Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TELAVIV765
2009-04-01 04:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Tel Aviv
how-toVZCZCXRO5864 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHTV #0765 0910408 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 010408Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1254 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000765
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV IS
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BENYAMIN NETANYAHU
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000765
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV IS
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BENYAMIN NETANYAHU
1. (U) NOTE: This profile is the first in a series of reports on
key members of the new Israeli government, which is scheduled to be
sworn in on March 31, 2009.
--------------
NETANYAHU'S MATURATION
--------------
2. (SBU) Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is expected to obtain
from the Knesset tonight a vote of confidence in his government.
Netanyahu's second stint in office (note: his first term as Prime
Minister was in 1996-1999) has prompted a question: Has Bibi
changed? Thus far, political observers have only the tortuous
coalition negotiations by which to glean how the new premier will
lead. On that basis, Netanyahu, who has headed the Likud party
since 1993 with only one interlude (the Sharon years 1999-2005),has
clearly learned from at least some of his past errors of judgment.
Chief among them, by his own admission, was his decision in 1996 to
form a narrow rightwing government. On being asked to form a
government after the 2009 elections, Netanyahu went first to his
"natural partners" on the right, but he always indicated his
preference for having a broad-based government with either or both
the Kadima and Labor parties on board. In that regard, Netanyahu
made every effort, going beyond what most previous Israeli
politicians had done to secure a balanced government.
3. (SBU) The cost to Likud of cobbling together a coalition that
would include his rightwing partners and the left-leaning Labor
party was steep in terms of financial, policy, and portfolio
concessions. Netanyahu's ability to slide these deals past his own
senior party members may be interpreted as indication of his
improving leadership skills. But it may just as well signify Likud
rank-and-file understanding of the new balance of power with
Israel's party political system in which the existence of Kadima,
with its 28 seats in the opposition, provides a constant default
option for the malcontents within the governing coalition.
--------------
PRAGMATISM OVER IDEOLOGY
--------------
4. (SBU) Netanyahu is solidly center-right on the political
spectrum, and he remains more pragmatic than ideological in most
matters. On the peace process he is keeping all options open
regarding a two-state solution, and may be willing to advance the
process significantly as long as he is not forced to publicly
acknowledge the extent of such progress. To succeed along such a
path we expect him to rely heavily on his improved skills at
political wheeling-dealing to keep the right flank on board while
quietly (but perhaps slowly) cooperating on the peace process
agenda, which he understands is critical to Israel's relations with
the U.S.. In his speech to the last Knesset session of the Olmert
Government March 30, Bibi said his government will be willing to
offer "generous concessions" for peace with the Palestinians, and
that his government would "do all in its power to reach peace with
all our neighbors and with the entire Arab world." We note that
while largely non-ideological on the peace process, Netanyahu does
maintain an ideological passion for free markets, which suggests to
us that his commitment to facilitating investment in the West Bank
is more than just rhetoric and will result in active personal
involvement on his part.
--------------
FOCUSED ON IRAN
--------------
5. (SBU) Netanyahu holds strong views on the Iranian threat. He
believes that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should be taken
at his word when he says Israel should be wiped off the map, and
that deterrence theory does not apply to a nuclear-armed Iran.
Netanyahu argues that Hamas in Gaza and Hizballah in Lebanon
represent Iranian bases surrounding Israel. While some have
suggested that Netanyahu may prefer to pursue negotiations with
Syria rather than deal with the Palestinian issue, at least so far
Netanyahu has consistently expressed great skepticism about Syria's
willingness to give up its strategic ties to Iran in return for
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV IS
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BENYAMIN NETANYAHU
1. (U) NOTE: This profile is the first in a series of reports on
key members of the new Israeli government, which is scheduled to be
sworn in on March 31, 2009.
--------------
NETANYAHU'S MATURATION
--------------
2. (SBU) Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is expected to obtain
from the Knesset tonight a vote of confidence in his government.
Netanyahu's second stint in office (note: his first term as Prime
Minister was in 1996-1999) has prompted a question: Has Bibi
changed? Thus far, political observers have only the tortuous
coalition negotiations by which to glean how the new premier will
lead. On that basis, Netanyahu, who has headed the Likud party
since 1993 with only one interlude (the Sharon years 1999-2005),has
clearly learned from at least some of his past errors of judgment.
Chief among them, by his own admission, was his decision in 1996 to
form a narrow rightwing government. On being asked to form a
government after the 2009 elections, Netanyahu went first to his
"natural partners" on the right, but he always indicated his
preference for having a broad-based government with either or both
the Kadima and Labor parties on board. In that regard, Netanyahu
made every effort, going beyond what most previous Israeli
politicians had done to secure a balanced government.
3. (SBU) The cost to Likud of cobbling together a coalition that
would include his rightwing partners and the left-leaning Labor
party was steep in terms of financial, policy, and portfolio
concessions. Netanyahu's ability to slide these deals past his own
senior party members may be interpreted as indication of his
improving leadership skills. But it may just as well signify Likud
rank-and-file understanding of the new balance of power with
Israel's party political system in which the existence of Kadima,
with its 28 seats in the opposition, provides a constant default
option for the malcontents within the governing coalition.
--------------
PRAGMATISM OVER IDEOLOGY
--------------
4. (SBU) Netanyahu is solidly center-right on the political
spectrum, and he remains more pragmatic than ideological in most
matters. On the peace process he is keeping all options open
regarding a two-state solution, and may be willing to advance the
process significantly as long as he is not forced to publicly
acknowledge the extent of such progress. To succeed along such a
path we expect him to rely heavily on his improved skills at
political wheeling-dealing to keep the right flank on board while
quietly (but perhaps slowly) cooperating on the peace process
agenda, which he understands is critical to Israel's relations with
the U.S.. In his speech to the last Knesset session of the Olmert
Government March 30, Bibi said his government will be willing to
offer "generous concessions" for peace with the Palestinians, and
that his government would "do all in its power to reach peace with
all our neighbors and with the entire Arab world." We note that
while largely non-ideological on the peace process, Netanyahu does
maintain an ideological passion for free markets, which suggests to
us that his commitment to facilitating investment in the West Bank
is more than just rhetoric and will result in active personal
involvement on his part.
--------------
FOCUSED ON IRAN
--------------
5. (SBU) Netanyahu holds strong views on the Iranian threat. He
believes that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should be taken
at his word when he says Israel should be wiped off the map, and
that deterrence theory does not apply to a nuclear-armed Iran.
Netanyahu argues that Hamas in Gaza and Hizballah in Lebanon
represent Iranian bases surrounding Israel. While some have
suggested that Netanyahu may prefer to pursue negotiations with
Syria rather than deal with the Palestinian issue, at least so far
Netanyahu has consistently expressed great skepticism about Syria's
willingness to give up its strategic ties to Iran in return for
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.