GEORGIA: EU DISCUSSIONS REGARDING EUMM'S FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000908

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: EU DISCUSSIONS REGARDING EUMM'S FUTURE

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment. According to EU Monitoring
Mission (EUMM) Head of Mission Haber, EU member states do not
have a clear vision of the EUMM in the future. The mission
will almost surely be extended for a year, but some elements
in the EU would prefer to see it end at that point. Assuming
the OSCE's closure, they have a vague notion that the UN
would then take over monitoring duties for all of Georgia,
including both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Haber suggested
that EU member states were content to allow the EU itself to
take the lead on Georgia issues and avoid active bilateral
engagement with Russia on Georgia, an approach which reduces
pressure on Russia and consequently on South Ossetian de
facto authorities. He said he was pleased to sense that
Georgia, feeling supported by the EU's continued presence and
firm non-recognition policy, was less paranoid about Russian
aggression and more open to creative approaches to
engagement. Considering questions about the UN presence and
the EU's long-term commitment, however, Haber suggested it
was worth thinking about the long-term structure of
protecting Georgia's security and territorial integrity. As
we think about the way forward, we will need to track all
these issues closely with the EU itself and individual member
states. Interestingly, key EU member state Ambassadors in
Tbilisi have cautioned us several times that Haber is more
concerned about the EU's long-term presence that most member
states. End summary and comment.


2. (C) In a May 5 meeting with the Ambassador, EUMM Head of
Mission Hansjoerg Haber raised a number of issues on the
future of the EU, as well as the overall international
presence, in Georgia. He reported that EU High
Representative Solana had rather abruptly cut off recent
discussions in Brussels on the topic, as he did not want to
focus on EUMM's future until after a decision was made on a
new UN mandate. Although Haber thought that holding off on
the discussion until June was acceptable, he warned that
there was sentiment among some (unnamed) EU members states
that the EU should extend the EUMM for only one more year,
then allow the UN to take over. An assumption underlying
this attitude is that the OSCE mission to Georgia will close,
and the UN will somehow be in a position to take over for the
OSCE in South Ossetia. Haber said that High Representative
Solana, who is somewhat under the influence of the EU's
representation in New York, may also prefer to cede
leadership on Georgia to the UN. He said it would therefore
be important for the EU to engage in a serious conversation
about the EUMM's future after the UN mandate is resolved.


3. (C) Haber noted that some (again unnamed) EU states were
also content to cede leadership on Georgia policy to the EU
and avoid active bilateral engagement with Russia on Georgia.
He raised the example of the EUMM's MOU with the Georgian
Ministry of Defense. The EUMM has made a series of public
statements about the MOU, praising Georgia for its consistent
adherence, while explicitly noting the lack -- and the
potential usefulness -- of a similar agreement covering the
other side of the administrative boundaries. Individual EU
states, however, have not followed suit. Haber warned that
Qstates, however, have not followed suit. Haber warned that
this lack of bilateral engagement reduced the pressure on
Russia -- and by extension on South Ossetian de facto
authorities.


4. (C) Haber contrasted some of the attitudes within the EU
with those in Georgia. He was pleased to note that the
situation on the ground has improved somewhat, with the
Georgian government no longer paranoid about additional
Russian military action. He also considered Minister for
Reintegration Yakobashvili's seemingly sincere discussions
about the possibility of engagement with the breakaway
regions as positive. Although the EUMM's lack of access to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia was a primary issue in the frst
months of the mission's operation, Haber no longer receives
constant questions about when the monitors will get in. He
thought Georgia had become comfortable with the combination
of the EU's firm policy of non-recognition of the two
breakaway regions and its monitoring mission, even to the
point of not being overly concerned about the OSCE's future.
He even thought Georgia's tough line in the UN negotiations
was enabled by its faith in the EUMM. Nevertheless, this
attitude on the part of the Georgians assumes that the EUMM
will be here for the long haul -- and, as Haber pointed out,
this assumption may not be well-founded.


5. (C) Although Haber admitted that the security environment

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has improved, he suggested that purely military circumstances
made up only about 60 percent of overall stability -- with
status issues, which of course remain completely unresolved,
making up the remainder. On that note, Haber suggested that
Russia has adopted the practice of ignoring what it has
agreed to. He also reported that Foreign Minister Vashadze
told him recently that Russia has a consistent strategy of
moving itself into the position of mediator, rather than
party to the conflict.

COMMENT, PART 1: NOTHING IS SETTLED


6. (C) Haber requested the meeting with the Ambassador,
something he rarely does, to deliver the above messages, so
they are worth taking seriously. Furthermore, Haber travels
to Brussels frequently to consult with EU leadership, and his
sense of the mood there is at least credible. In addition to
the uncertain future of the OSCE and UN missions in Georgia,
according to Haber, the EU is also unsure about a long-term
commitment to the EUMM in supporting Georgia's territorial
integrity. Although, as Haber rightly pointed out, the focus
right now should be on the OSCE and UN negotiations, it will
be important to track the EU's attitude closely, especially
if the OSCE and/or UN missions are blocked. Whenever Haber
raises these points in the presence of EU Ambassadors,
however, as he has done on several occasions at the weekly
EUMM briefings for the diplomatic corps, several key EU
Ambassadors have approached us quietly to caution that this
is a particular concern of Ambassador Haber rather than a
problem for the EU or EU member states.

COMMENT, PART 2: THE EU HAS ITS ROLE, BUT SO DO MEMBER STATES


7. (C) Haber's comments about the willingness of individual
EU member states to yield to the EU on Georgia policy -- and
their consequent unwillingness to tackle Georgia issues
head-on with Russia -- are especially telling. Although the
EU clearly has a very important role to play, especially in
sponsoring the EUMM, its member states do too. So far
Russia, and in turn the Abkhaz and South Ossetians, have
suffered very little from their ongoing flouting of the
cease-fire, even with the EUMM, OSCE and UN all providing
consistent evidence of those violations. Effective promotion
of U.S. policy, especially in regard to Russia's role in
Georgia, will require not only coordination with the EU, but
encouragement of its component members to engage actively on
a bilateral basis.
TEFFT