GEORGIA: DFM NALBANDOV ON UN, OSCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000843

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019
TAGS: PREL OSCE GR RS KZ GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DFM NALBANDOV ON UN, OSCE

REF: A. TBILISI 760

B. TBILISI 821

TBILISI 00000843 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Nalbandov
summoned the Ambassador April 29 to request further U.S. help
in encouraging the UN Secretary General to title his report
"Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia." He also identified
particular redlines for Georgia in the negotiations for a new
UN mandate or UNSC resolution: the language must retain
reference to Georgia's territorial integrity; the six-point
cease-fire agreement is the only document in force and
therefore needs to be referenced; and the Geneva process is
the only operating venue for talks and must be affirmed. He
added that Georgia opposed any appearance in New York by
Abkhaz de facto "government" representatives. Regarding the
May 18-19 meeting of the Geneva process, Nalbandov said
Georgia sought a plenary session. In connection with the
OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference in June, Nalbandov
explained Georgia's position regarding the agenda language.
The Ambassador agreed to convey Georgia's concerns to the
Department. End summary.

UN NEGOTIATIONS


2. (C) Following up earlier comments (ref A),Nalbandov
restated Georgia's request that the United States encourage
the UN Secretary General (UNSYG) to title the upcoming report
something along the lines of "Situation in Abkhazia,
Georgia." Nalbandov said he had the impression that the
UNSYG himself would be deciding on the title, so it would be
important to convey our encouragement directly to him or his
staff.


3. (C) Nalbandov also listed some of Georgia's redlines in
the negotiation of a new UN mandate and resolution, although
he cautioned this was not necessarily an exhaustive list.
First, a resolution must retain reference to Georgia's
territorial integrity. That reference would preferably be
explicit, but at the very least must be via citation of
earlier resolutions (such as UNSCR 808) that use the phrase.
Second, the August 12, 2008 six-point cease-fire agreement,
as the only agreement relating to the conflict still in
force, must also receive reference. Third, any resolution
must also make reference to the Geneva process, which is the
only functioning venue for international negotiations.
Nalbandov noted that the inclusion of the internally
displaced persons issue within the framework of the Geneva
process was one reason it was so important to Georgia.


4. (C) In his final point about the UN process, Nalbandov
reiterated Georgia's opposition to any involvement or
appearance by the Abkhaz in the discussions in New York, in a
formal or informal capacity, including an Arria-style meeting.

GENEVA AND OSCE


5. (C) Nalbandov told the Ambassador that Georgia supported
the holding of a plenary session at the May 18-19 session of
the Geneva process. He noted that the Abkhaz de facto
"government" representatives have still not committed to
participating, but the holding of a plenary session is more
important to Georgia than the participation of the Abkhaz.
He said Georgia had communicated this preference to EU
Special Envoy Pierre Morel.


6. (C) Nalbandov also offered an explanation of Georgia's
position on the agenda for the OSCE's Annual Security Review
Conference (ASRC),to be held in June (ref B). After
QConference (ASRC),to be held in June (ref B). After
reviewing the history of the negotiations over the text,
Nalbandov noted two key points for Georgia. First, the
language that Georgia originally proposed, "with special
focus on the armed conflict in August 2008," used text
approved by the entire OSCE at the Helsinki Ministerial in
November 2008, and should therefore be non-controversial.
Second, Georgia is concerned that, if the language does not
unambiguously refer to the Georgia-Russia war, the 2010
chairman-in-office of the OSCE -- Kazakhstan -- could have an
easier time avoiding a discussion of the war when it sets the
agenda for the 2010 ASRC. (Nalbandov added that this second
issue is very sensitive, and he would not want it discussed
openly.) Thus, Georgia would be willing to accept a
compromise along the lines of "with special focus on the one
(conflict, a word used earlier in the sentence) that took
place after the 2008 ASRC," but the current Greek version --
"with special focus on serious developments that led to the

TBILISI 00000843 002.2 OF 002


deterioration of the security situation since the 2008 ASRC"
-- left too much room for future avoidance of the August 2008
war itself.
TEFFT