TFHO1: ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSULAR SECTION'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000684

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN, CA/EX

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CASC CLOK CMGT CPAS CVIS CFED
SUBJECT: TFHO1: ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSULAR SECTION'S
RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS

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1. (U) Summary: The coup against President Mel, Zelaya on
June 28th tested the Consular Sections ability to safeguard
American citizens in a time of political uncertainty. The
section proved to be up to the challenge, successfully
processing hundreds of AmCit calls on the ACS hotline, and
making efficient use of the warden system and embassy website
to keep the American population in Honduras and the United
States updated on the unfolding political situation, and
travel precautions. This cable explores the section,s
response to the political crisis, and takes a look at lessons
learned from this experience, to better prepare this section
and other posts for similar emergencies in the future. End
Summary.

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ACS Hotline: Responding to the Crisis
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2. (U) In the week that followed the coup, the American
Citizen Services hotline was inundated with over 125 calls
per day; to handle the high volume, the Consular Section
closed to all but select emergency American Citizen Services.
In the first week, calls were predominantly from AmCits in
Honduras, seeking embassy advice on evacuation, travel and
transportation, and general information on the political
situation. As the crisis continued to unfold (and receive
attention from the international media),the number of
in-country calls were matched in number by calls from the
United States. The hotline received calls from family
members, congressional offices, universities, and church
groups, inquiring after AmCits in Honduras and the status of
the U.S. travel policy to the country. The number of
coup-related calls decreased substantially in the weeks that
followed, holding steady for the past 1.5 weeks at around
five coup-related calls out of the approximately 50 calls the
ACS phone line receives daily. Calls in recent days are from
AmCits in the United
States, seeking Embassy recommendations for upcoming travel
to Honduras; though advised on the embassy,s position to
defer all nonessential travel, these callers have appeared
reluctant to rethink or postpone their travel arrangements.

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The Wardens: Reports from the Field
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3. (U) About ten days after the coup, the Consular Section
attempted to individually contact its wardens to better
assess the aftermath of the crisis (in terms of protest and
travel restrictions) across Honduras. In total, 14 wardens
were reached, representing 9 of the 11 zones in Honduras in
which the embassy has a warden presence. Wardens
representing COPA zone - which includes the tourist site
Copan - could not be reached, while wardens covering the
Tegucigalpa zone were not contacted. Most other wardens
reported that activity in their zones had calmed down
substantially from the week following the coup. The number
of protests (if they had not died down completely) had
decreased dramatically, and any protests in the last few days
had been peaceful. There were few roadblocks; wardens
reported buses and commercial vehicles entering and exiting
their zones without difficulty. Any military/police presence
appeared to be nominal. Wardens in the Bay Islands reported
calm but expressed concern for tourist businesses due to the
stream of tourists leaving the islands due to the political
situation, as well as the embassy,s travel recommendations
dissuading travel to Honduras.

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NIV Activity and Patterns Post Coup
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4. (U) The Consular Section was closed to Non-Immigrant Visa
services the week following the coup, re-opening July 7 for
scheduled interviews. Officers reported nothing out of the
ordinary among applicants or their expressed reasons for
obtaining visas, adding that applicants who have been

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interviewed since the coup were scheduled well before June

28. Two notable exceptions were interviewed the week of July
20 when the attorney for the mayor of San Pedro Sula, as well
as the mayor,s son interviewed for an NIV. Both sought
temporary shelter in the US in order to escape the threats on
their lives following the arrest of the AmCit SPS mayor (he
was later released). Also of note, the families of two
Supreme Court justices requested that their B1/B2 visas be
"transferred" to their diplomatic passports. While the
Consular Section has refused to accept or review any visa
applications from the de-facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a
handful of diplomatic visas from the Honduran
government-in-exile have been approved. The number of
referrals has increased as the wait time for a regular
appointment has increased and pro-Zelaya applicants appear
nervous about being able to leave the country. The Consular
section put in place a procedure whereby all B referrals may
contact the call center and will automatically be considered
for an expedited appointment. Starting July 27th, officers
will start interviewing regular applicants who scheduled NIV
interviews after the June 28th coup; however the NIV section
does not anticipate many applicants requesting visas solely
because of the political unrest.

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American Citizen Services Post-Coup
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5. (U) The Consular Section opened only for emergency
American Citizen Services the week following the coup. ACS
issued four CRBAs (Consular Report for Birth Abroad) for
American citizens leaving the country in light of the
political unrest. ACS resumed normal operations July 7. In
the two weeks following the coup, the ACS hotline received a
large number of calls from AmCits in Honduras looking to
acquire emergency passports. However, AmCits were informed
that the embassy would not issue emergency passports for
reasons related to the coup; such requests would be processed
within 10 days, the normal turnaround. Only one emergency
passport (for a child) was issued specifically for reasons
related to the political unrest.

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Lessons Learned
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6. (U) Consular staff quickly responded to the needs of
American citizens in the aftermath of the coup, processing
hundreds of calls to the hotline, and updating warden
messages, talking points, and the embassy page in a timely
manner, effectively upholding the Mission,s goal to enhance
the security and well-being of American citizens in Honduras.
The section emerged with some lessons learned from its
response to the crisis:


7. (U) First, training all LES on the CTF system is
imperative to a successful response to a crisis in which
there is a high volume of calls to the ACS hotline. In the
week following the coup, there were 5 FSOs and 3-4 ACS LES
answering the phones at any given time. However, the high
volume of calls left those on the hotline with little time to
effectively log calls into the Crisis Services system in CTF.
Meanwhile, other LES in the office, who were available to
answer calls, were not trained in the CTF system, and
therefore had no reliable access to our talking points, and
no way to log calls. The section,s response was to hold a
CTF training mid-week for all LES, increasing the
number of people available to process calls, and freeing FSOs
to resume visa services the following week.


8. (U) Second, in the event that visa services should be shut
down for an extended period of time, the consular section
learned the value of maintaining close ties to CSC staff;
with their assistance, the vast majority of 950 NIV
applicants had their missed appointments rescheduled within
72 hours. This proactive relationship with CSC, as well as
the prompt press release to Honduran media detailing the

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closure of the section no doubt greatly reduced the number of
NIV-related calls to the section, thereby creating more time
to respond to ACS calls.


9. (U) Third, NIV realized that it should have opened more
slots for emergency visa appointments to better accommodate
applicants who, due to the section,s four-day closure, were
now under time constraints for their visas.


10. (U) Finally, the section observed the importance of
always having stand-by projects for NIV and IV FSOs. Even
with the high volume of calls on the ACS line, the absence of
visa interviews left officers with a certain amount of
downtime; having projects (or catch-up work to complete)
constituted a more effective use of FSOs, time.

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Comment
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11. (U) The seamless integration of the NIV, IV, and ACS
sections, in collaboration with the support received from CSC
and the Department, allowed the section to efficiently and
successfully serve U.S. citizen interests in a time of
crisis. End Comment.
LLORENS