GEORGIA: SECURITY SITUATION AT THE MTSKHETA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000952

SIPDIS

DOE/NNSA PLEASE PASS TO CATHERINE KENNEDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC KCRM PARM PINR GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SECURITY SITUATION AT THE MTSKHETA
RADIOACTIVE STORAGE FACILITY

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D


1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 7.


2. (C) Summary and Comment. The radioactive storage facility
in Mtskheta, the permanent storage facility in Georgia for
disused radioactive sources, is in need of a strengthened
security guard presence, according to local experts and
police. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
Administration/Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
program has done a tremendous job in upgrading the physical
infrastructure and security procedures of the facility, and
will be further upgrading the alarm system this summer.
However, one area in the overall system still in need of
improvement is guard security procedures and manning. While
post does not consider the current situation an immediate
threat, the facility is widely known to house radioactive
material and is easy to access, located just off the main
highway north of Tbilisi and not far from the embassy. In
order to provide more robust security at the site, the
Government of Georgia could designate the facility a site of
strategic national importance, which would in turn require
the government to provide state protection for the facility.
End Summary and Comment.

CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION


3. (C) The radioactive storage facility is on the property of
the decommissioned nuclear reactor in Mtskheta, a few miles
north of Tbilisi. It is maintained by the E. Andronikashvili
Institute of Physics (IOP),which is part of the Ministry of
Education and Science. The current security system
components that GTRI has provided include deadbolt locks for
doors; security lock boxes for key control; a two-person rule
procedure in which each storage room door requires two
independent keys and personnel to open it; siren/strobe light
alarms; fixed and mobile duress buttons; motion sensors for
each storage room and access entry; balanced magnetic
switches on the doors; CCTV cameras, monitor and digital
recording system; backup power via a diesel generator;
exterior lighting; central alarm station room; and vibration
sensors to detect penetration in the road side exterior wall.
GTRI also ensures that personnel at the facility have been
trained and a response plan for the facility developed. GTRI
contracts for warranty and maintenance visits on a quarterly
basis. GTRI will be upgrading the alarm system this summer
with the ability to conduct surveillance of the facility at
off-site locations, thereby providing redundancy to the
primary security system described above.


4. (C) Currently, the IOP has a private contract with the
Security Police Department (SPD) to provide security guards.
The current contract between SPD and IOP allows for six
guards from their Mtskheta Division to be on site 24/7.
Their main responsibility is to perform perimeter checks of
the entire territory, which is about three hectares,
consistently throughout the day and night. However,
according to IOP personnel and as observed by poloff, the
guards spend a majority of their time stationed at the main
Qguards spend a majority of their time stationed at the main
entrance to the property and do not even have direct line of
sight to the storage facility, whose back wall is exposed to
the road. IOP personnel claim that the guards are
inexperienced and turn over frequently. IOP requested that
the guards perform the perimeter checks, but were told that
this would cost more money. Neither the IOP nor the Ministry
of Education, which controls IOP's budget, has the financial
resources to meet the increasing demands of the SPD. IOP
employees told poloff that they often take it upon themselves
to "guard" the facility due to the lack of acceptable
security procedures exhibited by the guards. On 20 May, at
the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program Scenario-Based
Workshop, an official with the Nuclear and Radiation Safety
Service (NRSS) also discussed the issue of security at the
facility, noting especially the lack of expertise displayed
by the current security guards.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT


5. (C) Mamuka Komakhia, the Deputy Chair of the Security
Police Department, whose department provides the current
security guards to the site, also raised concerns regarding

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the current situation. Due to the line of sight constraints
from the main entrance, he recommended that a control post be
established at the entrance of the storage facility with a
static guard presence. He also suggested a barrier be
erected at the entrance as a deterrent. However, without a
financial increase in the contract, he would not be able to
make these changes.


6. (C) The IOP has repeatedly appealed to the Government of
Georgia for at least eight years, through letters to the
Prime Minister, that it declare the facility a site of
strategic importance, which would afford it state protection
by specially trained guards. Besides acknowledging receipt
of IOP's letters, the Prime Minister's office has not
responded to IOP's requests. According to post's
understanding of the law entitled "Engineering and Geodetic
Control and Safety of Units (or Locations) Deemed Strategic
and of Special Importance," the storage facility does qualify
for this protection. Article 4 of the law states that
facilities that are considered of strategic importance
include buildings/facilities of those plants that use
radioactive or toxic material as well as manufacturing,
scientific-construction, military, customs and border control
facilities that are necessary to provide for the country's
security protection. Further, article 9 states that State
Supervision protection of such facilities is exercised by
Ministry of Defense, Special Protection Service, State
Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State
Surveillance Service, Border Protection Service - within the
area of their competence.


7. (C) The IOP has asked the Embassy to express USG support
in order to designate the facility a GOG site of strategic
importance. Post requests Department guidance in responding
to this request.
TEFFT