GEORGIA: SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT UN REPORT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000942

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT UN REPORT ON
ABKHAZIA

REF: A. USUN 491

B. STATE 4Q27

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. The Georgian Government has made
clear, both publicly and privately, its discontent with the
UN Secretary General (UNSYG)'s report on Abkhazia, Georgia.
It perceives both the title and key elements of the report's
substance as a capitulation to Russian pressure, as evidenced
by the May 18 walkout of the Geneva talks. In a public
statement, Foreign Minister Vashadze stated his
dissatisfaction with what he called a compromise text,
noting, however, that the language was not a victory for
Russia either. Abkhaz de facto "foreign minister" Shamba
trumpeted the report as a success of the May 18 tactics.
Georgian press outlets portrayed the report as a Russian
victory at Georgia's expense, and opposition leader Nino
Burjanadze portrayed it as a failure of Georgian diplomacy.
However the UNSYG and his staff determined the final version
of the report, the Georgians clearly perceive this as the UN
yielding to Russian pressure. The Georgians believe that the
Russians and their proxies have effectively used Geneva to
blackmail the UN itself. End summary and comment.

GOVERNMENT: DISSATISFIED IN PUBLIC, OUTRAGED IN PRIVATE


2. (SBU) In public comments aired on national TV, Georgian
Foreign Minister Vashadze expressed concern over elements of
the UNSYG's report on Abkhazia, Georgia (released to UN
Security Council members on May 18 under the title "The
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council
resolutions 1808, 1839, and 1866"). Although he noted some
"positive elements," such as a reference to the current
mission by its full name (United Nations Observer Mission in
Georgia) in the first paragraph of the text, he suggested
that other elements were "obviously included as a result of
pressure by Russia." In particular he noted that the entire
report, including the title, never uses the phrase "Abkhazia,
Georgia." Overall he called the report a compromise,
explaining that he was "not very satisfied" with that
compromise, but that it could also "not be a source of
satisfaction for Moscow" either. He also noted that the
government had not completed its detailed examination of the
recently received text and might have more comments later.
In conclusion, Vashadze promised that "Georgia will never
allow Russia to legitimize two virtual Bantustans, which
Russia has created on Georgian territory," and suggesting
that "Russia's goal is clear -- to kill the UN mission, like
it did with the OSCE mission, as Russia does not want to have
witnesses of violations of commitments."


3. (C) Intentionally or not, Vashadze confused the public
discussion of the report somewhat by calling the text a
"preliminary version." (According to a UNOMIG staff member,
the text is final, but has only been released to UN Security
Council members pending its formal publication.) He also
made reference to Security Council action due by June 15,
seeming to conflate the publication of a final version of the
report with a new UNSC resolution, which would be required by
June 15 to establish a new UN mandate for Georgia before the
expiry of the current mandate. (Note: It is possible that
Vashadze was trying to downplay the negative signifiance of
QVashadze was trying to downplay the negative significance of
the report by suggesting that UNSC action could correct its
deficiencies. End Note.) In TV interviews, Deputy FM
Bokeria also noted the importance of the June 15 date, which
could suggest the Georgian strategy will now be to focus on
the text of a possible UNSC resolution. Even so, both
Vashadze and Bokeria made it clear they were not happy with
the report.


4. (C) In private comments to U.S. delegates at the Geneva
talks on May 19, Bokeria and Deputy Reintegration Minister
David Rakviashvili deplored the report, seeing it as a
capitulation to Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz theatrics
in Geneva on May 18 and a real threat to Georgia's
territorial integrity. (Note: On May 18, at the first of two
scheduled days of the fifth round of Geneva talks, the Abkhaz
de facto representatives did not appear, because the UN
report, originally scheduled for release on May 15, had not
yet been issued. After the co-chairs' initial remarks, the
South Ossetian de facto representatives then announced they
could not participate in a session without their Abkhaz
counterparts and left the room; the Russian representatives
then followed suit. End Note.) Both noted specific elements

TBILISI 00000942 002 OF 003


that served to lend additional support to Abkhaz and South
Ossetian so-called "sovereignty," thereby undermining
Georgia's territorial integrity, and to legitimize the
Russian military presence in Georgia. Bokeria echoed, for
example, Vashadze's concern about the complete lack of the
phrase "Abkhazia, Georgia." He also objected to the proposed
element of a future security regime in paragraph 64(h) --
"Transparency arrangements, including access and provision of
information, with regard to the military installations in
Senaki and Ochamchira" -- because it seems to suggest that
the two bases are equal in status and legitimacy. The
phrases "Georgian and Abkhaz sides and key international
stakeholders" and "Georgian and South Ossetian sides, as well
as representatives of the Defense Ministry of the Russian
Federation, OSCE and EU" in paragraphs 4 and 6 respectively,
seemed to both Bokeria and Rakviashvili to suggest that
Russia is not party to the conflict, but only a
disinterested, even responsible third party.


5. (C) Bokeria had more fundamental concerns than the text of
the report. Right after the Russians and South Ossetians
walked out on May 18, Bokeria said that, if the UN report did
not refer to the "Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia," everyone
would perceive the walkout as a successful bit of blackmail.
He noted that this would be the perception even if the title
had been decided before the walkout, because no one would
know exactly how the UNSYG made his final decision. Bokeria
also pointed out that the Russians and their proxy states
were effectively using the Geneva process (or would be seen
by the world to be using it) to influence the work of the
mighty United Nations, of which Abkhazia and South Ossetia
are not members -- something the Geneva process was of course
not meant to do.

ABKHAZ: PLEASED AS PUNCH


6. (SBU) The Russian radio program Ekho Moskvy quoted Abkhaz
de facto "foreign minister" Sergey Shamba as saying that the
Abkhaz tactic of boycotting the first day of talks in Geneva
achieved its objective. He suggested that the boycott helped
convince the UN to omit references that would suggest that
Abkhazia is still part of Georgia, seeing this as evidence
that the international community is beginning to perceive
Abkhazia's status as qualitatively altered. "It can be said
that, to a certain degree, we have achieved what we wanted .
. . We wanted to test the international community and see
whether it would be prepared to take the real situation into
account or it would continue being hostage to the old
stereotypes. Today we saw that there is hope that they will
mend their ways," he was quoted as saying.

GEORGIAN PRESS AND OPPOSITION: NOT IMPRESSED


7. (SBU) The developments seemed to take Georgian
commentators by surprise. Georgian media outlets, including
TV and print outlets from across the political spectrum,
portrayed the report as a Russian victory. They also
criticized the UN for lowering its standards in the face of
Russian pressure. Some in turn went on to criticize the
government for allowing this to happen. Opposition leader
Nino Burjanadze held a press conference to make this
accusation, calling the episode a failure of Georgian
diplomacy and blaming the government for losing international
Qdiplomacy and blaming the government for losing international
support.

COMMENT: PERCEPTION IS MORE THAN REALITY


8. (C) We, of course, cannot get inside the minds of the UN
drafters, in particular the UNSYG himself, who reportedly
made the final decision on the title himself. Whether they
bowed to Russian pressure or not (suggested ref A),however,
the perception in Georgia is clearly that the Russian (and
Abkhaz and South Ossetian) tactics won. Furthermore,
Shamba's statement indicates the de factos are only too happy
to take credit for their tactical victory. Vashadze's final
comments -- which move away from the report itself to more
general themes of protecting Georgia's territorial integrity
-- indicate the government is now regrouping to determine how
to minimize the damage. One question the Georgians are now
asking themselves is whether the Geneva process is more
dangerous than helpful. Although the U.S. and other
delegationsconvinced Bokeria not to boycott day 2 of Geneva,
in order to avoid being blamed for a complete breakdown of
the process, it is hard to argue that the benefits of the
Geneva process, which have been minimal to this point, have

TBILISI 00000942 003 OF 003


outweighed the costs so far. Not only has Geneva given the
de factos a respectable platform, but it has possibly enabled
them to twist fundamental international organizations and
processes to advance their own agenda.
TEFFT