CWC: IRAQ ISSUES DURING OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000443

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR
BAGHDAD FOR HOLCOMBE
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP>
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO)
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IQ
SUBJECT: CWC: IRAQ ISSUES DURING OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
SESSION, JULY 14-17, 2009 (EC-57)

REF: A. THE HAGUE 415

B. THE HAGUE 411

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-43-09.

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a series of bilateral meetings
surrounding Executive Council 57 (EC-57) the week
of July 13, members of the U.S. delegation met with
Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa, new Iraqi delegate
to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) Muhanned Al-Miahi, Iraqi Foreign
Ministry official Jwan Khioka, senior OPCW
Technical Secretariat (TS) officials, and British
representatives to discuss a range of issues.
Topics included security for TS officials traveling
to Iraq, possible assistance to Iraq, and the
chemical weapons (CW) recovered by the U.S. and UK
in Iraq before it joined the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC). It was clear from conversations
with the Iraqi officials that communications gaps
between Baghdad and The Hague remain significant
and likely will continue to slow progress in Iraq's
implementation of the CWC. End Summary.

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SECURITY FOR TS PERSONNEL IN IRAQ
--------------


2. (C) Following their earlier meeting with OPCW
Deputy Director-General (DDG) John Freeman (UK) on
July 10 (ref A),Delreps Beik and Smith called on
Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa on July 13 to
request a meeting with the Iraqi delegation during
EC-57. They were introduced to Muhanned Al-Miahi,
Iraqi third secretary and newly-designated delegate
to the OPCW. Abbas Al-Khafaji, who had previously
worked OPCW issues in The Hague, has been moved to
another portfolio. Ambassador Banaa said Director-
General Pfirter had phoned him about security for
the TS team to go to Iraq; Banaa had sent the
request back directly both to the Foreign Ministry
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Banaa
noted the importance of good security under the
Iraqi authorities, especially given the UN's
history in Iraq following the bombing of the UN
office and the death of UN Special Representative
Sergio Vieira De Mello in 2003. He advised that
information about the dates and specific movements
of the TS team be restricted, with no publicity on
the visit until after it was completed.


3. (SBU) U.S. Delreps, led by EC Representative
Mikulak, met bilaterally with the Iraqi delegation
on July 16. Jwan Khioka and Muhanned Al-Miahi
attended for Iraq without Ambassador Banaa. In
addition to assistance (see below),the question of
security for the OPCW visits was raised. Delreps
stated that security is the responsibility of the
Iraqi government, and should be handled in Baghdad,
not The Hague. They noted that the OPCW has a
Memorandum of Understanding with the UN that
includes security provisions; the TS would consult
the UN for advice and assistance, as necessary.
Given the UN's MOU with the U.S. for security
assistance in Iraq, Delreps suggested that that
document might form the basis for any arrangements
Qdocument might form the basis for any arrangements
made for the TS staff, and offered to provide a
copy of the MOU later.


4. (C) On July 17, Ambassador Banaa requested an
urgent meeting with Delrep Beik and Representative
Mikulak on short notice. Khioka and Al-Miahi
accompanied the ambassador. Banaa seemed to
believe that the U.S. was working the security
issue independently without consulting him, and
insisted on better coordination. Delrep repeated
what had been discussed with Banaa's delegation the
day before, that security arrangements needed to be
coordinated in Baghdad between the Iraqi government
and OPCW, and that OPCW needed to work within the
UN framework, formally requesting U.S. assistance
if needed. Delrep gave the ambassador a copy of
the UN-U.S. MOU on security in Iraq, which had been
offered the day before. Delreps repeated their
message from the previous meeting that established
contacts and procedures would be useful as visits
are planned, as well as clarification on how much
lead time is necessary for security requests. To
Khioka's statement that someone from the American
Embassy would accompany the TS team, Delreps also
clarified that the U.S. does not normally
participate in bilateral TS visits in any country
and would not expect to do so in Iraq, unless
invited by the Iraqi government.


5. (SBU) In a later telephone call to DDG Freeman,
Delrep asked if the TS had the UN-U.S. MOU; Freeman
requested a copy. He informed Delrep that a letter
from the Iraqi Ambassador two days earlier had
contained assurances for security that the TS
considered sufficient under the Convention. OPCW,
he said, will proceed as they normally do, with
advice and assistance from the UN, and had offered
new timelines for the team's initial visit.
Freeman agreed with Delrep that communications all
around have had gaps and that ongoing coordination
would be important to move things forward.

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IRAQI REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
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6. (SBU) During the July 13 meeting with Ambassador
Banaa introducing new U.S. (Smith) and Iraqi (Al-
Miahi) delegates, Banaa briefly described a list of
requirements that the Government of Iraq intended
to circulate to prospective donors/partners. He
stated that several governments (Germany, Japan,
Serbia) have expressed interest in assisting Iraq,
but expressed concern over the lack of planning.
This list of requirements was later provided by Al-
Miahi to the U.S. delegation for review (copy
scanned to ISN/CB).


7. (SBU) During the larger July 16 bilateral
meeting with the Iraqi delegation, Jwan Khioka
inquired about the status of an official U.S.
response to the earlier Iraqi request for
assistance. Delreps stated that it was under
consideration and that a response will likely be
released prior to the upcoming visit this fall of
Iraqi officials to Washington. Delreps requested
that, in addition to General Ali, representatives
from the Foreign Ministry also join the visit to
discuss the response initially in Washington,
Qdiscuss the response initially in Washington,
followed by a more detailed discussion in October
in The Hague on the margins of the next Executive
Council session (EC-58).


8. (SBU) Khioka also asked whether the U.S. had
received a copy of Iraq's detailed plan for
destruction of its remaining CW. Delreps replied
that they had not, but offered to provide comments,
if requested. They noted that the CWC destruction

experts are based in Washington; however, Embassy
Baghdad, or the Delegation in The Hague, could
forward the destruction plan to appropriate
Washington offices, as had been done for the draft
initial declaration.


9. (SBU) In a bilateral meeting with Delreps July
15, Canadian representatives Louis-Philippe
Sylvestre and Angela Peart expressed an interest in
providing assistance to the Government of Iraq in
meeting its CWC treaty obligations. Sylvestre
stated that although Canada would likely not be
able to commit personnel, there is government
interest in providing equipment and other
assistance. The Global Partnership Program is a
possible vehicle for assistance. It was originally
established as a mechanism for providing assistance
to the former Soviet Union, but it has been
extended globally. Sylvestre said coordination
with the Global Partnership Program has been very
successful and could work for Iraq. He fully
supported having a collective of countries provide
assistance to Iraq and would be interested in
discussing this further with the United States and
the UK.


10. (SBU) DDG Freeman informed Delrep that he had
authorized re-prioritization of the 2009 Budget to
allow the TS to fund Iraqi participation in UK/U.S.
training for the National Authority in the UK later
this year.

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U.S. AND UK RECOVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
--------------


11. (SBU) As during the last Executive Council (EC-
56),several countries (Iran, Russia, South Africa)
raised questions about the U.S. and UK destruction
of CW found in Iraq before it joined the CWC. In a
surprise intervention during the informal meeting
on destruction July 13, Iraqi Ambassador Banaa
informed member states that all such questions
should be directed to his government. In later
bilateral meetings, Delreps thanked him for his
forthright statement, assured him that the U.S.
would direct any such questions we might receive to
his delegation, and promised to provide any
information in response first to his delegation.


12. (C) Delreps met privately with OPCW Legal
Adviser Santiago Onate (Mexico) on July 15 to seek
his views on the role of the OPCW regarding U.S.
and UK recovered Iraqi CW. Onate referred to the
views he expressed earlier to Delreps (ref B) and
in his April 2009 conference call with U.S. legal
counsel Brown (State) and Wager (DoD). He
reiterated those views: the U.S. and UK letters in
April are not declarations under the CWC; the
circumstances surrounding the Iraqi CW recoveries
were not contemplated by the framers of the
Convention; all of the CWC obligations of a State
Party could not be met if the recoveries were
viewed as falling within the provisions of the CWC;
and, as there was no CWC requirement to report any
information, any information reported should be
treated as a voluntary transparency measure. In
the meeting, Onate also pointed out that the TS
Qthe meeting, Onate also pointed out that the TS
would not be capable of carrying out the supporting
functions described by the Convention in a
situation of conflict, as the TS would have neither
authority nor security, and the location was that
of a non-State Party to the CWC.


13. (C) Onate added that the acceptance by the TS

of an offer by the U.S. and UK to review their
records would not be considered an inspection and,
therefore, no inspection report would be issued.
He stressed that there is no requirement in the CWC
for such a review. Any report would simply
describe the actions the TS had performed, the
contents of the reviewed documents, and might be
analogous to the report on the recent Executive
Council visit to Pueblo and Umatilla. Onate opined
that other States Parties would be mostly
interested in the disposition of the CW. He
concluded that the issue was a political question
as to whether the events would be treated as an
instance of CWC non-compliance, which would be
futile, or, taking the South African proposal at
face value, might provide an opportunity to learn
what might be useful for similar situations in the
future. Onate did question why the U.S. and the UK
informed the UN Security Council but not the OPCW.
Delreps pointed out that joint U.S./UK letter to
the UNSC was in response to the earlier
resolution's (UNSCR 1483) provision requesting the
information.


14. (C) Delegation legal adviser Gibbs and other
U.S. and UK delegation members participated in a
telephone conversation with UK legal counsel Louise
Symons (MOD) on July 16 regarding the UK's legal
analysis supporting their Schedule 1 Declaration
submitted to the TS in April. Symons believed that
the CWC applied to the Iraqi CW recoveries but that
UNSCR 1483 relieved the UK of any possible non-
compliance. Gibbs pointed out that, if the
applicability of the CWC was conceded, future
recoveries under different circumstances would
place CWC States Parties in an awkward situation if
no UNSCR were available. Symons agreed and stated
that she had not considered such possibilities.
She suggested that the UK might be willing to agree
that events like the recoveries were not
contemplated when the CWC was negotiated and that
the CWC therefore would not be "relevant," but she
said that further discussions would first be
necessary with UK MOD counsel.


15. (C) In discussing the immediate problem, the
submission of the UK Declaration, it was generally
felt that an attempt at withdrawal would be
immediately noticeable and subject to scrutiny.
Gibbs stated that any solution would be welcome
that was not prejudicial to the characterization of
an intended U.S. transparency filing on the
recoveries. A possible solution would be informal
solicitation of a letter from the TS to the UK
requesting clarification of the nature of the UK
Declaration, to which the UK would respond that
the submission was intended not as a formal
Declaration but as a transparency measure provided
in the format most familiar to the TS, that of a
Declaration. Gibbs suggested, and Symons agreed,
that further legal consultations by e-mail would be
appropriate.

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RECORDS REVIEW PREPARATIONS
--------------


16. (C) On July 15, Delreps Hoggins, Ozga, Robinson
Q16. (C) On July 15, Delreps Hoggins, Ozga, Robinson
and Smith met with Director of Verification Horst
Reeps (Germany) to discuss the ongoing preparations
for a visit by the TS to review the U.S.
destruction records for recovered CW in Iraq. The
group identified the first week of September 2009
as a target date for this activity. Reeps said he
does not expect extensive records and understands

that the reporting was conducted in a combat
situation. He noted that the team will likely
comprise just himself and Senior Chem Demil Officer
Gabriela Coman-Enescu (Romania). When asked about
the expected product from this visit, Reeps
speculated that it could be a joint report prepared
in a combined effort of transparency by the U.S.
and the TS. He stated that the report would be
internal to the TS and would be delivered to the
DG; the DG might then make an oral or written
report on the matter to the Executive Council.

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PLAN TO INSPECT IRAQI BUNKERS?
--------------


17. (C) On July 16, Delreps Robinson and Smith
called on Senior Chem Demil Officer Jeff Osborne
(U.S.). Osborne explained that he had prepared a
proposal to the DG detailing how investigation of
the bunkers in Iraq could be conducted. He said
the DG had noted the proposal as a possible tool to
assist Iraq, if requested. Osborne was not aware
of any specific requests from Iraq for assistance
from the TS. Delreps expressed considerable
concern over the potential safety and environmental
risks of Osborne's proposed fact-finding. While
Osborne believes that the TS is qualified to
perform this task, Delreps wondered whether he had
current and complete information. Osborne
explained that the proposal will not be presented
to Iraq and that the decision remains with the DG.

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DEL COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) While the OPCW Technical Secretariat has a
range of views on Iraq -- from Jeff Osborne
volunteering to go, to greater caution by those
responsible for the safety of OPCW staff -- TS
coordination is controlled by the current Director-
General and his Deputy.


19. (C) On the other hand, messages between the
OPCW, the Iraqi Embassy in The Hague, and Baghdad
continue to show major gaps. The Iraqi
Ambassador's plea for greater coordination is valid
internally as well as with the U.S., UK and TS.
Delreps tried to emphasize in all of their meetings
with the Iraqi delegation that Iraq must take the
lead, the U.S. is ready to assist if needed, and
that the central point for security issues lies in
Baghdad, while CWC-related questions should include
The Hague. Del believes Jwan Khioka got the
message; we were not so sure about Ambassador Banaa
or his new delegate, Al-Miahi.


20. (C) Donor coordination will likely be needed in
the future, but it may be too early to put too many
players into the loop until the Iraqis have the
basic elements of their implementation plan settled
with the TS.


21. (U) BEIK SENDS.

GALLAGHER