GEORGIA: NINO BURJANADZE FROM THE OUTSIDE LOOKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000089

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: NINO BURJANADZE FROM THE OUTSIDE LOOKING
IN

REF: TBILISI 55

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary/Comment: The transition from being Speaker
of Parliament and interim President to being one of many in a
marginalized non-Parliamentary opposition has been a
difficult one for Nino Burjanadze. Burjanadze has been
unable to garner much more than a meager level of public
support since her move to the non-Parliamentary opposition.
Her former UNM allies simply ignore her. A reluctance to
work with potential non-Parliamentary opposition members
unless they agree to support her has not been well received
by her potential political allies. Many non-Parliamentary
opposition leaders openly speak about their dislike for her.
Both in public and in private, Burjanadze has become
increasingly radical, joining opposition calls for
Saakashvili's resignation and early elections. Burjanadze
has fallen into the unenviablepolitical position of sounding
like a radical non-Parliamentary opposition member without
the benefit of having their support. Some of her friends and
moderate supporters have expressed their regret at taking a
more confrontational path. Increasingly walling herself off
among her core group of supporters, Burjanadze seems
unwilling to accept that her position in the political
landscape has fundamentally changed, leaving us to wonder if
we are seeing the beginning of the end for a Georgian
political titan. End Summary/Comment.

Move to Opposition - A Political Blunder?


2. (C) In many ways, Burjanadze's move to the
non-Parliamentary opposition could not have been scripted
more poorly. By leaving the UNM in April 2008 and not
running independently for Parliament, she effectively cut
herself out of the political debate. Not running for
Parliament has the added effect of disqualifying her from
receiving public political party funds, though she is now
likely eligible for the limited political party development
funds from the government. Tbilisi Mayor and UNM stalwart,
Gigi Ugulava told the Ambassador that her move was not well
thought out and that her natural political space would be in
the moderate Parliamentary opposition. Ugulava feels that
had she stayed in Parliament, she would be polling around 20%
rather than the 3% she currently garners. (Embassy Note:
Ugulava is citing a recent Quinlan, Greenberg, and Rosner
poll commissioned by the UNM. End Note.) Outflanked by
Giorgi Targamadze, whose Christian Democratic Party (CDM) is
filling that void in parliament, Burjanadze is finding that
her natural constituency has migrated elsewhere. Ugulava
believes that she is making her political decisions,
including the cutting of ties with UNM and espousing radical
political views that are not her own, on the bad advice of
her father and husband. When the Ambassador asked Burjanadze
about CDM's apparent success as a moderate opposition party,
she dismissed Targamadze as nothing more than a creation of
Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili. While well respected
both in Georgia and on the international scene during her
time as a parliamentarian, Burjanadze has little experience
as a grass roots politician, something Ugulava was quick to
highlight. In effect, the timing and nature of her departure
from government left her only one choice when she decided to
return to politics, the non-Parliamentary opposition.

I'm Here, Now Follow Me!


3. (C) Numerous non-Parliamentary leaders can hardly
withhold their disdain for Burjanadze (mirroring the private
disdain she has for most of them). Although some more
Qdisdain she has for most of them). Although some more
moderate non-Parliamentary groups attempted to reach out to
Burjanadze (notably New Rights and Republicans),these
political leaders tell us that Burjanadze views cooperation
as a one way street. Poloff has been told repeatedly that
Burjanadze will only discuss political cooperation with
potential allies if they agree in advance to support her for
President or as the head of any Parliamentary ticket. Thus
far, nobody has taken her up on her "offer". Irakli Alasania
would seem to be a natural political fit as an ally, but thus
far also seems to be interested in being at the top of his
own ticket. Other than Burjanadze, her party consists of no
notable names and nobody who brings with them any obvious
constituency or funding base. Kakha Kukava (Conservatives)
claimed to Poloff that Burjanadze had called "half of
Tbilisi," but nobody was willing to join her party. Another
commentator said the one common theme among those in
Burjanadze's party is they are all a "former" something or
other. A local staff member asked an acquaintance, Manana
Salukvadze, who was working for UNDP why she joined
Burjanadze's party. She replied that the salary Burjanadze
offered was very high.


4. (C) We anticipate that Burjanadze would have had

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difficulty winning over the leaders of the non-Parliamentary
opposition, even had she been more willing to treat them as
equals. The most radical non-Parliamentary opposition such
as Kukava, Eka Beselia (United Georgia),Koba Davitashvili
(Party of People),and others disliked her when she was with
the UNM, something which has not changed. Kukava, Beselia,
and Zurab Tkemaladze (Industrialists) (as well as others)
have told Poloff that Burjanadze uses her relationship with
U.S. and European officials to intimate that she has foreign
support for her party. Each of them told Poloff that
Burjanadze's camp is behind pushing rumors that she is the
U.S. choice to replace Saakashvili (reftel). Only Tkemaladze
had anything positive to say about Burjanadze, commenting
that she might have some chance to lead a multi-party,
non-Parliamentary opposition group, but only if she radically
changed her attitude towards the members of the group.
Apparently the dislike is mutual; Burjanadze has never
indicated she would ever work with the more radical parties.
Although Burjanadze cooperated closely with New Rights and
Republican leaders in formulating her approach to the
November 7, 2008, anniversary protest (they all eventually
decided not to participate),she made harsh derogatory
remarks about New Rights leader David Gamkrelidze at a lunch
with the Ambassador. Ironically, the only member of the
non-Parliamentary opposition Burjanadze now appears open to
working with is long time rival and nemesis, former Foreign
Minister Salome Zourabashvili.

UNM Does Not Return My Calls - With Misha, It's Personal


5. (C) Burjanadze complained at length to the Ambassador
about the unfair, vindictive, and generally terrible
treatment she receives from her former allies. Her
complaints range from being unable to use the VIP entrance at
the opera, to a recent GOG dcision to discontinue providing
her a government car and security staff. Even though former
PMs Gurgenidze, Noghaideli, Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava, and
Presidential Chief of Staff Eka Sharashidze lost similar
perks, Burjanadze told the Ambassador that her protection is
required by law as a former acting President and that this is
an illustration that Saakashvili is out to punish her. She
appears generally surprised and upset that some people no
longer take her calls or seek her advice. During her lunch
with the Ambassador she repeatedly called Saakashvili an
undemocratic authoritarian. Burjanadze cited as evidence
that there is a lack of free media that she recently had
given four TV interviews, of which only a portion of one
interview aired. The Ambassador politely challenged her on a
number of sweeping statements to little avail. Burjanadze
even went so far as to say the Russians want Saakashvili to
remain President.

Painted Into a Corner


6. (C) A large portion of Burjanadze's initial appeal as a
potential opposition leader was her reputation as a calm,
thoughtful moderate who was a well-known representative of
Georgia on the international scene. Now the difference
between Burjanadze's rhetoric and the most radical
non-Parliamentary opposition member is negligible if any.
She has joined them in repeating the non-Parliamentary
opposition line, calling for new elections and leveling a
constant stream of criticism of President Saakashvili. She
has neither articulated her party's stance, nor so far had
much success in developing her foundation. Burjanadze's
numbers in the latest NDI poll (choice for Parliament 3% -
Party favorable 10%, unfavorable 30% - Personal favorable 30%
QParty favorable 10%, unfavorable 30% - Personal favorable 30%
like, 42% dislike) are not encouraging especially since her
personal favorability numbers have dropped precipitously
since announcing her own party and joining the
non-Parliamentary opposition. Without a consistent funding
source other than her family's wealth and without a party
platform, Burjanadze appears to be counting on her push for
new elections to keep her in the news. This may be tough
however, since pre-term parliamentary elections appear
extremely unlikely to occur, and the chance of pre-term
Presidential elections in the near term is next to nil.

What Is Her Future


7. (C) Comment. Although Burjanadze might be down in the
polls, we don't count her out. However, her near to mid-term
political future is cloudy. If she stakes out a position on
the issues and begins to engage in the substantive debate
(which we have encouraged her to do),she may regain some
lost ground. Another option would be for her to accept a
partnership or a secondary role in a political movement;
Irakli Alasania and others would certainly listen, but there
is no sign that Burjanadze is ready for that. She admitted
to the Ambassador that spending time in fashionable cafes in
the Vake section of Tbilisi, listening to people tell her
what she wants to hear is of limited benefit. Burjanadze

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also told the Ambassador that she is considering
participating in IRI-sponsored political party development
seminars (something that Christian Democrat leader Targamadze
credits for having helped him establish a real political
party). At the same time, she makes little attempt to hide
her disdain for retail campaigning, which only serves to
reinforce the negative stereotype held by much of the
population at large that she is a leader of an out-of-touch
elite. Unless she starts to do the ground work necessary to
build a party, probably having to spend her own funds to do
so, it is difficult to see how Burjanadze's party can survive
until the next round of elections (next scheduled at the
local level for 2010). Although her extensive resume will no
doubt continue to open doors and guarantee media interest, as
of right now, Burjanadze finds herself in a place she never
thought imaginable -- just another member of the
non-Parliamentary opposition.
TEFFT