Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09THEHAGUE768
2009-12-23 16:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CWC: TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT PLANS FOR EXPERTS

Tags:  PARM PREL OPCW CWC IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0768/01 3571625
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231625Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3622
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0179
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000768 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV
BAGHDAD FOR REID AND HOLCOMBE
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IZ
SUBJECT: CWC: TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT PLANS FOR EXPERTS
MEETING ON IRAQI BUNKERS, JANUARY 12-13, 2010

REF: THE HAGUE 738

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-78-09

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000768

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV
BAGHDAD FOR REID AND HOLCOMBE
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IZ
SUBJECT: CWC: TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT PLANS FOR EXPERTS
MEETING ON IRAQI BUNKERS, JANUARY 12-13, 2010

REF: THE HAGUE 738

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-78-09

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On December 22, Delreps met with senior
Technical Secretariat (TS) officials to discuss
plans for the trilateral meeting with Iraqi and
U.S. experts January 12-13, 2010, on the status of
the Iraqi chemical weapons bunkers (reftel).
Senior TS staff had met with the Director-General
(DG) and the Legal Advisor the day before, and
emphasized the need for substantial justification,
including photographs, of the Iraqi weapons bunkers
before a legal determination can be made on
possible encapsulation of the bunkers in lieu of
destruction. The Technical Secretariat wants to
separate the cases of the two remaining bunkers
and, at minimum, help Iraq amend its initial
declaration by removing Bunker 41 which no longer
contains chemical weapons.

-------------- --------------
MORE ASSESSMENT/PROOF NEEDED OF BUNKERS' CONTENTS
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Delreps Beik and Smith met with Horst Reeps,
TS Director of Verification, and Dominique Anelli,
Head of Chemical Demilitarization, on December 22
to get a read-out on the TS meeting the day before
on whether encapsulating Iraq's remaining chemical
bunker would meet the legal requirements of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. The Director-General
held the meeting with senior staff before leaving
for the Christmas holidays. Reeps stated that the
DG's concern is that Iraq not be treated
differently from any other State Party to the
Convention, despite the differences in its history
and the condition of its remaining chemical
weapons. The TS believes that Bunker 41 can be
separated out and removed by amendment from Iraq's
initial declaration as there appear to be no
remaining weapons in that bunker. Anelli noted
that the DG and Legal Advisor needed "more
assessment" of Bunker 13 and very clear

justification before determining whether
encapsulation of the bunker with cement would meet
the legal requirements of the Convention.


3. (C) Both Reeps and Anelli emphasized the need
for photographs as the best evidence of what
remains in the bunkers. Reeps noted that U.S.
troops took photos in 2003, and that the Iraq
Survey Group also had photos that would be useful.
He asked what exactly the U.S. experts were
bringing in January; Delrep said she would forward
the question to Washington, but noted that the
experts coming had developed the DOD paper
presented to the Iraqi delegation in Washington in
October. Anelli stated that if no new information
and evidence of the contents is forthcoming, the
January meeting is not worth the time and expense
for the experts to come to The Hague.


4. (C) Delrep asked whether the initial TS visit to
Iraq would take place in the near future. Reeps
responded that he himself has now been tapped to
lead the team, and more TS officials had recently
undergone UN security training in Amman. He said
the UN would plan to accompany the team with armed
guards, probably private contractors, and was
concerned about the Baghdad itinerary as both the
Qconcerned about the Baghdad itinerary as both the
Ministry office and INMD are outside the Green
Zone. Reeps noted that the OPCW is waiting for an

invitation from the Iraqi government, and that the
"Kurdish Ambassador here" (a clear reference to
Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa) had different views
from his government on the best site for the
meeting. Reeps did not believe the visit would be
possible before the March elections.

--------------
PLANS FOR THE JANUARY 12-13 EXPERTS MEETING
--------------


5. (C) Delrep informed Reeps of the list of U.S.
experts coming for the January trilateral meeting
and the names of the Iraqi experts that she had
received from their Embassy. Reeps said he would
chair the meeting, with TS participants including
Anelli, Senior Demil Officers Yaugen Ryzhykau and
Gabriela Coman-Enescu, and an observer from the
Legal Advisor's office. He proposed starting the
meetings at 9:15 on January 12 "with very few
breaks" and the agenda to go "bunker by bunker."
The TS is under orders from the DG to report
everything on Iraq on a daily basis and would
propose a summary status at the end of each
session, to be drafted by the TS and approved by
the group. The DG will include status information
on Iraq in his report to the Executive Council (EC
59) in February.

--------------
ASSISTING IRAQ TO MAKE ITS CASE
--------------


6. (C) Reeps expressed his intention to conclude
the meeting with how to proceed and the next steps
for all concerned, particularly Iraq, which will
need to amend its initial declaration if this
meeting agrees on the assessment basis and the
separation of the status of the two bunkers.
Although the time is relatively short, it would be
ideal for Iraq to present amendments to its initial
declaration at EC 59 in February -- ideally for
both Bunkers 41 and 13, but at least for Bunker 41.
This would be a year after Iraq's accession to the
Convention and its initial declaration, and it
would be preferable for Iraq to present its case
first before Council members dissect the amendment
documents. Delrep noted that TS endorsement of any
plans for entombment of Bunker 13 would be critical
to convince the Council of its viability; if it
appears to be a U.S. or Iraqi proposal, Council
members will be suspicious that Iraq is shirking
its responsibilities. Reeps and Anelli
emphatically agreed.


7. (C) Reeps advised that the group of countries
wanting to assist Iraq be activated, and included
in the information exchange and political planning
early, to help make Iraq's case to the Council. He
said Germany could be helpful in this regard.
Delrep noted the meeting that took place during the
CSP among countries interested in assisting Iraq as
a good starting point.


8. (U) BEIK SENDS.

MANN