Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI923
2009-05-15 14:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA SNUBS INTERNATIONAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS RS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5543
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0923/01 1351423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151423Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1575
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0222
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2273
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4840
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000923 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA SNUBS INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY

REF: A. TBILISI 808

B. TBILISI 674

C. TBILISI 908

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000923

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA SNUBS INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY

REF: A. TBILISI 808

B. TBILISI 674

C. TBILISI 908

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. South Ossetian de facto
authorities' willingness to cooperate with the international
community -- meager as it was -- took several steps backward
in recent days. On May 7, they blocked the second meeting of
the Incident Prevention Mechanism; on May 5, they blocked a
visit from the Geneva process co-chairs to Tskhinvali; on May
1, a South Ossetian soldier shot directly at an EUMM patrol
for the first time; and on May 8, South Ossetian soldiers
threatened other EUMM monitors at the same spot. The South
Ossetians surprised the EUMM with a seemingly cooperative
attitude in a May 12 meeting, but in general their actions
speak much louder than their words. With Russian border
guards on the administrative boundary line, they likely feel
quite confident in flouting the international community.
Although their May 12 cooperative spirit may have been
intended to make amends before the May 18-19 Geneva talks, it
is clear that the de factos perceive no disincentive for
non-cooperation. End summary and comment.

SOUTH OSSETIA BLOCKS THE SECOND MECHANISM MEETING


2. (C) At the first meeting of the Joint Incident Prevention
and Response Mechanism (JIPRM),all parties -- including
South Ossetian representative Chigoev -- agreed that the
second meeting would take place on Georgian-controlled
territory (ref A),although they did not settle o a specific
location. EUMM and OSCE participants attest that Chigoev
even said he would be willing to go all the way to Tbilisi if
necessary, but the basic agreement was to meet somewhere
south of Tskhinvali. According to EUMM Head of Mission
Hansjoerg Haber (most of the following is based on his
account),on April 30, the EUMM sent invitations to all
parties to meet at the Gori Hotel, which is just north of the
city and has sufficient space to provide a separate room for
each delegation (one element that was lacking at the first
meeting). On May 4, the EUMM received a reply from South
Ossetian de facto "presidential" representative Boris

Chochiev (Chigoev's direct boss). Chochiev objected to the
proposed location on the grounds that it did not accord with
the provision in the Geneva document establishing the JIPRM
that the meetings would be held in the so-called "security
zone." (Note: The Geneva document contains no such
provision.) Since Gori is well outside this zone, Chochiev
proposed meeting back at the location of the first meeting.


3. (C) Noting that the Geneva document only states that the
JIPRM would meet at locations "to be agreed," Haber explained
that he made two key points to Chochiev in a May 4 reply.
First, the original Georgian position was that the JIPRM
meetings should alternate between territory controlled by
Georgian and by South Ossetian de facto authorities, and the
Georgian willingness to meet on the administrative boundary
at Ergneti for the first meeting had therefore been a
concession on their part. Second, the South Ossetian
representative himself, Chigoev, had agreed to holding the
meeting on Georgian-controlled territory. On May 5, Chochiev
replied with a justification of the South Ossetian position
based on the September 8, 2008 implementing measures, which
Qbased on the September 8, 2008 implementing measures, which
he cited as the foundation for the Geneva talks, and
therefore the JIPRM. Although not entirely clear, his
argument seemed to be based on the phrase "the areas adjacent
to South Ossetia and Abkhazia" used in that document; he
suggested that Ergneti would fall into that category, but
Gori (or its outskirts) would not.


4. (C) Haber countered on May 6 with an announcement of his
intent to hold the meeting in Tirdznisi (about four
kilometers from the boundary),even though the specific
venue, a municipal building, was neither very comfortable nor
appropriate. He did not ask for a reply. He also informed
the Russian representative, Proshkin, who replied with a
one-word answer: "Tak" ("Okay," or "Got it"). Chochiev did
reply to Haber, however, reaffirming the position he took on
May 5, stating that Tirdznisi was not in the adjacent areas,
and that the de facto authorities would only meet in the
"area of Ergneti." At that point Haber decided there was no
point in pursuing the issue further and informed the sides of
a decision to postpone the meeting. On May 7 the EUMM
released a statement calling for "cooperation in getting
together" for the Mechanism, adding that it was

TBILISI 00000923 002 OF 003


"disappointing that we had to adjourn the meeting planned for
today as one side changed its position on a suitable location
as expressed during the initial meeting on 23 April."

SOUTH OSSETIA BLOCKS VISIT OF GENEVA CO-CHAIRS


5. (C) EU Special Representative Pierre Morel, UN Special
Representative Johan Verbeke, and OSCE Special Representative
Charalampos Christopoulos -- the three co-chairs of the
Geneva process -- visited Sukhumi on May 4, then planned to
stop in Tskhinvali on the way back to Tbilisi the next day.
South Ossetian de facto authorities agreed in principle to
this itinerary beforehand. They informed the EU, however,
that upon arrival at the administrative boundary, the
delegations would have to exit their own vehicles and ride in
de facto vehicles from the boundary to Tskhinvali.
Representatives of all three organizations, who have traveled
into South Ossetia on numerous occasions since the war, found
this proposal unacceptable, including on security grounds; it
was also counter to the practice followed in previous trips
of all three representatives riding in their own vehicles all
the way to Tskhinvali.

SOUTH OSSETIAN SOLDIERS SHOOT AT ONE EUMM PATROL, THREATEN
ANOTHER


6. (C) On May 1, an EUMM patrol approached the administrative
boundary line between Dvani (on the Georgian-controlled side)
and Muguti (on the South Ossetian side). A South Ossetian
soldier stationed at a post on the South Ossetian side of the
boundary, who appeared to be drunk, pointed his weapon at the
patrol and fired five shots, none of which hit the patrol's
vehicle. According to Haber, this was the first time an EUMM
patrol had been "directly targeted." (Note: Post is aware of
other incidents of shots being fired toward EUMM patrols (ref
B); it is not entirely clear what distinction Haber sees
between such incidents and the May 1 attack. End Note.) No
one was hurt, and the patrol was not sure how close the shots
came to their vehicle, but it immediately withdrew.
Considering the incident an "isolated case" (i.e., the act of
a single inebriated soldier, not a directed or coordinated
attack),the EUMM decided not to make it public. When an
EUMM patrol approached the same location on May 8, five South
Ossetian soldiers took up firing positions, with one directly
pointing an RPK rifle at the patrol. The patrol disengaged.
Three hours later another EUMM patrol returned with the Gori
EUMM chief to view the area. The South Ossetians again
appeared threatening, and the patrol took video of the
incident and the positions f the South Ossetians.

AND NOW FOR THE GOOD COP


7. (C) EUMM set up a meeting with Russian Colonel Tarasov on
May 12 to discuss the May 8 incident, bringing with them the
videotape of the threatening behavior. Also in attendance
was Chochiev, who took the EUMM delegation by surprise by
stating that the behavior of the South Ossetians had been a
mistake, the incident would be reviewed, and any individuals
found to have violated rules would be reprimanded. He traced
the threatening reaction of his troops to an incident earlier
in the day, when a Georgian police Cobra APC had allegedly
approached the checkpoint in a threatening manner before
departing; he explained that the EUMM vehicle was mistaken
for a Georgian COBRA. The EUMM gave the South Ossetians a
Qfor a Georgian COBRA. The EUMM gave the South Ossetians a
copy of the video, who promised to study it further. EUMM
noted to the diplomatic corps on May 14 that the attitude on
the other side of the table was quite constructive during the
meeting, and the South Ossetians also shared details about
the introduction of Russian FSB border guards to the boundary
line. They stated that the Russians might select new
positions to guard the boundary, as well as possibly
construct new border posts as they deemed appropriate. Apart
from an unacceptable South Ossetian request to have prior
notification from the EUMM as to their patrols, EUMM
officials characterized the meeting as "very different" from
the past.

COMMENT: ACTIONS, NOT WORDS


8. (C) Certainly a more constructive attitude in meetings
would be welcome. Even if we accept the May 1 and 8
incidents as isolated aberrations, however, the recent snubs
to the Geneva co-chairs and the JIPRM participants, which
exceeded even the South Ossetians' own impressive level of
obstructionism, would seem to be a more reliable indicator of
their current attitude toward cooperation with the

TBILISI 00000923 003 OF 003


international community. The regularity of security
incidents has actually decreased considerably in recent days,
a trend OSCE monitors trace to the presence of Russian border
guards, for one of two reasons: either they have in fact
established a more secure environment, or the Russians, South
Ossetians and Abkhaz want the world to believe they can (and
have therefore backed off the mischief). The South Ossetians
may well want to convey such a message right now, in the
context of the OSCE discussions and the upcoming Geneva
talks, in order to suggest that Russia has effectively
established security. In any case, it seems that the South
Ossetians are feeling more secure with their Russian friends
along the boundary, and therefore less obliged to make any
concessions to the international community. As discussed in
ref C, they -- and the Russians -- see no downside to their
stance.
TEFFT