS' MEETING
--------------


16. (U) The report of the Twelfth Session of the
Scientific Advisory Board and the accompanying note by
the Director General are on the Council's agenda. While
the recommendations appear to be non-controversial, there
is a danger that Iran, India, and others may use this as
an opportunity to try to set up a Governmental Experts
meeting to review each and every SAB report. Whether or
not this occurs may be contingent upon the outcome of the
Governmental Experts meeting the week before the EC to
review the SAB report to the Second Review Conference.

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ABAF - LET'S MAKE A DEAL
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17. (SBU) After having deferred the consideration of
seven nominees (three replacements for previous members
and four new candidates from African Group delegations)
to the Advisory Body for Administrative and Financial
Matters (ABAF) at EC-54 (ref C),Del has been consulting
informally with other delegations, within WEOG and with
the TS on ways to proceed. Currently, there are two
issues: clearing the pending nominations before the EC as
more nominations are expected to be added to the mix; and
taking the opportunity to reform the ABAF to insure it
provides independent, expert advice. When deferring the
nominations at EC-54, the U.S. requested that curricula
vitae of all nominees be circulated to the EC before
approving candidates to serve on the ABAF. The TS has
circulated a paper with the nomination letters and
curricula vitae of three of the deferred nominees;
however, the four African candidates have refused to
provide their curricula vitae describing the request as
discriminatory and not required by the ABAF's rules of
procedure.


18. (SBU) In order to move ahead, Del suggests approving
all pending nominations for a provisional period. During
this provisional period, the ABAF and the EC would have
the opportunity to clarify procedures for nominations and
appointments. At the end of the provisional period, the
ABAF would then be re-constituted (with currently serving
members eligible to apply for re-appointment) in
accordance to the revised rules.


19. (SBU) Del has engaged Costa Rican Ambassador
Francisco Arguilar in his role as EC Vice-Chairman for
QFrancisco Arguilar in his role as EC Vice-Chairman for
Administrative and Financial Issues. Arguilar has agreed
to take up the issue during the EC, including holding an
informal consultation on the margins. Del does not
expect the issue to be resolved during EC-55 but believes
that with sufficient engagement, a compromise can be
accomplished during EC-56 in April -- in advance of the
ABAF's first meeting this year in late May.

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MUSICAL EC CHAIRS
--------------


20. (SBU) The slate of candidates for election of the EC
chair and vice chairs to begin office in May are on the
agenda for this EC. GRULAC will have the Chair and has
agreed that Mexican Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco will be
their nominee. Del expects no opposition to Lomonaco,
except possibly from Iran, as Lomonaco has been the most
vocal proponent of voting at the last several meetings of
the Council and CSP, notably when Iran was blocking
action in those bodies. If Iran does object to his
nomination, this election might well push the EC to a
vote, although consensus would be highly preferable.


21. (SBU) WEOG approved the nomination of Dutch
Ambassador Pieter de Savornin Lohman as vice chair.
German Ambassador Werner Burkart had indicated his
willingness to stay on, but bowed out in deference to his
colleague. Lohman plans to retain Burkart's destruction
portfolio (ref B).


22. (SBU) Other regional groups have not yet officially
chosen their candidates for vice chair, although the
Russian delegation would like to take the Eastern
European seat. The question of the Iranian retention of
the vice chair without an accredited Representative could
re-emerge if Iran pushes to remain in the Asian seat.
Strict adherence to the Rules of Procedure would deny
that, but could also affect the Russians as their
ambassador will be leaving The Hague this spring.


23. (SBU) Delrep asked Algerian Ambassador Dani if he
would retain the African vice chairmanship; he replied
that he hoped another ambassador would step forward to
take it. (Del comment: Given Dani's DG ambitions, he
may want more time to campaign. A more active vice chair
on industry issues is long overdue, although most of the
African delegations are not staffed to take a Bureau seat
on. End Comment)

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WILL THERE BE ANY OTHER BUSINESS?
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24. (SBU) The Iranian delegation has been canvassing key
delegations (not the U.S.) for support for a special
session of the Conference of States Parties to reconsider
the report from CSP-13 and adopt a final report by
consensus. Japan, Mexico, Russia and western delegations
have firmly told them that the decisions of the
Conference stand, the CSP chairman's report is valid, and
no special session is needed. French delegate Annie Mari
believes the Iranians are getting some support from the
NAM, but Del strongly doubts that the Iranians can obtain
anywhere near enough member states' support for a special
session. The Iranians might try, however, to include
discussion of this issue at the EC under "any other
business."


24. (U) Beik sends.
GALLAGHER