Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09THEHAGUE501
2009-08-18 15:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

GICNT: 2009 GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR

Tags:  PARM PREL PTER KGIC RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0501/01 2301518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181518Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3176
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000501

SECSTATE FOR GLOBAL INITIATIVE PARTNER NATIONS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KGIC RS
SUBJECT: GICNT: 2009 GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR
TERRORISM PLENARY MEETING REPORT, PART 3 OF 3

REF: STATE 53043

Classified By: Political Economic Counselor Drew Mann for reasons 1.4,
b and d.

START PART THREE OF THREE

BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE NETHERLANDS
--------------


32. (SBU) AA/S Kang met with Robert de Groot at the Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday, June 15, 2009. De
Groot, Deputy Director for Political Affairs, began the
meeting by describing one of the recent lessons that the
Dutch had arrived at from the recent Gaza Counter Arms
Smuggling Initiative meeting in Ottawa. The Dutch had
concluded that government institutions, other than the
Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs (such as
intelligence and law enforcement agencies) can do a lot to
promote international objectives. This applies to both the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global
Initiative. The Global Initiative is an excellent
opportunity for Ministries to reach out to other home
agencies in a way they have not done in the past and to
cooperate in various activities. It is important for GICNT
countries to use those agencies. The Dutch also noted that
it is a challenge to figure out how to proceed in all these
initiatives without creating something too large and
bureaucratic.


33. (SBU) AA/S Kang noted that the United States has some
ideas on how to strengthen the implementation of the Global
Initiative to make it a durable international institution,
and that the United States is interested in Dutch views.
AA/S Kang said that the United States appreciates the
flexibility of the GICNT and is not interested in creating a
secretariat with bricks and mortar. In addition, the new
administration is seeking to increase engagement by GICNT
partners, while reducing the U.S. footprint.


34. (SBU) De Groot stated that the Dutch Government is not
sure that they want the United States to step back too much
from leadership of the GICNT. He said that the United States
is the only country that can really afford to send people to
multiple simultaneous meetings. He did add that the Dutch

Government would be interested in coordinating on the Global
Initiative agenda and on the working groups. He also added
that it would be difficult to use the United Nations as an
umbrella for the GICNT, given the difficulty of negotiating
agreements in a UN forum. However, it would be possible to
take advantage of various UN resolutions. De Groot
emphasized that some form of enhancement is needed now that
the GICNT had grown so large to ensure that it retained its
focus. It is important to prevent the GICNT from taking on
too broad an agenda.


35. (SBU) AA/S Kang agreed that we want to keep the focus of
the GICNT narrow. In addition, we need to think about how
the Initiative can take advantage of the nuclear security
summit that President Obama announced during his April 5
speech in Prague.

Netherlands on European Security


36. (SBU) De Groot noted that there are a number of European
security issues coming up. The first is the Organization of
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meetings in Corfu,
Greece. Russian President Medvedev clearly has a vision of
European Security. The challenge for the European nations
will be to find a common European Union position--as well as
a common NATO position--for the upcoming meetings. De Groot
also said that he believes that the Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) Treaty will be resolved once other issues
such as the follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) are resolved.

Netherlands on Iran
QNetherlands on Iran


37. (SBU) De Groot asked AA/S Kang for an update on where the
United States is on our discussions with Iran and whether
there is a timeline for this engagement. AA/S Kang responded
that there is no real timeline, though we would not be
willing to continue indefinitely without a response. AA/S
Kang echoed President Obama,s statement that the United
States will likely have a better picture of where the
negotiations stood by the end of the year. In the meantime,
the United States will continue its dual-track policy of
implementing sanctions against Iranian government entities,
such as the shipping industry, and seeking diplomatic
engagement with Iran.


38. (C) De Groot stated his belief that the Iranians are on
a very clear path and have made a strategic decision, based
on regional considerations, not to halt their nuclear
efforts. Moreover, he said it was not clear to him what Iran
would want out of a negotiation. The only question is what
the rest of the world could do to stop these programs. As a
result, the Dutch MFA strongly supports imposing more
sanctions on Iran. However, the MFA is receiving pushback
from the Ministry of Finance. Some Dutch officials believe
that every time the EU imposes a new sanction, the Dutch
financial sector is hurt, while the interests of other EU
nation are not. He also affirmed that the Dutch Government
believes that the actions the United States is taking to
engage the other countries in the region and increase their
confidence is the right response.

Netherlands on Missile Defense
--------------


39. (C) De Groot also brought up missile defense and advised
that in September there is to be a Nimble Titan exercise in
Amsterdam. The focus of the exercise will be on the
political aspects of missile defense, not the usual military
aspect of deploying and using missile defense systems. He
noted that he would be very pleased if a State Department
official could attend, as well. AA/S Kang responded that his
bureau is very much involved in missile defense issues and
also in the Nimble Titan series of exercises.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH RUSSIA
--------------


40. (SBU) AA/S Kang met with Russian Ambassador Safonov,
Special Presidential Representative for International
Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism and Transnational
Organized Crime. Amb. Safonov began the discussion by noting
how far U.S. and Russian relations have come over the past
several years. He stated that the United States and Russia
have not always been able to do everything they wanted, but
our two countries should not underestimate what we have
achieved. AA/S Kang explained to Amb. Safonov the U.S.
proposals for strengthening the Global Initiative to make it
an enduring international institution. He said that the
United States values the flexibility and adaptability of the
Initiative and still values U.S. and Russian leadership.
AA/S Kang stated that preventing nuclear terrorism is
important for both the U.S. and Russian presidents. He hoped
that our two governments could make good progress at the
Plenary meeting, that we would hear good ideas from others,
and that we could move forward on enhancing implementation.


41. (SBU) Amb. Safonov responded that nuclear materials
security should be the focus of the two presidents when they
meet in July. The meeting should cover not just the history
or recent past of this issue but the cooperation that has
been achieved, such as the Global Initiative, where the
United States and Russia have pushed and pulled together to
get the initiative running. Amb. Safonov observed that at
its initial stages, the Global Initiative was flexible and
soft. This worked and, as a result, the number of countries
that are participants has grown. This showed that the GICNT
was interesting to many countries. He agreed with AA/S Kang
that the initiative needed to move forward. He urged that we
ensure our progress is matched with a careful assessment of
(1) the technology and how to protect that, and (2) the plans
and schemes of potential enemies. Amb. Safonov also referred
to President Obama,s statement regarding strengthening the
Global Initiative and said that Russia agreed; the details
QGlobal Initiative and said that Russia agreed; the details
could be finalized at the working level. He noted that we
have completed the very important first stage of the GICNT,
which consisted of getting it up and running. As we move
into this second stage, we must work carefully to bring good,
reliable ideas. Amb. Safonov said that he believed the GICNT
is maturing and that we should invite all GICNT countries to
work on enhancing implementation. These changes should be
relevant, have an impact, and steer clear from duplication.
He also cautioned that we must be careful not to scare
countries away, because the threat is real. He noted that
Russia looked forward to promoting the GICNT with the United
States.


42. (C) AA/S Kang then observed that with the increase in
reliance upon nuclear energy around the world, the U.S. and
Russia need to take into account the security issues that
come along with that capability. Amb. Safonov responded that
relevant technology exists that should be shared. In that
respect, Amb. Safonov added that there was real concern among
his colleagues about the risks in Pakistan. He asked what
can we do if the Taliban take over that country. He said
that Russia felt it needed to find out the real threat and
address it.


Kosovo and GICNT
--------------


43. (C) Prior to the Kang-Safonov meeting, U.S. and Russian
delegations met at the staff level to review the substance
and logistics of the Plenary. During this meeting, Rozhkov
noted emphatically that while Kosovo had provided a letter of
endorsement of GICNT Principles to the United States, the
Russians, as Co-Chair, objected. He urged the U.S.
delegation not to raise Kosovo with Safonov, and explained
that he had worked to persuade his leadership not to
overreact by recruiting those whom the United States would
reject. Rozhkov,s bottom line to his seniors: The GICNT is
not a political forum; we should handle these sensitive
topics in other areas and let the GICNT be what it is. The
U.S. delegation took the message on board and AA/S Kang did
not raise the issue.

WINS and GICNT
--------------


44. (U) Separately but in the same meeting, Rozhkov said that
the Russians support the World Institute for Nuclear Security
(WINS) and noted that WINS might be a source of good
organizational support for GICNT.

BILATERAL PULL-ASIDE WITH FRANCE
--------------


45. (U) In a pull-aside with Thomas Guibert, Adviser,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AA/S Kang described President
Obama,s call to make the GICNT a durable international
institution, and said that the USG was still working with the
Russian Co-Chair on how to do so. He solicited French input
and requested their support to move in this direction. AA/S
Kang also mentioned the USG,s interest in continuing to
conduct outreach in various fora and regionally. Guibert
noted GOF,s desire for progress on nuclear forensics and
said France would like to host a forensics event in or about
in January 2010.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM
--------------


46. (SBU) AA/S Kang met with Liane Saunders, Head of the
Counterproliferation United Kingdom,s Department of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. AA/S Kang began the
discussions by noting President Obama,s call to make the
GICNT an &enduring international institution8 and discussed
some of the United States, plans for achieving those goals.
Saunders related that the UK believes that the GICNT is a
good practical group and that we should not seek to turn it
into a &talking shop.8 The group needs to be operational.
Saunders added that the group draws in unique partners into
the Counterproliferation area that normal do not work on that
issue. The GICNT also needs to work to draw in more
countries and develop more capacity. Saunders also stated
that the current format of Plenary Meetings is difficult for
many of the newer partner nations. There is a level of
information saturation from all of the presentations.
Instead, some of the presentations could be carved off.
Instead, the Plenary Meeting should be a forum for decision
making. That would bring more dynamism to the Initiative
without bringing the bureaucracy.


47. (SBU) Sanders also raised the issue of whether there
should be a mechanism in the GICNT to evaluate partner
capacity. She observed that this is obviously a very
sensitive subject. There might be a way to develop standards
that were acceptable to all countries if you get the right
balance in a steering group that develops those standards.
You want to avoid a pass/fail type system and instead provide
countries with basic standards that will help them address
certain risk situations. Exercises are also an excellent way
of telling how countries are doing. You can create standards
Qof telling how countries are doing. You can create standards
for exercises which would allow you to disguise the fact that
you are judging a country,s performance. AA/S Kang
concurred that this would be particularly useful for
targeting some of the newer partners that had less experience
in these areas. Saunders agreed that some prioritization
would be useful. She also cautioned that you do not want to
make an unrealistic hurdle.


48. (SBU) Coordinator Watt briefed Saunders on the U.S.
incentive program, which would provide countries with
assistance in developing roadmaps for a certain Global
Initiative function area. She noted that while the United
States would pay for this assistance, the recipient would be
required to put the assistance to practical use by conducting
a GICNT exercise. Saunders noted that the UK is looking at
E

prioritizing nuclear security funds. She agreed that
countries are looking at where they can get money to help
them implement these security issues. The UK has some money
uncommitted and is working on a list of priority countries.

UK on Enrichment and Reprocessing
--------------


49. (C) Saunders and AA/S Kang also discussed the results of
the recently concluded Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting.
On the issue of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR),Saunders
stated that she believes the Turkish Ambassador does not
understand the issue and has weak technical support. It is
also unclear whether this is driven from Ankara or if the
Ambassador is operating beyond his instructions. Saunders
believes that Turkey could be brought around with the change
in language on instability. Saunders believes it is
important to go back and work on Turkey. Saunders also noted
the challenge of getting South Africa to agree to the ENR
provisions. She noted that UK Prime Minister Brown wants to
find ways where the UK can add value on nuclear issues. He
is contemplating using his relationship with South African
President Zuma to raise this issue. However, that will
likely have to wait until the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Director General,s race is concluded. She
closed by noting that the U.S. and UK should work closely on
this issue.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH SPAIN
--------------


50. (SBU) AA/S Kang met with Spanish Secertary of State
Lossada on June 16. Lossada sought to discuss the issue of
Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR),which was discussed at the
recently completed Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting.
According to Lossada, Spain recognizes that there are
countries that should not be allowed to have ENR
capabilities. Spain particularly noted that there are
countries close to its borders that it would not want to see
with these capabilities. However, Spain objected to being
lumped into the same category as these other States. While
they did not have immediate ENR plans, given their level of
technological development, they could foresee a point in the
future where they might want to develop ENR capabilities.
However, if they agree to the language in the U.S. ENR
proposal, they would be restricted to receiving black box
technology. AA/S Kang observed that the U.S. was in a
similar situation, but he believes that this is the best
means of achieving consensus on this issue and putting in
place conditions on these transfers.


51. (C) AA/S Kang and Lossada also discussed the current race
for the IAEA Director General position. Lossada noted that
Spain put Echavarri into the race in the hopes that he could
be a potential consensus candidate and avoid a deadlock.
Instead, the race was again deadlocked, which was causing
polarization among Board of Governor (BOG) members. The
polarization, Lossada observed, could cause problems in the
future. AA/S Kang said the United States strongly supports
Japanese candidate Amano, adding the U.S. view that Amano had
the strongest nonproliferation credentials among the
potential candidates and that he was only a few votes shy of
the two-thirds majority necessary. AA/S Kang advised that
the United States was planning a strong campaign on behalf of
Amano in order to secure the few remaining votes that would
put Amano over the top.


52. (U) The U.S. senior delegation has cleared this cable.
This cable was cleared by U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary
(AA/S) Eliot Kang.

END PART THREE OF THREE
QEND PART THREE OF THREE
LEVIN