ZELAYA AND THE FOURTH URN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000439

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN
WHA/FO FOR A/S SHANNON AND DAS DAVE ROBINSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2019
TAGS: PREL OAS KSUM CU HO
SUBJECT: ZELAYA AND THE FOURTH URN

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 431

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Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d).


1. (U) This is an action request message. Please see para 10.


2. (C) Summary: In a lengthy meeting on June 7, the
Ambassador conveyed our concerns to President Manuel &Mel8
Zelaya over the increasingly polarized political situation in
Honduras, attributing much of the blame on his recent actions
pushing for a referendum to hold a constituent assembly. The
Ambassador stressed our strong support for Honduran democracy
and expressed the expectation that a legal, constitutional
and consensual solution could be found to the current
political crisis. Zelaya defended his actions, blaming the
polarization on a reactionary business and media elite. He
reiterated his intention of supporting the electoral process
and transferring power to his elected successor on January
27, 2010. Zelaya appeared more aware than in past
conversations of growing opposition to his referendum plans
and the limitations he faces in Congress. He asked for U.S.
help in seeking a consensus on the referendum issue within
his own party (see action request ) paragraph 10. End
Summary.


3. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by the DCM, met with
President Manuel &Mel8 Zelaya June 7 to review the results
of the OAS General Assembly (reftel) and discuss the
political situation in Honduras. The Ambassador opened the
discussion by noting that Honduras was increasingly divided
and polarized over the issue of the President's proposal to
hold a Fourth Urn on Election Day (November 29) for the
purpose of gaining citizen approval for the convening of a
constituent assembly to reform the Honduran constitution. He
said that while he understood the President's keen interest
in consulting the people on constitutional reform, it seemed
that the Fourth Urn was a distraction from focusing on the
many serious economic, financial, social and security
problems facing Honduras and of greatest concern to the
Honduran people. Moreover, the Ambassador warned the
President that while there were many members of the
conservative economic and political elite who were knee jerk
opponents of the Fourth Urn, there was a rapidly growing
feeling by many moderates that the President's campaign
represented an effort to weaken democracy and the rule of
law. Worse, many were convinced that he planned to
manipulate the Fourth Urn issue to stay in power beyond his
constitutionally mandated term. The Ambassador cited several
worrisome trends, including Zelaya's refusal to back down
from his plans to hold a poll on June 28 to canvass public
support for the Fourth Urn despite the fact that a judge had
ruled that using the National Statistical Institute to hold a
poll that had political implications was illegal. His
(Zelaya's) dismissal of a court order, and his decision to
involve the Honduran military in doing the logistical work of
the poll was in many people's eyes a blatant disregard for
the rule of law. Finally, the Ambassador noted that
President Zelaya's refusal to submit a fiscal budget to
Congress was seen by many as an example of the arbitrary way
he was managing the nation and its public finances. The
Ambassador noted that congressional leaders had reported that
the Minister of Finance had been blocking the disbursement of
funds to pay for congressional salaries and operating
expenses. The recent decision by the National Congress to
pass a resolution censuring the President, an act
unprecedented since Honduras's return to democracy 28 years
ago, was a harbinger of the coming political crisis, and a
reflection of the serious deterioration of relations between
the legislative and executive branches.


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4. (C) The Ambassador stressed U.S. support for Honduran
democracy and its constitutional order. He noted that we and
the democratic community around the world would expect that
whatever was done or not done with regards to the Fourth Urn
be handled in a manner that was legal, constitutional and
consensual. The Ambassador expressed the hope that Honduran
institutions were sufficiently strong and mature to ensure
the maintenance of the rule of law, the holding of general
elections on November 29, and the peaceful transfer of power
to a new government on January 27, 2010. He said the U.S.
would continue to work closely with his government on the
many economic and security issues of common interest and
would also look forward to working closely with and providing
support for the newly-elected government beginning early next
year. The Ambassador said that we wanted President Zelaya to
end his term of office on a high note and avert a political
crisis that could be tragic for Honduras, himself personally
and his family.


5. (C) Zelaya blamed the polarization of Honduras on the
reactionary response of the business elite to what they
perceived as a threat to their privileged position. Zelaya
stressed that the Honduran constitution had been consistently
broken and trampled upon by the political and business elites
to suit their whim. By way of example, he alleged that
former President Ricardo Maduro should not have been allowed
to run for the Presidency since he had been born in Panama.
In the same way, both leading presidential contenders faced
legal impediments to their candidacy, since the constitution
prohibited Vice Presidents (Liberal Party candidate Elvin
Santos) and Presidents of Congress (National Party candidate
Pepe Lobo) from running for the Presidency. (Note: Not
necessarily true, since the prohibition is for sitting Vice
Presidents and Presidents of Congress. The constitution
states that a Vice President can run for the Presidency if he
resigns six months prior to the election. Following his
primary victory on November 30, 2008, Santos resigned as Vice
President a decision that was ratified by the National
Congress. In the case of Lobo, he is not currently holding
elected office, although he is a former President of
Congress). Zelaya argued that his decision to not present a
budget was legal and constitutional and cited the various
articles and circumstances that would allow the GOH to manage
government operations under a continuing resolution.


6. (C) Zelaya acknowledged that an increasing number of well
meaning moderates were turning against him, but blamed this
on the intensity of the press campaign that the media barons
had unleashed against him. He insisted that nothing in the
law prohibited the executive from polling people on whether
they should be consulted on the issue of constitutional
reform. In any event, everyone understood that the poll had
no legal standing and that the National Congress retained the
final legal authority on whether to approve his Fourth Urn
proposal, sanction some variant of a plebiscite on
constitutional reform, or reject the proposal outright.
Zelaya insisted that he would respect the National Congress's
final decision, although he expected that there would be
strong popular pressure on legislators to support the Fourth
Urn. Zelaya stressed that public concerns about his joining
the military in a coup were ridiculous and that the era of
military action to break the constitutional order were a
thing of the past.


7. (C) Zelaya reiterated his commitment that he had no/no
interest or intention to stay in power and vowed to turn over
the presidency to his elected successor at the inauguration
on January 27, 2010. He said if he could dispel concerns
about his intentions, he believed that the political
leadership would be willing to engage him in serious

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negotiations and substantive discussion on the Fourth Urn
proposal. He agreed with the Ambassador that the ideal
objective should be that anything done on the Fourth Urn be
legal, constitutional and based on a general consensus. He
warned that a failure to handle this issue in some way would
result in a continuing polarization of Honduras with a
potential for confrontation and crisis.


8. (C) In closing, Zelaya said he did not see how he could
impose his will on the National Congress, or on the
leadership of his Liberal Party. However, he was seeking a
dialogue within his own Liberal Party to include Congress
President Micheletti, Elvin Santos and Former President
Carlos Flores Facusse. Zelaya asked for U.S. assistance in
encouraging a dialogue and requested that the Ambassador
agree to privately participate in a meeting with his fellow
Liberals. The Ambassador agreed to consult Washington on his
request and said he would seek guidance from Washington if we
could encourage a dialogue between the Liberals on this
issue. The Ambassador stressed that even if the Department
approved the Embassy role, the U.S. would in no/no way push
anyone to adopt any/any specific position on this matter.
These negotiations would need to be handled directly by the
parties. The Ambassador said he would get back to Zelaya on
his request.


9. (C) Comment: Zelaya remains determined to push forward on
his Fourth Urn proposal and sees the June 28 poll as an
opportunity to generate momentum towards this objective.
Zelaya is committed to continue to lead a nationwide campaign
in support of the Fourth Urn. We expect him to scheme and
maneuver and seek to remain a major protagonist on the
political scene in Honduras. However, in contrast to past
discussions, he seemed more aware of the growing opposition
to his plans for the Fourth Urn and seemed to more fully
appreciate the limitations he faces in Congress. Zelaya's
interest in sitting down with key Liberal Party leaders does
provide an opportunity to broker a deal that could result in
the creation of a legal/constitutional mechanism for
consulting the Honduran people on the issue of constitutional
reform without undermining, or weakening the current election
process. Zelaya may be seeking a face saving way out of this
situation; he will also probably want some guarantees
against prosecution after he leaves office, both for himself
and his family. In this regard, U.S. interests will be
served if we can encourage President Zelaya and other
Honduran senior leaders to come up with a viable solution to
the existing political crisis.


10. (C) Action Request: Embassy requests Department
authorization to respond favorably to President Zelaya's
request to participate in a dialogue between Liberal Party
leaders. Such a meeting could result in a consensus
political agreement on the handling of the Fourth Urn issue.
We believe that other political actors likely would join a
Liberal party consensus position. The Embassy would avoid
taking any position on this issue, but will encourage all
sides to adopt a solution that strictly adheres to Honduran
law and the constitution.
LLORENS