Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI82
2009-01-15 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: MOD CLOSE TO SIGNING MOU WITH EUMM

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG 
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0768
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0165
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4758
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2238
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000082 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MOD CLOSE TO SIGNING MOU WITH EUMM

REF: A. 08 TBILISI 2118

B. 08 TBILISI 2458

C. STATE 3291

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000082

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MOD CLOSE TO SIGNING MOU WITH EUMM

REF: A. 08 TBILISI 2118

B. 08 TBILISI 2458

C. STATE 3291

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 5.


2. (C) Summary and comment. On January 14, Deputy Defense
Minister Giorgi Muchaidze summoned PolOff and Acting DATT to
explain the government's position on a draft agreement with
the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and seek U.S. comment. The
Ministry is ready to sign, but is awaiting a response from
the EUMM on a few proposed changes. According to the
agreement, the Ministry voluntarily agrees to limit military
activity in zones around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to
inform the EUMM of all significant tactical exercises. The
two sides have agreed on the basic parameters of the
agreement, including the definition of the zones. The major
change proposed by the Ministry is to split the agreement in
two, with one greement on South Ossetia and one on Abkhazia;
it is prepared to sign the South Ossetia agreement now, but
wants to wait on the Abkhazia agreement pending a decision by
February 15 on the future of the UN Observer Mission to
Georgia (UNOMIG). Post does not see any major disadvantage
for Georgia in signing and sees potential political benefit
if we can work with the EU to use the agreement to put
pressure on Russia to follow suit. Post requests Department
guidance on responding to the Georgian request for U.S.
comment. End summary and comment.

THE SHAPE OF THE AGREEMENT


3. (C) Muchaidze, along with Head of the Ministry's
Analytical Department David Nardaia (who worked on the text),
summoned EmbOffs to present the latest draft of the proposed
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated between the
Ministry of Defense and the EUMM (draft text emailed to
EUR/CARC). The two-page document takes as its point of
departure the Six-Point Agreement (August 12 cease-fire),in
particular Georgia's commitment as part of that agreement to
"abstain from recourse to the use of force." The MOU bars
the Ministry from "any significant movement or re-deployment
of its units of Battalion strength or greater and all

artillery and mortars with a calibre of 120mm or more, and
more than 5 armoured vehicles with a calibre more than 60mm
but less than 120mm" in zones around the conflict areas. It
commits the Ministry to informing the EUMM of any "tactical
exercises . . . larger than a Battalion in strength" at least
48 hours in advance, and it allows the EUMM to visit "the
sites of permanent dislocations of MOD armed forces" with
24-hour prior notice. The declaration of a state of
emergency by the government automatically terminates the
agreement. Also, either party can terminate the agreement
with one week's notice (this provision has not been agreed to
by the EUMM, but the Ministry does not expect it to be
controversial.) Once signed, the MOU will be made public.

THE ZONES


4. (C) The zone around South Ossetia, already agreed by both
sides, is defined most precisely on a map annex to the MOU.
It is a rough rectangle surrounding South Ossetia, defined on
the west by a straight north-south line running through Oni
and Sachkere, on the south by a line roughly following but
just north of the east-west-highway, and on the east by the
Mchadidjvari-Dusheti-Ananuri Road and the Georgian Military
QMchadidjvari-Dusheti-Ananuri Road and the Georgian Military
Highway. Significantly it does not include the east-west
highway or the Military Highway themselves.


5. (C) The zone around Abhazia is a 15 kilometer-wide band
opposite the Abkhaz side of the administrative boundary.
Although the EUMM had originally proposed a 20 kilometer
band, the Ministry decided the extra five kilometers would
create an unacceptable delay for responses to attacks at the
boundary. Muchaidze noted specific concern over the portions
of land outside Abkhazia but north of the Enguri River near
Gahmukhuri and Khurcha (see ref B). The extra five
kilometers would also include the port of Kulevi, which the
Ministry likewise found unacceptable. Although it is in
principle ready to accept this zone, the Ministry has decided
to reserve its final decision until a decision on the future
of UNOMIG is made.

HEY PARTNER -- WHAT DO YOU THINK?

TBILISI 00000082 002 OF 002




5. (C) Muchaidze said the Ministry is ready to sign the
document immediately, pending the EUMM's response to its
proposed changes (in particular the proposal to split the MOU
in two). He added, however, the Ministry wanted to inform
the United States, as Georgia's new strategic partner (ref
C),of the pending agreement and seek any comments and
recommendations that the U.S. might have, to include whether
or not to sign the agreement. Post therefore requests
Department guidance on a suitable response. Paragraphs 6-8
contain post's thoughts.

COMMENT -- MORE PLUSES THAN MINUSES


6. (C) Any country would naturally pause before unilaterally
and voluntarily limiting its own sovereign right to deploy
its defense forces anywhere on its own territory at any time,
without having to inform anyone. Nevertheless, Georgia faces
unusual circumstances, including the presence of nearly 8,000
(and possibly more) foreign troops on its own territory, and
it seems to understand that there are potential benefits to
showing flexibility to prevent further violence and
ultimately promote a peaceful resolution of the current
situation. There is a risk that domestic political critics
will portray the MOU -- and its (largely symbolic)
relinquishing of sovereignty -- as a sign of weakness. The
government seems to have determined that any limitations this
MOU places on the Ministry, along with any domestic political
risks, will be offset by the potential gains in cooperation
with the EUMM and the broader international community.


7. (C) Furthermore, an analysis of the limitations accepted
by the Ministry indicates that, in practice, the Ministry is
not imposing on itself any truly onerous requirements.
Although battalion-strength units and artillery above 120mm
are barred from the zones, smaller units and artillery are
not, and the zones are sufficiently narrow to allow rapid
movements of the larger units and equipment if necessary.
Additionally, in an extreme situation, the government can
cancel the agreement. Finally, as a non-binding MOU, the
agreement does not impose any legal constraints on the
Ministry; only political ones. If a situation arose in which
the Ministry felt it had to cancel or even beach the terms
of the agreement, the government would probably be facing
larger political concerns than its good terms with the EUMM.


8. (C) Post believes that the potential benefits to Georgia
outweigh the potential risks. For Georgia to reap those
benefits, however, the EUMM will need to approach Russia with
a proposal for a similar agreement on the Abkhaz and South
Ossetia sides of the boundaries -- and share with the
international community Russia's response. According to
Muchaidze, the EUMM has already proposed such an arrangement
with Russia, and the latter responded with a completely
unacceptable counter-proposal that would commit Russia only
to informing the EUMM of any movements outside Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. (The EUMM has not informed post of such a
proposal to the Russians.) Although the MOU's risks for
Georgia are minimal on an operational level, it does
represent a restriction on Georgia's own sovereignty, and it
does therefore carry domestic political risks. Georgia's
flexibility deserves recognition, as does its re-commitment
to the non-use of force -- a concession the Russians, South
Qto the non-use of force -- a concession the Russians, South
Ossetians and Abkhaz seem unable to provide. If we recommend
that Georgia sign this MOU, we should be ready to take the
steps necessary to help Georgia reap the rewards.
TEFFT