CWC: DESTRUCTION INFORMALS, JULY 13, 2009 (EC-57)

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000463

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO)
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: DESTRUCTION INFORMALS, JULY 13, 2009 (EC-57)

REF: A. THE HAGUE 437

B. THE HAGUE 452

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-47-09

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) On July 13 before the formal opening of
the Executive Council (EC),the new EC Chairperson,
Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco (Mexico),convened the
customary informal consultations on chemical
weapons destruction issues. In addition to the
usual presentations by the Technical Secretariat
(TS) and by Russia, the U.S., Libya, Japan and
China, there was an unusually lively discussion of
the U.S. and UK report in April on destroyed
chemical weapons in Iraq prior to its joining the
Convention.


2. (SBU) Copies of the TS presentations have been
sent to ISN/CB; none of the country presentations
were distributed as hand-outs. Detailed notes on
all the presentations and the discussion follow.

--------------
PRESENTATIONS BY THE TS
--------------


3. (SBU) Horst Reeps, Director Verification
Division, briefed on verification activities since
the last informal session in April. He noted that
as of June 30, 2009, 45.87% of category 1 and 52%
of category 2 CW had been destroyed (not including
Libya and Iraq). Currently there are 8 CWDFs in
operation: 5 in the United States (Tooele, Pine
Bluff, Anniston, Umatilla and Dugway) and 3 in the
Russian Federation (Maradykovsky, Leonidovka and
Shchuchye). Libya completed reloading of mustard,
pinacolyl alcohol and isopropyl alcohol at Ruwagha
and plans to reload thionyl chloride and phosphorus
trichloride later this year, the delay occasioned
by the corroded state of the current tankage.
Between April 20 and June 30, there have been
inspections of 7 CWPFs, 5 CWSFs and 1 OCW. Of the
208 Article VI inspections scheduled for 2009, 119
have been completed with 50 inspections, including
two Schedule 2 inspections with sampling and
analysis, occurring between April 20 and July 12.
Article VI inspections resulted in two issues
requiring further attention (IRFA) one during a
Schedule 1 inspection involving insufficient
declaration of Schedule 1 chemicals, and one during
a Schedule 2 inspection where ADPA for 2006 and
2008 was unavailable. On time submission of ADPA
for 2008 improved over that for 2007 (57 vs 38)
with 21 OCPF ADPA submitted in electronic format
representing 70% of all declared OCPFs up from 30%
in 2008. The TS plans to deliver EDNA of Schedule 2
and 3 declarations later in 2009.


4. (SBU) Stephen Wade, Head Declarations Branch,
presented data on CW and Article VI information
submitted to the TS between April 17 and July 8,

2009. During the period, 1207 pages of
documentation had been received. Three initial
Article III declarations had been received from
Lebanon (no CW or CW facilities, possession of
RCA),Cambodia (no CW or CW facilities, RCA
declaration pending) and Bahamas (no CW or CW
facilities, possession of RCA). Additionally the TS
received the annual reports on destruction for the
Russian Federation and Japan; amendments to initial
declarations from Australia, Japan, Belgium,
Germany, Liberia, Ukraine, Iraq and Libya; 90 day
QGermany, Liberia, Ukraine, Iraq and Libya; 90 day
reports on CW issues from Libya, the United States,
Russian Federation, Japan, China and India; and new
OCW discoveries and destruction in the United
Kingdom. Fourteen initial declarations have yet to
be submitted.


5. (SBU) Dominique Anelli, Head Chemical
Demilitarization Branch, briefed on progress in CW
destruction. Only items not previously covered by
Reeps or Wade are highlighted here. Currently 88.6%
of the 70 declared CWPFs have been converted or
destroyed, with 5 left to be destroyed, 3 to be
converted (Rabta 1 and 2 in Libya and
Novocheboksarsk in the Russian Federation) and 27
under verification. Operations at CWDFs include:

- United States: Tooele, H/HD destruction;
Anniston, HD/HT mortars, projectiles, OTCs
destruction; Umatilla, H destruction; Pine Bluff,
on-going H/HT destruction; Dugway, completed
explosive destruction campaign July 10.

- Russian Federation: Maradykovsky, thermal
treatment and cutting of mutilated munitions bodies
and incineration of hydrolysate reaction mass,
preparations for train 2; Leonidovka, draining of
hydrolysate reaction mass from aerial munitions;
Shchuchye, destruction of 122 mm rocket warheads
filled with GB; Pochep received an initial visit by
the TS June 29-July 3, 2009, with building in
various stages of construction.

- Thirteen States Parties have declared OCW with
seven OCW sites in seven States Parties under
verification. Three States Parties have declared
ACW (China, Italy, Panama). China has 33 ACW
sites.

--------------
RUSSIAN PRESENTATION
--------------


6. (S) Viktor Kholstov of Russia's Ministry of
Industry and Trade presented Russia's report orally
with no slides or handouts. He stated that
Russia's current focus is on meeting its 45%
destruction timeline of December 31, 2009. As of
July 13, it had destroyed 34.7% of its CW stockpile
at five CWDFs: Gorny, Kambarka (both closed),
Maradykovsky, Leonidovka and Shchuchye. Kholstov
reported that the first Shchuchye operational
facility and its train one started up in March 2009
and had destroyed 132,338 artillery shells. At
this rate, by year's end the facility would destroy
500 MT of agent. He noted that at Shchuchye, the
second destruction line involving reactor
technology in the current operational building
would start up on July 20 and is expected to
destroy 230 MT of GB by year's end. The second
Shchuchye facility had its final engineering review
in June and is expected to be operational in the
4th quarter, projecting destruction of 1900 MT of
agents by year's end. A second reactor-technology-
based train is expected to start up in the first
half of 2010. Kholstov thanked States Parties for
their financial and technical support to Shchuchye
for "this truly international facility".


7. (S) At Leonidovka, the first destruction train
has already drained 65% of hydrolysate reaction
mass from aerial munitions and 1000 MT of this
reaction mass has been thermally treated. Thirty-
two percent of the munitions casings have also been
destroyed. Work is ongoing on a second train
involving reactor technology, and Russia expects to
be ready soon to work with the TS on a facility
Qbe ready soon to work with the TS on a facility
agreement and detailed plans for destruction. The
Pochep CWDF is expected to start up by the end of
2010 and the Kisner CWDF is under construction.
Kholstov thanked Canada for its financial support


for this facility's construction.

--------------
U.S. PRESENTATION
--------------


8. (SBU) Dr. Arthur Hopkins, Principal Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, delivered
a presentation on the U.S CW demilitarization
program. He noted that the United States has met
its category 1 CW destruction timelines and that
100% of category 2 and 3 CW and 100% of CWPFs have
been destroyed. At present, the United States has
destroyed 62.1% of its category 1 CW including
96.6% of its nerve agents. He detailed the
destruction progress at each U.S CWDF and noted
that the United States, due to the acceleration
factors of incentives and experience, was on track
to destroy 90% of its CW by April 2012.


9. (SBU) Hopkins then described issues causing
delays at the ACWA sites, Pueblo and Blue Grass:
Congressional requirements for alternative
technologies to incineration, involvement of the
states in which facilities are located in permit
requirements, environmental considerations and
safety issues. He presented the timelines for
construction operation and closure, with operations
at Pueblo projected to be completed in 2017 and at
Blue Grass in 2021. He reiterated the U.S.
commitment to complete destruction of its CW
stockpile in a safe and environmentally responsible
manner and emphasized that the United States was
continuing to look for ways to accelerate the ACWA
sites' CW destruction.


10. (SBU) The South African Ambassador said he
appreciated U.S. transparency and commitment to the
total destruction of its CW stockpile, but observed
that if the U.S. misses the 2012 deadline, this
"leaves us in a conundrum" and "we must begin to
think about how to deal with the situation in
2012." Careful consideration is needed to manage
the situation, he said, without re-writing the
Convention, opening the Convention for amendment,
or relieving the pressure on possessor States
Parties to complete destruction on time.


11. (SBU) Iran's delegate from Tehran, Alireza
Hajizadeh (formerly posted to The Hague),stated
that Iran has been following the destruction since
the extension request (2006) and has always been
worried about construction of the two sites now
extending beyond the destruction deadline.
Hajizadeh stated that their delegation requested
information about this during the two previous
Executive Council sessions, but they were not given
much information, and are now hearing about a
delay. He said the reasons offered for having to
continue destruction activities beyond 2012 were
"not convincing", that first financing was raised
as an issue and now it is not the issue, then new
technology was raised while similar activities were
happening in other states in the United States.
Hajizadeh asked, "What has been stopping you from
starting earlier? Why use new technology? If there
are problems, we need action before it is too late.
Informing us that 2021 and 2017 are projections, we
should not accept this. You should tackle these
issues and comply with your obligation. Why not
start earlier if you will be using new technology?
Qstart earlier if you will be using new technology?
What are you doing to accelerate?" He asserted
that it was also not convincing that one state in
the U.S. can make a decision that does not comply
with international obligations, and suggested that
the U.S. would not discriminate among states to
allow an unsafe method to be used, so why was the
new technology proposed if the old technology was
safe enough for other states.


12. (SBU) Hajizadeh stated that he does not care
about internal matters )- only treaty compliance.
He said that the United States should abide by its
international obligations and asked whether there
are "other ways" to comply with internal
regulations, whether the first stage could be done
now with the residue dealt with at a later time.
Dr. Hopkins replied that complying with safety
requirements was paramount and that any changes in
plans would be difficult due to permit
requirements. However, he added, the Obama
administration was reviewing the situation and
looking at all options for acceleration.

--------------
LIBYAN PRESENTATION
--------------


13. (SBU) Faihi Asseidi, Technical Director of
GMP&MSC at Rabta, presented the status of the
conversion of Rabta 1 and 2 Chemical Weapons
Production Facilities and the situation with the
Rabta CW Destruction Facility. In May (28-31),the
TS visited Rabta 1 and 2 to assess the status of
conversion. He said that Libya would be submitting
a national paper prior to October 2009 to the TS
detailing why it is necessary to retain the sandbag
covered wall to protect the Rabta complex. He then
detailed the progress on conversion, which is on
schedule for completion in October 2009, with
validation and readiness for pharmaceutical
production to begin at year's end. Among the
photos shown was one of Rabta 1 (building 17A)
which showed that the original concrete floor had
been replaced with one suitable for pharmaceutical
ingredient manufacture.


14. (SBU) The situation of the construction of the
Rabta CWDF is less positive. Asseidi said that the
timeline for 1% destruction, 1 May 2010, may need
to be revisited in light of "environmental
concerns". A request would be forthcoming to ask
for an extension of the deadline. Libya promised to
keep the EC informed on its progress.


15. (SBU) Following Libya's presentation, the
Iranian delegate intervened to urge Libya to "spare
no effort" to comply with its current extended
deadline and urged other States Parties to help and
offer assistance. Hajizadeh asked to see Libya's
extension request.

--------------
ACW: CHINESE AND JAPANESE PRESENTATIONS
--------------


16. (SBU) Japan presented its plans for destruction
of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China.
Masanori Nishi, Director-General of the ACW Office
of the Cabinet of Japan, indicated that the number
of ACW items at Haerba-ling is 300,000-400,000 and
at other locations in China is 46,000. He said
that trial excavations of some 641 munitions at
Haerba-ling revealed that they are randomly
stacked, mixed with other refuse and stuck
together, precluding remote, mechanical recovery,
and requiring removal by hand. Japan will improve
the excavation facilities and resume trial
excavations in 2010 with test destruction using
mobile destruction facilities (MDFs) in April 2010.
Also in April 2010, Japan will place MDFs near
Nanjing where it will begin destruction activities
with the expectation that over a year's time some
Qwith the expectation that over a year's time some
36,000 items will be destroyed.


17. (SBU) He Zhenliang, Deputy Director-General and
MFA Counselor for CW Abandoned by Japan in China,
said that China was concerned that the ACW should
be destroyed safely but also within the timelines
of the Convention. He outlined the support China
has given Japan that included help for the trial
excavations at Haerba-ling, assistance to the
Japanese MFA to arrange for moving MDF to Nanjing,
and assistance to Japan for the disposition in 33
trust warehouses of newly discovered ACW from 70
sites in 16 provinces or municipalities. The
Chinese presentation then hammered the Japanese for
not destroying a single chemical weapon to date.

-------------- ---
DISCUSSION ON RECOVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN IRAQ
-------------- ---


18. (SBU) Ambassador Siamand Banaa of Iraq stated
that since entry into force of the Convention for
Iraq, the National Monitoring Directorate, Ministry
of Defense, and Ministry of Industry conducted an
assessment of the Falluja and Muthanna sites.
Subsequently Iraq had invited the TS to send a team
for a "preparation visit". Iraq said the safety of
the team would be assured. Banaa thanked States
Parties for offers of assistance (Germany, Spain,
Serbia). He said that, as a result of Iraq's
complex situation, Iraq needed a variety of
assistance and offered to circulate a list of
requirements.


19. (SBU) Iran intervened with an offer to help
Iraq. The Iranian delegate then raised the issue
of CW destroyed by the U.S. and UK in Iraq before
it joined the Convention. On the basis of the UK
and U.S. correspondence with the TS, Iran
requested that the TS provide a comprehensive
report addressing the timelines for its receipt of
RCW information from the U.S. and the UK, what
activities took place for destruction, what actions
were taken by the TS to verify the information, and
what actions were taken to protect the environment.
Hajizadeh expressed concern over environmental
implications of recent sandstorms moving from Iraq
to Iran. He requested the TS report by the next
informal meeting.


20. (SBU) The South African Ambassador expressed
disappointment that no reference was made to RCW in
the informal destruction briefings by the TS, but
emphasized an interest in looking to the future
rather than the past. He wanted to know what the
TS is doing about the current RCW reporting and
what it intends to do in the future. He called upon
the U.S. and the UK to assist in helping the TS
develop guidelines to cope with situations like
Iraq that might occur in the future, based on their
experience in dealing with CW destruction "when
people are shooting at you."


21. (SBU) Iraqi Ambassador Banaa then took the
floor to object to the proceedings. He thanked Iran
and South Africa for their interest in the RCW
issue, but requested that any such questions should
be directed to the Iraqi delegation.


22. (SBU) The Director-General stated that,
following the invitations from the U.S. and UK
governments, the TS will visit both States Parties
to review their records and he would report to the
next informal meeting prior to EC-58. The DG said
that the RCW situation was not anticipated by the
Qthat the RCW situation was not anticipated by the
Convention, and he concurred with Iran that
environmental issues in relation to CW destruction
are important.


23. (SBU) A lively, but disjointed, series of
interventions followed. The Iranian delegate
observed that Iran regarded the U.S. and the UK as
possessor States Parties occupying Iraq, and that
had not addressed Iraq on the RCW issues because
the current Iraqi Government was not in charge
during the period in question. Iran then concluded
by asking the TS what it was going to do about
Muthanna. The Director-General referenced the
invitation by Iraq for the TS to visit and said
plans are now being finalized. The visit will help
determine what technical support is needed and to
develop plans for destruction and inspection.
South Africa followed by restating its call for
developing plans to cope with future RCW incidents.
Iraq reminded States Parties that it had a list of
requirements which it needed to support its
efforts.


24. (SBU) Del Comment: The destruction informals
have in the past been primarily factual
presentations with little, if any, discussion.
Iraq's plans for destruction, the U.S. and UK role
in Iraq from 2003 to 2009, and the U.S. destruction
schedules have now put a spotlight on this meeting
and another avenue for political discussion of
controversial issues. End Comment.


25. (U) BEIK SENDS.

GALLAGHER